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Policies are usually initiated in response to specific circumstances, but they do
not become effective unless they are embedded in operating institutions.
Understanding the historical process through which policies evolve is essential for
assessing their character and their consequence.  This study is a detailed history of the
US bioweapons program from its inception to the present.  It is an original analysis
based on archival documents and scientific reports.  The issue is, does the application
of national security measures such as the classification of scientific programs improve
biodefense?
Initial organization of the US bioweapons program as a secret, military
program that performed threat assessment work (1941-1969) led to the development
and stockpiling of biological weapons for deterrence, but few medical defenses.  A
strategic review in 1969 concluded that bioweapons were not useful for legitimate
military missions and did not enhance US deterrence. It also concluded that
proliferation threatened the US.  To reduce proliferation, the US destroyed its
bioweapons arsenal and enforced the norm against bioweapons acquisition by signing
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972.  Subsequent
organization of the US biodefense program was as an unclassified military medical
research program.  This work at the US Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) improved medical countermeasures without a
concomitant classified, offensive program. However, in response to the terrorist
attacks of 2001, the US is again imposing secrecy over important aspects of its
biodefense work, including its threat assessment work.  Based on the analysis here,
current policy will increase the risk to US security by both enlarging the threat space
and reducing defensive options.
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“The unleashing of the power of the atom has changed everything but our modes of
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Chapter 1:  Management of the Bioterrorist Threat
“Problems are not solved at the same level of awareness that
created them.” – Einstein
Biological weapons are excellent terrorist weapons, but are not effective for
legitimate military missions.  That was the original judgment of the US in the first
few decades of the twentieth century.  During World War II, the accuracy of that
assessment was challenged through an intense BW R&D program that grew through
the 1950s and 1960s.  The original justification for the US BW program was defense
against presumed enemy BW programs: the result was a stockpile of biological
weapons.  Driving this outcome was the argument that understanding of offensive
BW potential was critical to development of defenses. However, when the US
terminated its BW program in 1969, it had not produced or stockpiled adequate
medical countermeasures.  Current policy in reaction to the 2001 terrorist events is
applying the same logic – and expecting the opposite outcome. Instead, US policy
should evolve out of the predominantly open and defensive medical research program
that has existed since 1969 to manage the bioweapons threat.  That was a robust,
unclassified scientific R&D program based at the US Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID): it developed important medical
defense against the most virulent bioagents known.
The Approach
This study reviews the history of the US policy with respect to biological
weapons.  It is a review of the judgments made in 1942 that led the US to create its
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own biological weapons program and those made in 1969 when the judgment was
made to terminate the offensive part of the program and restrict itself to defensive
investigations.   There is very little published about the policy discussions that led to
the origins of the US BW program.  There is less about the US biodefense program
after 1969.
No information that is not publicly available was used in this study.  The
information presented to establish the context for the US BW program’s origins
comes from the archives of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).  There are
extensive records from the NAS committees that argued for the establishment of the
US BW program.
The work at USAMRIID after 1969 receives at most a passing reference in
every work published about the US biodefense program.  There is literally no
published history of this effort that describes the work performed at USAMRIID
despite the fact that it was unclassified.  A major effort was made to locate a complete
set of Annnual Reports published by USAMIID: these contain summaries of the
scientific work done there.  There is no single library outside of USAMRIID that has
every published year and the USAMRIID library is not accessible without a security
clearance and does not lend materials to other libraries.  There is reason, therefore, to
believe that the nearly complete set assembled for this dissertation (only FY1983 and
FY1984 are omitted because they were not published) is the only one of its kind
outside of Ft. Detrick.  The extensive summaries provided in Appendix A and the
tables in Appendices B, C, and D are based on an exhaustive reading of every
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scientific report in every USAMRIID Annual Report from 1969-1990.  This is,
therefore, the first detailed account of USAMRIID’s work ever published.
Through these original contributions, a more informed discussion about
biodefense policy is now possible.
Broader Issues
Fundamentally, this study deals with the benefits and risks of secrecy and of
transparency in security policy.  Biotechnology is currently a prominent area of
concern, but it is only a single example of the kinds of security challenges countries
will face as technologies evolve seemingly ever more rapidly.  Practices in other areas
are adjusting to the way technology is altering their operations.  How we understand
the requirements of national security may also require changes in practice.
In the midst of an evolving global dynamic, policymakers are faced with the
need to make security decisions under complexity – a circumstance recognized years
ago.1  This complexity is extended in the case of biotechnology because of its
application to predominately medical research and not to the creation of novel
weaponry.  Decisions about how to manage scientific work will affect the
development of both areas of research and, ultimately, the security of the US.
Wolfgang Reinicke explored the need for public policy to evolve in ways
commensurate with the challenge.  In his book, Global Public Policy, he
characterizes the challenge well:
Dual-use technologies are not “destabilizing” in themselves – their military
application is.  A regime based on denial has to assume that dual-use
technologies are destabilizing because it has no means of verifying how they
                                                
1 John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 21.
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are used.  Although this was a reasonable policy maxim during the era of
bipolar conflict, the end of the cold war and in particular the advent of
globalization have made a denial-based regime, except with regard to a few
highly sensitive technologies, unrealistic and unwise in light of other pressing
global issues.  Rapid technological evolution, borderless communication, and
continued liberalization of international economic transactions make efforts to
establish criteria to proscribe transfers a waste of time and resources, creating
a false sense of security.  As an alternative, disclosure-based regulation
coupled with public-private partnerships represents a regime in and of itself,
and not just a data support structure, although such a structure is no doubt an
important element in overcoming information asymmetry – an issue that
regulation by denial does not even attempt to address.  Under a disclosure-
based regime, dual-use technologies would be “stabilized” by disclosing their
application, ensuring adherence to agreed-upon standards.  In addition,
stability established through disclosure is qualitatively superior to stability
established through denial.  Disclosure-based regulation not only has a better
chance of preventing market failure (that is, proliferation), but also permits
other interests – public and private – associated with dual-use trade to be
realized, thus responding to their changing weight in framing the debate on
this global policy issue.2
This approach to security is not generally understood.  Much of what is
generally believed about national security still rests on notions of deterrence and
models based on the interaction of sovereign states seeking security through the
protection of their own borders.  Globalization is challenging the ability of states to
ensure their own security through traditional methods of national security.  One
definition of globalization is, “an ‘unbundling’ of the relationship between
sovereignty, territoriality, and state power.”3  Given the transformational changes in
the way the world operates, strategies going forward must adapt.  Recently, more
studies of the effects of and policy responses to globalization have been published.
                                                
2 Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing without Government? (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 1998): 198-199.
3 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations:
Politicsl, Economics and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1999), 8.
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The notions of national and military security are undergoing a significant
transformation as the emphasis shifts to cooperative or multilateral defence
and security mechanisms, and the security agenda expands to incorporate a
multiplicity of threats from the environmental to the cultural.  This reflects the
increasingly overlapping fortunes of national communities of fate.4
The importance of globalization for security policy is clear.  Biotechnology
can be used by any state for the improvement of its medical research.  It can also be
used to create weapons.  Preventing the military application of biotechnology is
crucial and likely requires the cooperation of all states.
Crafting an appropriate policy response to the threat of biological weapons
requires an understanding of the history of policy in this area, the characteristics of
the threat, and the characteristics of the tools that will likely work to prevent
catastrophe.
Since overwhelming retribution cannot be inflicted on an opponent that cannot
be identified, it has to be assumed that the problem escapes the bounds of
deterrent policy.  The natural threat certainly does.  Moreover, since access
cannot be restricted by standard methods of security classification and
physical isolation, direct preventive protection has to be based on different
methods than those developed for nuclear materials and chemical agents…. In
combination, natural and deliberate sources of biological threat constitute
powerful pressure for innovation in security policy.5
Generally, a balance needs to be struck between the conduct of military and
law enforcement operations and the control of infectious diseases generally.  There
are actually sharp trade-offs between the policy principles and institutional practices
of these two communities. Starkly put, the alternatives are secrecy vs. transparency.
                                                
4 Ibid., 136.
5 John D. Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution Press,
2000), 179.
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National security measures are designed to clearly identify a threat and
countermeasures to it.  The nature of the work lends itself to secrecy.  Intelligence
collection and threat assessment work generates information that is classified.
Revelation of such would compromise national security by revealing the very dangers
the US seeks to prevent.  Such information, unfortunately, does not remain secret
forever.  At numerous times in US history, highly consequential information has been
acquired by foreign governments.  Nonetheless, the tendency is to seek to control
access to materials and information and to identify vulnerabilities.  The logic of this
approach to national security is simple and intuitive.  In the case of biological
weapons, however, it has been shown to be counterproductive.
The basis for classifying information has been at the prerogative of the
Executive Branch.  There is no clear statutory authority for the protection of military
and state secrets.  Instead, “the authority of the Presidency itself has been the
principal basis for the entire network of security classification, with the possible
exception of the Atomic Energy Act.”6  President Franklin Roosevelt is credited with
developing the specific criteria used to classify documents: he also gave the order to
found the classified US BW program in 1942.
Greater transparency is the alternative to standard national security methods.
Transparency is not meant here to be understood as making all information generated
available to every curious soul on an instantaneous basis.  There are degrees of
transparency.  However, programs structured under the presumption of transparency
are markedly different from those structured under principles of secrecy.
                                                
6 Herbert N. Foerstel, Secret Science: Federal Control of American Science and Technology
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 20.
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Transparency serves important purposes in international relations.  Perhaps its
most important role is in providing a level of reassurance among states and for the
institutionalization of norms of behavior.7  This approach was embraced by the US
after 1969 because of the need to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons.
Biotechnology is the specific case here, but other technologies, e.g.
nanotechnology, will pose very similar problems for policymakers in the nearest
future.  Articulating the general challenge and providing this historical analysis, it is
hoped, will help researchers understand how to conceptually grasp the most important
security challenges of the future.  These kinds of security threats are widely
dispersed, rapidly evolving technologies that have important beneficial applications,
but which could be misused by small numbers of individuals to put whole cities – and
possibly whole countries – at risk.
How we choose to structure biodefense policy will heavily influence the kinds
of results we can expect.  The relevant history is a guide.
A Brief History Lesson
Prior to World War II, biological weapons were considered potentially
powerful, but too unmanageable for standard military operations.  Major Leon Fox
wrote in 1933, “at the present time practically insurmountable technical difficulties
prevent the use of biologic agents as effective weapons of warfare.”8   In addition,
there was a basic repulsion to using BW, “The use of germs as a method of warfare is
                                                
7 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
8 L.A. Fox, “Bacterial warfare: the use of biologic agents in warfare.” Military Surgeon 72: 189-207,
1933 (reprinted in The Military Surgeon 90, no. 5 (May 1942).
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prohibited by a national law and would be generally regarded as a practice of the
grossest inhumanity.”9  As late as 1940, the consensus of both the US National
Institute of Health and the US Chemical Warfare Service, was that biological
weapons were most useful as sabotage weapons.10  Reports of possible Japanese and
German BW programs, however, prompted a complete reversal of opinion, leading to
the establishment of a large, secret BW program housed in a civilian agency and
devoted to surveying the full range of potential BW agents and the development of
weapons and countermeasures.
The question for the first BW committee – a group of scientists assembled by
the US National Academy of Sciences – was whether biological weapons were
technically feasible.  It was asserted that biological weapons would be a potent
addition to the US arsenal if they could be manufactured with predictable effect that
the military could control and that its use would not be governed by moral
considerations or international agreements.11  Based on the recommendations of the
committee and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, President Roosevelt approved the
                                                
9 J.E. Mills, Memo to Commanding Officer, Edgewood Arsenal (October 26, 1921). ).  National
Academy of Sciences Archive, Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 2, “Report: Exhibit
B.”
10 The progress report prepared by CWS (August 28, 1939) is cited in “Progress Report No. 54:
Biological and Bacteriological Warfare” (August 15, 1941), National Academies of Science Archive:
Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 1: “Organization and Administrative Liaison: 1941-
1942.”  The NIH opinion is reported in a Letter from R.E. Dyer, Chief, Division of Infectious
Diseases, NIH to The Surgeon General, USPHS, Bethesda, Maryland, December 16, 1940.  National
Academies of Science Archive: Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 1: “National Institute
of Health: 1941.”
11 “Report of the W.B.C. Committee” (February 19, 1942), National Academy of Sciences Archive,
Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 2, “Report: Feb 1942.”
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creation of the War Research Service (WRS) in 1942.  All information about WRS
was classified: even the order for its creation was never written down.12
Although civilian scientists pushed for the creation of a BW program and
oversaw the initial basic research, the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) asserted
exclusive control of promising biothreat agents for the purpose of weaponization.  In
1944, the civilian advisory group was almost completely excluded from the BW
program, relegated to a minor role and then disbanded a few years after the end of the
war.  After another review in 1949/1950, the Chemical Corps – formerly the CWS –
decided to invest in the creation of biological weapons for deterrence based on
promising advances in technology.  The original rationale of investigating the offense
for the purposes of creating better defenses was abandoned and deliberate acquisition
of offensive potential was pursued for its own sake.
Within a few years after the standardization of its first biological weapon, US
policy shifted from retaliation-only to first-use of lethal BW.  Incapacitants were
added to the arsenal in the 1960s to provide more options for use in limited war
scenarios.  Hundreds of field tests were conducted to assess the US vulnerability to
sabotage and to create better models for BW use.  By the close of the 1960s, the US
had standardized eight anti-personnel biological weapons and five anti-plant
weapons.  Thousands of pounds of biothreat agents were stockpiled.  “During the
                                                
12 Historical Report of the War Research Service, November 1944-Final.  National Academy of
Sciences Archive, Committees on Biological Warfare Series 4, Box 5.
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1960s… the Army showed that it had met the challenge of large-scale attack, at least
by its own calculations.”13
What is notable is the lack of physical and medical countermeasures to the
very BW agents the US weaponized.  Only the vaccines for tularemia and yellow
fever were both safe and effective against the BW form of the agent.  The LVS for
tularemia is still an IND vaccine.  The anthrax vaccine – although licensed by the
FDA – was not considered effective against all virulent strains,14 such as Ames, and
required numerous initial shots and annual boosters.  The VEE and Q fever
experimental vaccines then in the US stockpile were known to induce unacceptably
high levels of undesirable reactions, unacceptable side-effects, or both.  The
botulinum toxoid was not effective against all seven types of botulinum toxin, and
stockpiles were depleted by the early 1980s.  For SEB and Brucellosis, there is still
no human vaccine available, and immunity acquired through natural exposure to SEB
does not provide complete protection from an aerosol challenge.15  Furthermore, in
the event of a massive exposure, it remains unknown how effective any of these
vaccines would have been.
When the US chose in 1969 to unilaterally terminate its offensive BW
program, it was not because of the imbalance in the BW offense vs. defense.  Key
                                                
13 Davir R. Franz, Cheryl D. Parrott, and Ernest T. Takafuji, “the U.S. Biological Warfare and
Biological Defense Programs,” in Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest Takafuji, and David R. Franz, eds.,
Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon
General, 1997), 430.
14 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1985
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit D807 AA 011.
15 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Medical Management of Biological
Casualties Handbook, Fifth Edition (Frederick, MD: USAMRIID, 2004), 92-95.
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documents from the 1969 review remain classified.  However, one scientist testified
that the influential Presidential Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) concluded,
“our biological weapons program was a substantial threat to our own security.”16  An
Office of Systems Analysis review, DOD, concluded that lethal BW added nothing to
the US nuclear deterrent at the strategic level and BW proliferation reduced US
power when held in even small quantities by adversaries.17  Essentially, after over
twenty-five years of work that finally established the technical feasibility of BW, the
weapons were determined to hold no military value.  BW were only useful for
sabotage operations and putting powerful states at extreme risk.
Instead, BW nonproliferation became a primary goal and upholding the
international norm against such weapons the means.  The US associated itself with
the international agreement to ban biological weapons, signed the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972, and ratified the Geneva Protocol in
1975, the same year the BWC entered into force.  The US biological weapons
stockpile was destroyed by 1972 and all work after 1969 was restricted to defensive
investigations.
To carry forward US biodefense work, the US Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) was created out of the old Army
Medical Research Unit.    Volunteers from the Seventh Day Adventists had provided
most of the personnel used for human testing of BW vaccines for the previous
                                                
16 Testimony of Matthew Meselson, Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons.  Hearings
before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
US Senate 101st Congress First Session.  May 17, 1989.  Dr. Meselson was an author of the PSAC
report. (Emphasis in text is mine.)
17 Han Swyter, “Political Considerations and Analysis of Military Requirements for Chemical and
Biological Weapons,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 65, no. 1 (Jan. 15, 1970): 261-270
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decade.  However, that group was no longer available after the end of the Vietnam
War.  USAMRIID, therefore, limited itself to basic research for the development of
vaccines and therapies for biothreat agents and virulent emerging infectious diseases
like Ebola, Marburg, other viral hemorrhagic fevers, and Rift Valley Fever.  This
period of US biodefense work is not well understood because most interest in the past
US BW program was on the classified, offensive work in the pre-1969 period.18
Interest after 1969 typically shifts to international efforts to craft and enforce the
terms of the BWC.
USAMRIID’s work is informative and instructive about the effectiveness of a
biodefense program that is unclassified.  Over time, the USAMRIID research
program evolved toward greater openness and international collaboration.  Scientific
publications increased from an annual rate of about 20 to approximately 120.
USAMRIID’s unique biosafety facilities made it possible for scientists to study the
most virulent and infectious pathogens in order to develop defenses.  For this period
of time, the annual, detailed scientific reports published by USAMRIID were
consulted.  These were available from 1969-1990.19
In broad terms, USAMRIID’s work was similar to that of the medical research
community and followed general principles of public health.  The Institute of
Medicine defines public health as follows:
Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions
in which people can be healthy.  This requires that continuing and emerging
                                                
18 Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: the History of America’s Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1999), and Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005).
19 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report (Frederick,
Maryland: USAMRIID) for each fiscal year.
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threats to the health of the public be successfully countered.  These threats
include immediate crises, such as the AIDS epidemic; enduring problems,
such as injuries and chronic illness; and impending crises foreshadowed by
such developments as the toxic by-products of a modern economy.20
USAMRIID did all of these things in the context of biodefense: scientists
reacted to immediate crises, such as responding to outbreaks of novel diseases like
Ebola, Marburg, Lassa Fever, Legionnaire’s, and T-2 mycotoxins.  In addition to
reacting to sudden outbreaks of exotic diseases around the world, scientists at
USAMRIID maintained efforts to develop vaccines and therapies to “classic”
biothreat agents like anthrax, Q fever, VEE, and botulinal toxins.  Vaccines and
therapies developed at USAMRIID were sometimes field tested in or shared with
other countries where the diseases occurred naturally.  Finally, USAMRIID
maintained the research base to counter future crises such as novel biothreat agents,
by continuing to adapt new technologies to further its work and by investing in basic
research to understand pathogenesis and mechanisms of human immunity.
The record of work at USAMRIID is largely one of success despite an
extremely small budget – approximately $23 million annually in current (2006)
dollars.  Most of its effort – approximately 60% of its funding and time was spent on
vaccines and therapies.  Between 1969-1990, numerous new, experimental vaccines
were under development and some achieved IND status (full FDA licensing is
typically not feasible because the clinical human trials to establish their safety,
potency, and effectiveness cannot be performed).  New therapies, including the
antiviral drug ribavirin and the interferon-inducer poly-ICLC were tested and found
                                                
20 Institute of Medicine, The Future of Public Health (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
1988).
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effective against a wide variety of biothreat agents.  This work was helped by a strong
program of basic research which consumed approximately a third of USAMRIID’s
funding and work.  Only ten percent of USAMRIID’s work was, however, devoted to
the creation of better detection devices.
This was an unfortunate choice because it was discovered, over time, that
most biothreat agents and EID are susceptible to some form of therapy if they can be
accurately detected or diagnosed within a short period after the initial infection occurs
– often before clinical signs are present. Accurate diagnoses are difficult: even in the
midst of the anthrax attacks some victims died because of erroneous initial diagnoses.
A contributing factor to USAMRIID’s success was its work in and with other
countries.  Clinical trials with the antiviral drug ribavirin were done in collaboration
with Chinese scientists in China to treat an endemic viral hemorrhagic fever.   The
work also allowed USAMRIID scientists to test their diagnostic tests under field
conditions.  Work with Lassa fever victims in Liberia allowed scientists to collect and
purify human plasma for the treatment of the disease.  The vaccine for VEE was
useful in countering two outbreaks of the disease – and allowed for a large-scale
testing of the vaccine’s safety and efficacy.  A joint UN project with scientists in
Argentina led to the development of a vaccine against Junin – a viral hemorrhagic
fever that is on the NIH Category A list.
The unclassified nature of the US biodefense program was designed to
enhance confidence in US commitments to the BWC.  The open, beneficial, and
defensive nature of USAMRIID’s work was repeatedly emphasized both in public
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testimony21 and in public statements about the US Biological Defense Research
Program (BDRP) itself:  “While the detailed threat analyses provided by the
intelligence community are classified, ALL WORK CONDUCTED UNDER THE
BDRP IS UNCLASSIFIED.”22  The emphasis is in the text.
In reaction to the terrorist events of 2001, the US is shifting its biodefense
policy in important ways in an attempt to better defend itself against the threat of
bioterrorism.  New regulations are in place to control access to select agents that
excludes some foreign participation in domestic or international projects.  New orders
have extended the number of agencies with classification authority and expanded the
kinds of information considered for classification.  This is being applied in an ad hoc
way.23  Significant amounts of new funding is allocated to biodefense: both for
medical countermeasures at the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease
(NIAID) at NIH and for other biological countermeasures at the new Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), including work on threat assessments and red teaming.
Red teaming work is designed to test the vulnerabilities of the US in order to
anticipate potential threat scenarios.
The US published its strategy in April 2004, “Biodefense for the 21st
Century.”  Strategy rests heavily on development of security measures to predict,
                                                
21 Colonel David L. Huxsoll, former Commander, USAMRIID, testimony before the Committee on
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22 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Biological Defense
Research Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD:
USAMRDC, 1989): 2-2.
23 General Accounting Office, “Information Sharing: the Federal Government Needs to Establish
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prevent, and respond to bioterrorist acts on US soil.  New facilities are being created
by NIAID to work with the most dangerous human pathogens to further the creation
of medical countermeasures to known agents and to provide the scientific base to
respond to novel pathogens whatever their source.  In addition a major new entity is
being created in DHS for the purpose of biological threat assessment – and its work is
largely classified.
NBACC – the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center –
was established in 2002.  It is comprised of four major entities: a Biodefense
Knowledge Center organized at Los Alamos National Lab, a Biological Threat
Characterization Center (BTCC) and BioForensics Analysis Center (BFAC) that is
being created near USAMRIID, and an Agricultural Biodefense Center for research
on animal diseases.  Officials have repeatedly stated that the purpose of BTCC is to
understand potential bioterrorism agents, that is, the “next-generation of biological
threats.”24  It is asserted that such work is only for defensive purpose and will not
violate the terms of the BWC.  However, it is not at all clear that the work will not be
in violation of the international treaty.25
As of the end of 2006, the US has three major structures in place with
relatively distinct responsibilities.  The Defense Department remains responsible for
countermeasures and protective devices for military personnel.  This includes some
threat assessment work and intelligence collection.  The Department of Health and
                                                
24 Charles McQuerey, Remarks before the 7th Annual Executive Symposium on Emerging Business
Opportunities in Photonics,” (November 13, 2003).  www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech0142.shtm.
25 Milton Leitenberg, James Leonard, and Richard Spertzel, “Biodefense crossing the line,” Politics
and the Life Sciences 22, no. 2 (2004): 1-2.
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Human Services became responsible for monitoring biosafety and biosecurity at labs
that handle Select Agents, for purchasing medical countermeasures to WMD threats
under Project Bioshield, and for R&D on new medical countermeasures to biothreat
agents and certain EID.  DHS is working on detection systems for domestic
surveillance, threat characterization, red teaming, and threat attribution.
Current biodefense strategy is an attempt to impose fairly standard security
practices onto medical research and public health organizations.  These are two very
different institutions with very different practices: It is an uneasy fit.  HHS has not
been comfortable with the law enforcement requirements thrust upon it under the
Select Agent rules.  NIAID cannot make Bioshield purchases until DHS completes
material threat assessments – but the recent assessments are classified and cannot be
released, which has slowed purchasing of medical countermeasures to a standstill for
over a year.26  And new rules that require that scientists be “vetted” for participation
in international conferences to ensure that sensitive information is not divulged goes
against the tradition of open scientific exchange which has been standard practice.27
To stem the rising tide of government control, editors of scientific journals
voluntarily imposed a review process to prevent the inadvertent publication of
information potentially useful for bioterrorists.28
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Structuring a policy response to a security threat (i.e. biotechnology) that also
serves important beneficial purposes – in this case, medical research – is not at all
clear.  The tendency, again as before, is to impose classification on information and
activities that are not usually subject to such controls.
Such measures, particularly threat assessments, are deemed especially
important for the threat of bioterrorism.  A recent article made an important case for
threat assessment work based on what is technologically feasible and not based on
confirmed threats.  The authors argued that high-quality intelligence cannot be
acquired about state or terrorist BW capabilities, so “a biological threat
characterization program would enable US biodefense to anticipate and prepare for
emerging threats, bringing the defense closer to parity with the threat curve.”29  This
is a simple and direct application of the general national security approach to the
specific area of biodefense.  It is a natural reaction to a security threat, but has not
been demonstrated to be true.  Rather, the history of proceeding under this
presumption leads to precisely the opposite outcome: more threats and inadequate
defenses.
The public health and medical research communities, on the other hand,
typically work on a variety of actual disease agents.  For example the list of Category
A agents that guides NIAID’s biodefense R&D is composed of equal numbers of
DoD biothreat agents (those believed to have been weaponized) and virulent EID that
                                                
29 James B. Petro and Seth Carus, “Biological Threat Characterization Research: A Critical
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19
are endemic to parts of the world, but pose potentially great harm to all.  It remains
very challenging to develop vaccines and therapies to known pathogens.
Policymakers hope that developing the scientific base and infrastructure for dealing
with highly pathogenic agents can be used to combat future threats as they emerge.
That is, instead of working on medical countermeasures to future biothreat agents that
the US creates, scientists are attempting to develop a scientific infrastructure that is
capable of adapting to new threats as they emerge.
There is a tendency in the public health community toward transparency and
collaboration to combat disease.  Scientific publications rapidly spread information
and advanced techniques.  Networks to monitor disease have existed for years: the
influenza monitoring network operates under the World Health Organization (WHO)
and was instrumental in detecting and containing the first outbreak of highly
pathogenic avian influenza strain H5N1 in 1997 and continues to inform annual flu
vaccines.  More recently, international scientific collaboration organized under WHO
was critical to the quick response to the SARS outbreak in 2002-2003.  During that
crisis, the nearly real-time sharing of information and materials was essential to the
containment of that deadly disease.
Historically, public health has also been understood as a common good,
making possible invasive vaccination campaigns and access by international teams
during outbreaks. Public health depends, ultimately, on trust and openness about the
motivations for their efforts.  When organizations designed to improve public health
operate responsibly, the results can be tremendous because they can gain access to
countries that would otherwise close their doors.  The successful smallpox eradication
20
campaign is an example.  Measures by states that erode this trust can destroy its core
mission, putting the health of all at risk.  For example, unfounded suspicions about
the motivations behind the polio vaccinations caused entire regions to forego the life-
saving vaccine and threatened the polio eradication program.
Transparency, therefore, makes possible international collaboration based on
reassurance and the institutionalization of norms.  Security is gained through
information sharing and activities that enhance verification. Because a norm of
openness is established, deviations are noteworthy.
Secrecy, on the other hand, denies the possibility of open collaborations.
Instead the burden of ensuring security is placed on the control of information and
access, infiltration, and the accurate assessment of the threat.  It is risky, because
bioterrorism is a low probability but high consequence event.  In several scenarios,
efforts to respond to bioterrorist use of transmissible pathogens quickly spiral out of
control – and that is when the individuals knew they were participating in an attack
exercise.30  Structuring a policy based predominantly on secrecy denies the benefits
that can accrue from organizing policy based on transparency.
Application of what measures, therefore, best addresses the threat of
biological weapons?  There are actually two threats: those from dedicated state
programs and those from terrorist groups.  It is likely that terrorists will adopt and use
established biothreat agents because they are known to be relatively inexpensive,
technologically feasible, and reliable – and US countermeasures – physical, medical,
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or organizational – are clearly not adequate.  For example, the use of contaminated
letters to anonymously spread biological agents was noted as a potential threat over
fifty years ago.31  Furthermore, the anthrax in the 2001 attacks bore uncomfortably
close resemblance to the anthrax the US BW program had weaponized decades
earlier.
However, dedicated state programs do possess the resources to create novel
biological threats.32  As an example, the USSR’s program applied recombinant
technology in attempts to combine pathogens or make detection more difficult.  This
is the major source of future danger.  Classified US work on threat assessments and
Red Teaming at DoD and NBACC possibly pose the greatest threat of all because
such work enlarges the threat space, provokes suspicion, and gives legitimacy to
emulation.  The experience derived from over fifty years of biodefense work suggest
that competitive biothreat programs at the state level is the most significant source of
advanced biothreats to the US.
The original US BW program was founded based on fears of being
unprepared for the products of more sophisticated enemy BW programs.  Threat
assessment work was integral to the highly classified program, and yet it led to a
highly imbalanced outcome:  large stockpiles of potent bioweapons and smaller
stockpiles of vaccines of questionable effectiveness and utility.  In seeking to
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understand the maximum extent of danger, the US was producing the most advanced
forms of it.
By contrast the lessons of post-1969 period is that biodefenses can be created
in an unclassified program without concomitant offensive investigations.
International collaboration enhanced US medical countermeasures and, importantly,
identified the need for much more work on detection systems and quick, sensitive,
and simple diagnostic assays.
Those are the two relevant legacies and the unavoidable conclusions about
them.  More worrisome is the fact that technology in the biosciences is now truly
revolutionary.  That concern about technology has always been used in the past to
justify offensive investigations to characterize the threat over the horizon.  It will be
difficult to restrain the desire to push the technology to its limits in the name of threat
characterization.  But it must be resisted.  There is in biology an observation called
the “Red Queen Effect,” that states that in tightly coevolved interactions, evolutionary
change by one species could lead to the extinction of others.  Or, as the Red Queen
herself says, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the
same place.”  Defense must evolve as rapidly as the offense.  However, if the US
proceeds to develop the next generation of bioweapons in the name of defense, it will
be placing the seeds of its own destruction into the hands of the next generation of
terrorist.  And it will take legions of far swifter scientists working hard on actual
defenses to preserve even the inadequate offense-defense balance that the last round
of US offensive work left us with.
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Chapter 2: Creating the Logic of Biodefense
“While we perfect a biological weapon, we perfect the defense
against it, thereby destroying the weapon.  Would that all
weapons of war could be liquidated from the earth as simply as
this.”33  -- George Merck, 1946
Modern biological weapons originated in World War II: previous attempts to
deliberately spread disease were neither as organized or sophisticated.  Although
infectious diseases had a significant impact on the course of wars past, biological
agents were never studied so extensively with the purpose of creating militarily useful
weapons.  Much of how we still think about biological weapons was shaped during
that war, when the US established its own BW program.
By request of the War Department, the National Academy of Sciences was
intimately involved in establishing the BW program.  NAS documents were
declassified twenty years ago, providing a reasonably full account of the initiation of
the US BW effort.  Unfortunately, most documents of the Chemical Warfare Service
(CWS) are not publicly available, leaving the history incomplete.  This is nonetheless
an important starting point to a small but significant military program.
Pre-War BW Attitudes
Before scientific understanding of microbes advanced sufficiently in the
nineteenth century, biological warfare methods were crude and infrequently
employed.   When attempts were made to spread disease, it is uncertain how much
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any affect was due to the methods employed and how much to natural spread.34
Devastating epidemics that changed the course of wars and civilizations were mostly
unintended and attributed more to divine interference rather than human calculation.
Therefore, the potential of bioweapons has long been recognized, but little investment
was made to harness it until the twentieth century.
In World War I, Germany had a program to research, develop, and produce
biological agents and used several biological agents in sabotage operations against
animals.  The US, UK, and France knew of this history but took rather different
attitudes towards the military implications of BW in warfare. The UK remained
largely skeptical as to the practicality of biological weapons until the late 1930s,
when concern over Germany’s intentions generated the need to begin preparations for
a war.
Within the US military, differences of opinion as to the likely future use of
BW existed.  A 1922 lecture on BW (later reprinted) by Dr. L. Georges, Surgeon
Inspector of the Army – reminding his audience of German use of anthrax and
glanders in France and Romania – recommended a better understanding of BW to
begin preparations for a defense.35  It is unknown how widely Dr. George’s opinion
was shared within the Army medical community at the time.  Within the Chemical
Warfare Service, the opinion was strongly against the notion that BW would be
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employed because it was not militarily useful.  Technical Director, J.E. Mills wrote to
the Commanding Officer of Edgewood Arsenal in 1921,
My own feeling is that it is not advisable at the present time to undertake work
of this character [research and development regarding the offensive and
defensive problems of germ warfare].  I do not believe that germ
dissemination was used in the past war nor that it has ever been used in the
past in any war.  The use of germs as a method of warfare is prohibited by a
national law and would be generally regarded as a practice of the grossest
inhumanity and could not possibly be confined in its results to combatants.36
Little is known about the details of the French BW program.  Their knowledge
of German activities in WWI led them to engage in some BW work prior to the
signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
The Geneva Protocol was signed largely in response to the repulsion of chemical
warfare during World War I.
The Protocol prohibited the use of biological weapons, but not research,
production, or possession.  The US was instrumental in introducing and gaining
agreement on the Geneva Protocol, but the Senate refused to ratify it then.  (It did so
in 1975.)  While military figures supported it, veterans groups opposed ratification.37
Nonetheless, forty-two nations were adhering to it by World War II, with several
states reserving the right to retaliate in kind.38
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Nearly a decade later, opinions in the US and UK about BW began to shift.  In
1933, US Major Leon Fox wrote an influential article, arguing that biological
weapons would be used if they could be made to work.  Yet he concluded, “I consider
that it is highly questionable if biologic agents are suited for warfare.  Certainly at the
present time practically insurmountable technical difficulties prevent the use of
biologic agents as effective weapons of warfare.”39
The skepticism in the US was shared by the UK, but their higher probability
of being a target of Nazi Germany led them to take action earlier than the US.  A UK
subcommittee on Biological Warfare submitted two reports, in 1937 and 1938,
expressing concern, but no decision was taken to conduct any experiments.  Instead,
to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, they took two other enduring actions:
the creation of the Emergency Hospital Service and the Emergency Public Health
Laboratory Service.  The former would form the framework for nationalized health
care after the war.  The latter, a network of laboratories to aid in the diagnosis and
treatment of civilian casualties, became the Public Health Laboratory Service.40  That
is, efforts in the UK were directed first toward providing better protection for the
civilian population, and only after to experimentation in the area of bioweapons.
In November 1939, the British Medical Research Council assessed the value
of BW as less effective than orthodox methods of warfare.41  However, because the
Committee’s views were based on general considerations and not actual laboratory
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study, it was decided in September 1940 to grant resources and laboratory space at
Porton Down for Paul Fildes to test the feasibility of BW.42  Because Fildes did not
wish to report to the Armed Forces, and the Medical Research Council did not want
direct association with his work, it was agreed that his team would report (through a
subcommittee of experts) to a Committee of the War Cabinet under Colonel Sir
Maurice Hankey.  Their work was classified and much of it remains as such.  From
information shared with the US, however, it is clear that they pursued work on
Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum toxin A, among other bacterium.
Even after the outbreak of war in Europe, the opinion in both the US military
and public health organizations dismissed BW as a weapon of war and did not urge
any testing to confirm that opinion.  An August 1939 study for the US Chemical
Warfare Service (CWS) concluded that is was possible to disseminate bacteria by
airplanes, but such methods would be of doubtful military value.  Instead, there were
significant possibilities for using BW as sabotage weapons.43  Similarly, in response
to a request to review the issue of biological warfare in December 1940, the
consensus at the US National Institute of Health was, “That though there are a few
definite possibilities, the field of bacteriological warfare … offers possibilities
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decidedly less potent than generally assumed, and would for the most part be futile,
having only a slight nuisance value.”44
However, just over one year later, a single committee of scientists convened
by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and National Research Council (NRC)
reversed that prevailing view of BW.  Their assessment led to the quick establishment
of a secret and comprehensive biological warfare program.
Paradigm Shift: The WBC Committee and the Feasibility of Bioweapons
In the summer of 1941 concern in the Army CWS and Surgeon General’s
office (SGO) about evidence of enemy preparations to use BW led to requests for
action.  On July 15, 1941, the Army Surgeon General asked the Division of Medical
Sciences, NRC, to form a special committee of civilian scientists to survey all phases
of the BW problem and provide advice.  It was the Surgeon General’s opinion that
“since the primary function of the Medical Department is to preserve life rather than
to destroy it, its efforts should be directed solely toward prevention and cure.”45  This
opinion was not shared by the CWS.
CWS Progress Report No. 54 (August 15, 1941) recommended that either
CWS pursue both offensive and defensive research, or that it confine itself to
offensive research and assign defensive work to the Medical Corps.  That month a
new, secret research project was submitted to the National Defense Research
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Committee (NDRC) by the Army: “CWS-20: Study of Bacteriological Warfare
Methods and Means.”
The problem therefore, is to work out by actual tests after thorough study of
the literature means and methods for the most effective use of bacteria, toxins
and insects as a means of waging a war against an enemy country with a view
of later working out adequate defense measures in our own country against
such means and methods.46
To resolve the issue, Harvey Bundy, Special Assistant to Secretary of War
Henry Stimson convened a conference on biological warfare on August 20, 1941.
The division of offensive/defensive responsibility recommended by CWS was
basically endorsed, but a single civilian committee of experts was appointed to look at
the whole issue of biological warfare.47  Oversight of the research remained more in
the hands of the civilian committee and CWS: the Surgeon General did not receive
formal authority to oversee defensive research until 1944.
At the time, knowledge in the US about the potential BW threat was
extremely limited.  There were reports indicating German interest in the toxins
produced by Clostridium botulinum, the existence of Japanese bacteriological warfare
battalions, and Japanese use of plague in China and interest in the yellow fever virus.
To protect against the latter, the Medical Corps asked the Rockefeller Institute to keep
a supply of yellow fever vaccine for US troops serving in tropical regions.  There was
agreement “that despite exceedingly scanty information and previously held belief
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that the possibility of enemy use of such agents is very remote, the whole subject is
potentially of great importance and should be given careful study.”48
In response to Bundy’s recommendations, Secretary of War Henry Stimson
formally requested that the NAS and NRC appoint a committee, “to survey the
present situation and the future possibilities.”49  A secret committee, the WBC
Committee, was convened and held its first meeting on November 18, 1941.  The
WBC Committee existed for less than a year, but in that short time it overcame the
major obstacle to military investment in BW: it established the presumption that
biological agents could be employed as military weapons on a large scale.
In its first report of February 19, 1942, the WBC Committee stated that
“Biological Warfare is regarded as distinctly feasible…. The majority of the authors
conclude that biological warfare is entirely possible, even probable, and that in the
future, its use will be governed by the likelihood of military effectiveness rather than
by any moral considerations or international agreements.”50  The report gives little
indication of the reasons for their confidence.  It can be inferred, however, that three
factors influenced their conclusion: perception of the threat, potential effectiveness of
a biological weapon, and technical feasibility.
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Establishing the Threat
The known threat was not at all clear, and at that time seemed limited to a few
organisms: anthrax and glanders against animals, and yellow fever, plague, and
botulinum toxin against humans.  Intelligence reports about Japanese and German
interest in BW were scanty, but worrying.  In addition, the WBC Committee learned
of Germany’s use of anthrax and glanders in Romania, France, and the US to infect
animals in World War I.51  Some WBC members also believed that cholera was also
used by Germany to contaminate water supplies in the Balkans.52    Their concerns
about the potential of BW were reinforced by early interaction in December 1941
with the Canadian BW group, M-1000.
A survey of the literature convinced them that the threat was even more
significant. “It is evident from this review of the literature that biological warfare has
been the object of extensive investigation by scientists throughout the world.”53 Dr.
Georges’ 1922 article, considered one of the most comprehensive by the Committee,
gave a false sense of the ease by which bioweapons could be created, “[Microbial
poisons] lend themselves to very rapid, I might almost say instantaneous,
manufacture, in large quantities.”54  Enemy intentions and the literature survey
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indicated interest in bioweapons and both then begged the more fundamental question
of whether biological weapons could actually be produced.
Technical Fesibility
The question of effectiveness is subordinated to the first question of
feasibility.  In an undated memo, “Bacterial Warfare” from early in 1942, this issue is
set forth:
The answer to the last question [is BW technically feasible] is the real crux of
the matter, since, if bacterial warfare is possible, one must assume that the
enemy will consider its use, and history offers plenty of evidence as to the
effectiveness of epidemic diseases.  In our opinion, the potential effectiveness
of such a weapon is so great that, even if it seems a long shot, the subject
merits the most careful appraisal.  We believe that the technical advances of
the last few years point the way to the solution of those problems which in the
past have made bacterial warfare seem improbable.55
This is an important document in that it concisely sets forth the considerations
favoring the pursuit of biodefense at that time.  In summary:
• As an agent of total war, bacterial warfare could powerfully affect civilian
morale; History contains many instances in which disease was the
deciding factor in war.
• There is a general reluctance by experts in military hygiene, medical
bacteriology and epidemiology to seriously consider BW based on largely
humanitarian grounds;
• Technical advances and present involvement with an unscrupulous enemy
make it highly desirable that the entire subject be examined in detail.
• Any examination must include factors bearing on offensive use as well as
on the defense, if the defensive picture is to be realistic.
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• To be suitable as an offensive weapon, a disease must incapacitate or kill;
be highly infectious via channels which favor its spread to epidemic
proportions (respiratory); and for which effective control measures are
available – but not known or promptly available to the enemy.
• Frozen-dried (lyophilized) cultures might be especially suitable for
spreading air-borne diseases: the effective spread of air-borne diseases
could be a simple matter.
• Use of chemotherapeutic drugs is preferred for cost reasons, because they
may be effective against new diseases, and because immunization of an
entire population is difficult and would forfeit the advantage of surprise.
From the beginning it seems that biological weapons are envisioned primarily
as strategic terror weapons.  There is no indication in this document or in any WBC
Committee reports that BW would work well for standard military operations.  It is
stated that BW could be made to be militarily effective, but there is no document
indicating the conditions under which its use would be effective other than “as an
agent of total war”.
Choosing a Response
The WBC Committee performed a wide-ranging, largely theoretical
assessment of every candidate agent as to its possible methods of producing a harmful
effect on man, animals, plants, and food supplies.  They received 110 survey reports
in just 3 months. The core presumption was, “It is obvious that preparation for
defense necessitates a knowledge of the offense and, if this knowledge is not
available from experience, it must come from the results of careful investigation.”56
The appendices to the February 1942 are exhaustive discussions of the range
of microbes that could be made into a threat and possible methods of use.  Curiously,
despite the lengthy discussion of possible offensive applications, the
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recommendations are modest and largely defensive: development of vaccines, pest
control, disease surveillance, protection of water and milk supplies.  Only a few deal
with mass cultivation, use of vectors, and methods of dissemination.
On March 24, 1942 Secretary Stimson submitted the WBC’s first report to the
General Staff.  When he reported the results of their deliberations to President
Roosevelt on April 29 he indicated the reluctance of the General Staff to being
directly associated with BW work.57  The official history explains:
The formation of a civilian agency to take charge of b.w. presented certain
definite advantages over direct participation by some branch of the armed
forces.  In the summer of 1942 the entire subject of b.w. was in a purely
theoretical stage and civilian scientists formed the principal sources of
knowledge and advice.  The United States had never undertaken any
experimental work in the field.  The fact that b.w. was “dirty business” as the
Secretary of War expressed it, implied possible dangerous grounds for public
criticism of the armed forces if they should be found actively engaged in such
work, while the activities of a civilian agency might be more readily
disavowed officially.  Furthermore, a civilian agency secretly housed in the
Federal Security Agency would have the advantage of working under a cover
that would readily protect it from enemy detection.58
Secretary Stimson’s request for a civilian agency was approved the next
month: the War Research Service (WRS) was established with George W. Merck as
its director. Over its first year of work, WRS received $685,000 from the President’s
Special Emergency Fund.59 From the beginning, all biological weapons-related work
was classified as secret.  Even presidential orders for the formation of WRS were
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never written, but given in oral directives.  Work was moved to “Top Secret” on April
8, 1944 when fears increased about possible enemy use.60
When WRS was created a scientific advisory committee was also established.
The ABC Committee replaced the WBC Committee, although its membership
remained largely similar.  Just prior to its dissolution to make way for the ABC
Committee’s formation, the WBC Committee issued its final report in June 1942.  Its
research suggestions are more offense-oriented, influenced perhaps by reports from
Paul Fildes of Porton Down.
As noted earlier, the UK began its BW investigations before the US.  When
Paul Fildes visited the US early in 1942, he shared information about the more
advanced UK BW program with the US counterparts.  The UK work was focused, it
seems, on anthrax and botulinum toxin as retaliatory weapons.
The presumption of the need for offensive investigations is repeated in both
Fildes report and Col J.H. Defandorf’s summary of his visit to England in the spring
of 1942.  Lord Hankey wrote that, “it is only by a full examination of the methods of
attack that we can develop effective means of defense” and so work at Porton “has
been directed almost entirely to the exploration of offensive possibilities to supply
evidence on which defensive action can be taken, and on a means of retaliation if
required.”61  Because viruses could not be safely handled, experimentation at Porton
was confined to bacteria and toxins.  Furthermore, research was focused on anti-
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personnel and anti-animal weapons because anti-crop weapons were not considered to
be feasible.
British experimentation at Porton were influenced by intelligence reporting
the use of lice to spread typhus in Poland, production of botulinum toxin as a powder
of high potency by Germany (although the proposed method of use was considered
impossible), Japanese attempts to spread plague in China, and outbreaks of foot and
mouth disease in Ireland and potato disease in England.
Two major hurdles were the mass production of agent and the preservation of
virulence.  When they began, the British had little evidence of the practicality of
spreading BW by inhalation.  “When attempting to use bacteria as a ‘toxic dust’ we
have… dispersed the bacteria as finely as possible, but it may be found that coarser
particles are more efficient, since it is not known certainly that penetration into the
lung is necessary and, further, the finest dispersion leads to greater losses in viability
of the bacteria.”62
Progress after less than two years at Porton Down were as follows:
• Methods for the mass production and storage of anthrax.
• Methods for distributing anthrax against cattle (linseed cakes).
• Methods for protecting cattle against anthrax (1 c.c. of a spore vaccine
containing 9 million spores).
• Experiments to disperse anthrax as a ‘toxic dust’.
• Methods to mass produce botulinum toxin type A with a potency never
before recorded reliably (average lethal dose for man of 0.01mg by
injection and 40-50mg by mouth).  This overcame the earlier assumption
that inhalation of botulinum toxin was impractical.
• Early experimentation with an anti-toxin indicating the likelihood of
methods for active immunization for man.
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• Sabotage uses of botulinum toxin by ingestion (superior to chemicals
because onset of symptoms is delayed and hence the circumstances of
initial exposure are more readily concealed).
• Mass production of house flies to contaminate food.
• Unsuccessful attempts to store non-sporing bacteria in bulk, although
methods of drying some bacteria in various suspensions investigated.
• Experimentation with Glanders, Swine Fever, Rinderpest, and Brucella
melitensis against animals.
Fildes concluded his report with a request to the US for help on
experimentation along the same lines on a larger scale.
Given the British information and, having spent the previous four months
devoting “much time and thought to a study of the possible application of biology to
war…. The possibilities of biological warfare, the conditions under which it is most
likely to succeed and the end results that may be expected have been discussed…”63
the WBC Committee’s June 1942 suggestions were as follows:
1. Investigations be started on specific human, animal and plant diseases
(e.g. anthrax, botulism, cholera, bacillary dysentery, plague, typhus,
rinderpest, foot-and-mouth disease, late blight of potato, stem rusts of
cereals, certain insects and insect vectors).
2. Measures be taken to secure laboratories and personnel to produce and
preserve mass cultures of the various harmful agents that may be used
in biological warfare.
3. That authority and funds be provided to carry forward the work on
biological warfare.
Interaction with the Canadian and British BW committees seems to have
shifted the WBC Committee’s focus.  When it was formed, it was given both the
Army Surgeon General’s request for a BW survey to identify necessary defenses and
the CWS request for the investigation of offensive applications.  It can be concluded
that they believed that the former role was fulfilled by recommendations for the
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safeguarding of food and water supplies.  Henceforth, it seems that the WBC
Committee’s recommendations were more focused on supporting the CWS R&D
requests.  That is, offense first and defense after:
One of the tasks which face the WBC Committee is to develop a program of
Biological Warfare, to develop new agents and to devise methods of
distribution.  This will require large-scale production and large-scale
dissemination of these microorganisms.  The important point to consider is the
possibility of using new diseases or combinations of diseases and new
techniques of distribution of these diseases.64
Until the ABC Committee was formed in the fall of 1942, WRS initiated
research projects based largely on the WBC Committee’s recommendations.
The War Research Service (1942-1944)
WRS had three major areas of responsibility: Research and Development;
anti-biological warfare program; and Intelligence and Information.  The anti-
biological warfare program was defined as “the institution of countermeasures against
enemy attempts to use bacterial or chemical agents in a civilian or military
population.”  Measures included the protection of the nation’s water supply against
sabotage; protection of food supplies; the protection of biological products; and a
special program in the Hawaiian islands and Panama Canal zone.  Military personnel
in Hawaii were vaccinated against yellow fever and a supply of vaccine was sent for
the civilian population in Hawaii in the event it was considered necessary.  (Large-
scale immunization in 1942 with yellow fever vaccine, however, was not without
risk.  It resulted in the appearance of over 28,000 cases of serum jaundice, with 62
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deaths, shown later to be due to contaminated human serum used as an agent to
stabilize the vaccine potency.65)
Research and Development
E.B. Fred, former chairman of the WBC Committee, headed the Research and
Development department of WRS.  (The ABC Committee provided scientific advice
to WRS, but it is unclear how influential they were.  It met only four times over two
years.)  The purpose of WRS was as follows66:
1. To develop practical methods for large-scale production of agents potentially
adaptable to B.W.
2. To develop practical methods for safeguarding the personnel engaged in the
production, testing and handling of all B.W. agents, and of military and
civilian personnel who may be exposed to such agents.
There is no desire on our part to suggest the use of such agents in
warfare, but in order to study protection, it is necessary to investigate
the offensive as well as defensive operations.  In this way, it should be
possible to keep ahead of the enemy and avoid a bacteriological “Pearl
Harbor.”
CWS was assigned full responsibility for projects relating to weapons
development.  Other projects first began under WRS supervision and were later
transferred to CWS authority when sufficiently promising results were generated that
required development beyond the laboratory stage.  All projects were transferred to
CWS in 1944 when the War Department took over all BW work and abolished both
WRS and the ABC Committee.
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WRS work was influenced in several ways by the UK BW work.  First, Fildes
told Merck that “My instructions are that H.M. Government feels that (1) a study of
offense is an essential preliminary to the study of defense, (2) offensive studies are
valueless until they are taken to a stage of complete realism….67 In similar fashion,
WRS and CWS actively pursued studies on offense.
In November 1942, Dr. Fildes requested help from the US in the mass
production of anthrax spores, better bomb designs for the dispersal of anthrax, and
production of botulinum toxin (“three kilo dried X”), among other items.68  In
response, Merck indicated that work along these and other lines was underway.69  He
requested that CWS work on: a) development of effective means of dissemination of
agents using simulants; b) development of effective dispersal of anti-animal agents; c)
determination of the most effective design, size and tactical use of a bomb for the
dispersal of anthrax when dropped from aircraft.70  Although Fildes was probably
also working on ricin (“W”) – “likely to be used by us [UK]”71 – no request for help
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with developing this was made. However, by 1944, “freshly prepared potent ‘X’
mud” was packed and ready for shipment to Porton.72
The actual work of the WRS is hard to define clearly.  It existed under the
informal direction of Secretary Stimson through his Special Assistant and although it
was involved in the direction and coordination of nearly all BW matters, it issued no
orders or directives to the armed services, who were never officially connected with
WRS.  WRS initiated some BW projects, but was only consulted on others.  “Its
object was to serve mainly as a catalytic agent; to initiate broad general policies, and
to act chiefly as a liaison between various government departments and braches of the
Service…”73  The major actors are listed in figure 1below.
At the ABC Committee’s first meeting in February 1943, they discussed the
issue of protecting against the importation of plant diseases and insect pests and
recommended special protective efforts.  Upon their recommendation, and with WRS
support, the Department of Agriculture secured $469,000 from the President’s
Emergency Fund for a plant and insect pest quarantine program.74
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Figure 1: The War Research Service
At the second meeting of the ABC Committee in November 1943, WRS
provided a summary of all projects and the committee was given a tour of Camp
Detrick.  While there, Colonel Chittick requested the Committee’s advice on how
new construction at the camp could serve both the immediate BW needs and still
remain adaptable to whatever future use was required after the war.75  A
subcommittee recommended a continuation of its BW work to provide general
scientific knowledge and to remain current on biological warfare.
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Once projects were moved into the direct military oversight of CWS, little
information was given back to the civilian scientists in the ABC Committee. This
happened infrequently because projects were only moved to CWS when they
approached the prospect of pilot plant production. “Thus, as experiments progressed,
scientific investigation moved increasingly from civilian to military supervision.”76
This led to some tension between the civilian and military groups.  Civilian scientists
did not believe they could adequately advise WRS without knowledge of the projects
conducted at CWS.
As of the termination of WRS, total annual salaries and expenses were
$107,566.  Work on BW projects sponsored by WRS totaled $176,200 for 1944-45,
for a total of $283,766.77 (That is approximately $3 million in 2006 dollars.)  Table 1
below is a chronological account of WRS projects. Those studies that were
exclusively defense-oriented are highlighted.
Table 1: WRS Research Projects 1942-194478
BW Agent Code
Date
Started Status as of May 1944
Rinderpest GIR-1 July 1942 Established a vaccine plant, stockpiling of
vaccine; new vaccine developed.
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vaccine; new vaccine developed.
Typhus Fever YE Aug 1942 Growth on yolk sacs of developing chick
embryos developed. Methods to preserve it
in dry form being investigated. Objective
was exclusively offensive: develop
methods of (1) growing virulent strains;
(2) drying & preserving; and (3)
dissemination.
Dysentery Y Sep 1942 Mass cultivation achieved, large-scale
production recommended. WBC
recommended it for offensive use.
Foot & Mouth
Disease
OO Sep 1942 Work discontinued for lack of a suitably
isolated location, cost, and relevance.
Blight of Potatoes LO Sep 1942 Evidence provided for the possibility of an




RI Oct 1942 Lacking material for work.
Coccidioides OC Oct 1942 Virulent strain selected with characteristics
suitable for biowarfare.
Plague LE Oct 1942 Special labs created. Preliminary work.
Recommended for offensive use in 1942.
Anthrax N Nov 1942 Selected virulent strains, optimized
conditions for mass cultivation of spores,
devised method for drying; unknown
effect of dried spores on man.  Spores
could be stored in a suspension, dried, or
added to an inert carrier for weaponization.
SPD Mk I bomb produced (not filled);
penicillin effective if given early.
Botulism X Nov 1942 One type A strain selected for large-scale
cultivation. Determined ideal conditions
for maximum toxin production and process
to preserve dried, purified toxin. Toxoid in
use provided active immunity in humans.
Fowl Plague and
Newcastle Disease
O/E Nov 1942 Method for mass cultivation of viruses
dvlpd, Developed a stable formalin killed
vaccine (25,000 doses/day capacity),
preparation and storage of active immune
sera (dried). (Permit was required to
import the virus.)
Cholera HO Dec 1942 Work suspended. Difficulty obtaining
infective material and lack of method for
assaying virulence.  WBC Committee




MN Jan 1943 Penicillin effective in the chemotherapy of
anthrax in mice. No effective active or
passive immunization for humans.
Brucellosis US Jan 1943 Virulent strain of Br. suis selected, mass
culture medium developed, infectivity
studied, dissemination methods developed.
Recommended as one of the most
promising war weapons in 1942.79
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studied, dissemination methods developed.
Recommended as one of the most
promising war weapons in 1942.79
Sclerotium Rolfsii CO Jan 1943 Greenhouse and field experiments
established the viability and effectiveness
of this fungus for anti-crop use.
Blood studies LT Apr 1943 No positive results from tests of prisoners
of war. Tested for yellow fever, botulinus




AU May 1943 Completed. Work on mass production of
bacterial spores of simulants for anthrax.
Pest prevention and
plant surveys
ER June 1943 No detection of any deliberate spread of




UL Sep 1943 Working on mass cultivation and vaccine
development.




Jan 1944 Initial work promising, but preliminary.
Purpose was to determine the chemical
structure of the poison and to work out




Jan 1944 Large scale work begun.





May 1944 No report.
Psittacosis Suggested
Rift Valley Fever Suggested
Given WRS’s heavy emphasis on offensive R&D, two exclusively defensive
projects are noteworthy as exceptions to WRS’s general orientation.
Rinderpest:  This is the first approved BW project and predates the
establishment of the WRS.  Rinderpest is a disease of cattle.  After its December 1941
meeting – which included members from the Canadian M-1000 committee – the
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WBC Committee urged work on the production and storage of rinderpest vaccine.  As
a result, after many months of discussion, a joint, US-Canadian commission was
appointed by Secretary of War Stimson on July 10, 1942. All its initial work was
exclusively defensive in nature: (a) establishment and equipment of a plant at Grosse
Ile, Canada for the production of tissue-type vaccine of known effectiveness; and, (b)
research on a better vaccine.
Within two years, the plant was fully established and maintained a stockpile
of at least 5,000 doses of finished vaccine.  In addition, unprocessed tissue was
maintained for the production of another 100,000 doses of vaccine.  Research also led
to the production of a new vaccine whose methods allowed for much quicker vaccine
production and which induced full immunity more swiftly.  In addition, the new
vaccine could be dried without loss of potency for a long period of time.
Only after these accomplishments on the major problems of defense was there
consideration of a request to investigate the offensive potential of the rinderpest virus.
This was discussed in the fall of 1944.
Tularemia: This was not recommended for study in the June 1942 WBC
Committee report.  However, another study written in 1942 concluded that this agent
“has much to recommend it to those seeking potential agents of bacterial warfare…. It
is easily cultivated and its virulence can be maintained undiminished for long
periods.”80  WRS initiated work in 1943 towards mass cultivation, preservation, and
vaccine development.  Part of the reason given to Lee Foshay – who was
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investigating it without any WRS encouragement – was that tularemia was rumored
to be “one of the most likely organisms to be used by the enemy.”81 Initial vaccine
results looked promising.
On June 8, 1944, President Roosevelt approved the transfer of all BW work to
the War Department.  Secretary Stimson’s reasoning was as follows:
When War Research Service was first established, the primary considerations
were research, and secrecy so far as military participation was concerned.
Therefore, this activity was placed in a civilian agency for more perfect cover.
The immediate urgency now is one of military development, planning and
preparation.  This leads up to the conclusion that the responsibilities for
biological warfare should now be unified and centralized within the military
establishment.82
George Merck was soon thereafter appointed a consultant to Secretary
Stimson.  Between June-August 1944, responsibility for all WRS projects were
transferred to the Special Projects Division (SPD) of CWS based at Camp Detrick.
The Surgeon General was instructed to collaborate with CWS on defensive aspects.
The SGO accepted responsibility for the procurement, storage and issue of biological
products designed to protect troops against BW agents that the enemy might use and
for supervision of research on immunology and therapeutics.  To provide policy
guidance, a War Department Committee on Biological Warfare (USBWC) was
created with Merck as its chairman.
The basis for US actions consolidating BW work within the War Deprtment
was primarily a belief that Nazi Germany was planning to use botulinum toxin in
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long-range bombs.  It was a fear based mostly on faulty intelligence, but enhanced by
domestic research on the possibility of doing so.  Because US research indicated that
they could create such a weapon, it assumed that the Nazi government already had.
Intelligence
An initial survey of the intelligence collected was done in January 1943 by
J.P. Marquand.  Only four reports were from sources considered reliable: three
(accurately) dealt with Japanese BW experimentation and only one indicated Nazi
interest in botulinum toxin.  This single report of Nazi BW preparations was itself not
wholly convincing.  The Surgeon General’s office commented that, “While this report
is obviously inaccurate in many details, it contains certain points which may be of
significance.”83
This paucity of intelligence about BW preparations by Nazi Germany was
repeatedly attributed to impenetrable secrecy.  The possibility of there being no
sophisticated BW program at all is not given consideration.  Instead, more intensive
requests for intelligence on BW were made, including visits to theater commanders to
educate them on what to look for.  Perhaps as a result of this activity, more reports
about Nazi BW activity arrived in the latter half of 1943.
The increase in intelligence reports heightened concern about an attack with
botulinum toxin.  However, in a November 1943 memo, the Army Surgeon General
reported that no antibodies to yellow fever, botulinun toxin, anthrax, cholera toxin,
bacillary dysentery, typhus and ricin were found despite regular tests done on
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German, Italian, and Japanese prisoners of war.  This is a significant finding because
the only way then (and since) to provide immunity to botulinum toxin requires
several shots over many weeks.  However, this finding did not weigh as heavily as
other reports coming in from Europe.
Fear, scientific advances in the US program, and the new reports essentially
drove the US BW program from civilian laboratories into military production.
Concern in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) about Nazi intentions to use BW
led to high-level meetings in December 1943 within the US that quickly transformed
the BW program into an exclusively military enterprise:
Experiments of our own scientists and of the Canadians, though not wholly
conclusive, were beginning to indicate that “X” in powdered form could be
made in great quantities and preserved in an active state, and had highly lethal
qualities as a weapon against animals or man. It was the opinion of OSS that
the possible use of “X” or “N” in the German secret weapon was sufficiently
serious to be called to the attention of the JCS….84
This drive to military control is interesting for two reasons.  First, US analysts
regularly presumed that Nazi Germany was ahead of the US in its work on BW:  “It is
safe to assume that the Germans have made much further advances in the field of
experimentation with anthrax and that they developed more advanced bombs and
other methods for its dissemination.” Also, regarding botulinum toxin, “…we have
means of producing this in large quantities and it is safe to assume that the Germans
have perfected their technique much further.”85  It is a common error to apply self-
referential thinking.
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The second point is the controversial nature of the US intelligence analysis.
Many reports pointed vaguely to Nazi intentions to use some kind of biological
weapon.  Few indicated the actual biological agent they were presumed to be working
with.  Even when the strong likelihood indicated botulinum toxin, there were serious
reasons to doubt it.  Even the British did not think botulinum toxin a useful weapon
and doubted that the Germans had produced enough to pose a tactical or strategic
threat.86
The Chemical Warfare Service
Carrying the WRS R&D forward, and to fulfill British BW requests, CWS
established Camp Detrick in April 1943. Work at Camp Detrick was organized in
four main divisions: offensive, defensive, engineering, and safety.   Four biological
agent production plants were started. In addition to smaller pilot plants to study other
antipersonnel, antianimal, and antiplant agents, Camp Detrick established the
following87:
Pilot Plant No. 1 (Activated October 1943): production of botulinum toxin;
Pilot Plant No. 2 (Completed March 1944): production of anthrax simulant
Bacillus globigii and actual anthrax spores;
Pilot Plant No. 3 (Completed February 1945): production of plant pathogens;
Pilot Plant No. 4 (Completed January 1945): production of bacteria that cause
brucellosis and psittacosis in embryonated eggs.
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As of September 25, 1944, CWS had the following major projects
underway.88  In 2006 dollars, the total cost was approximately $500 million.
1. Camp Detrick: Frederick, Maryland (544.33 acres): $12,963,584.
Construction began in April 1943 and continued through 1944.  The purpose
was research and development.
2. Horn Island (Jackson Project):  Pascagoula, Missisippi (1969
acres):$444,886.47 spent. Construction began in July 1943 and was completed
in November.  It was established to serve as a proving ground for agents,
munitions, and defensive measures.  It was used for nine months to conduct
23 trials with botulinum toxin slurry dispersed from the Mk I bomb, none of
which were successful.89
3. Granite Peak Project: Tooele, Utah (250 sq mi): $1,474.885 spent.
Construction began in July 1944.  The purpose was to provide additional
facilities for testing agents, munitions, and defensive measures.
4. Vigo Plant, CWS: Terre Haute, Indiana (6100 acres):$29,778,846 spent.
Construction began in April 1944.  The purpose was the production of
botulinum toxin and anthrax spores on a large scale.  The Special Projects
Division, CWS, had ordered one million Mk I bombs to be mass produced and
filled with anthrax – half of which would go to the British.90
The Army Surgeon General’s Office
In contrast to this frenetic activity by CWS, the Surgeon General’s requests
were more modest.  After the transfer of all responsibility for BW to the War
Department, responsibility was shared between CWS and SGO.  Secretary of War
Stimson more clearly defined the SGO’s role in the defense program against BW in
January 1944.  This directed the Surgeon General to collaborate with the Chief, CWS
in defense against BW.  By CWS request, the Surgeon General agreed to be
responsible for “the procurement, storage, and issue of biological products designed
to protect troops against various biological agents that might be employed offensively
                                                
88 Dates and costs of construction are from William B. Sarles, “DEF Committee: Meeting of 12
October 1944 – National Research Council,” (October 12, 1944), National Academy of Sciences
Archive, Series 5, Box 5: Meetings: Oct 1944.”
89 Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), 77.
90Ibid, 70.
52
by the enemy.”91  On January 25, 1944, a liaison officer was appointed by the SGO to
provide closer relations between SGO and the Special Projects Division, Camp
Detrick.
Because of the increased concern about possible German use of botulinum
toxin, the SGO requested a meeting in January 1944, wanting to know what
recommendations WRS had about protective measures.92  Camp Detrick scientist
Fothergill described work on the Type A toxoid, estimating that 200 to 400 gallons of
toxoid could be produced weekly – sufficient to immunize 200,000 men – without
interfering with its other work.  With the addition of alum precipitated material,
toxoid to immunize 400,000 men could be made.  However, it would be necessary to
ship the toxoid to a biological manufacturing plant for bottling.
By May 1944, Camp Detrick was producing large amounts of botulinum type
A toxoid in response to the SGO request.  Gilliland Laboratories in Pennsylvania
agreed to bottle the toxoid and the Biologics and Control Division, NIH performed
the final control tests.93  By August 31, 1944, 101,196 vials of toxoid was sent
overseas, sufficient to protect 1,250,000 men according to an injection schedule of
two 1 ml doses.  Toxoid production was then moved from Camp Detrick to a
commercial company using methods of production developed at Camp Detrick.
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At the January meeting Dr. Baldwin asked about the production of large
quantities of penicillin for therapy against anthrax.  It was agreed that “there were
insufficient facts” available to comment on the production of penicillin.
DEF Committee: 1944-1948
Secretary of War Stimson, acting on the June 1944 recommendation and final
report of the ABC Committee, requested a new NAS-NRC committee be established
to carry on the work of the ABC Committee, providing advice to the War Department
when requested.  The reasons for having such a committee was not only to harness
the best scientific advice possible, but also because, given the risks of mass hysteria
and misunderstanding, “those responsible for conducting the war need the backing of
a group of scientists outside the War Department.”94 By August 1944, the DEF
Committee was formed.95
Because the USBWC would settle questions of policy, the DEF Committee’s
main purpose was to provide advice only on scientific matters.  The first meeting was
held in October 1944.  Members were told that the War Department requested DEF
Committee help in the following matters: (1) reaching a decision on whether
biological warfare is as good or better than existing methods of warfare; (2)
developing improvements in defense against possible enemy use of biological
warfare; (3) planning the postwar program of work on biological warfare.
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By June 1945, the DEF Committee was still discussing these questions. It was
of necessity theoretical, no biological weapon having been actually produced.  At the
time, the War Department did not permit CWS to manufacture and stockpile BW
munitions (the Vigo plant was completed but still being proofed, the Mk I, 4-lb bomb
was in production).  In response to the first question, they recommended that since the
US would be reluctant to use BW even in retaliation, “possibly more time and effort
should be expended on therapy of infectious diseases which may be naturally
encountered or due to enemy actions.”96  In response to the second matter, they urged
more work on dissemination studies, an expansion and intensification of studies on
defense and therapy, and more work on crop destruction agents.  There remained no
consensus on the third point, post-war research.  General Porter, Chief, CWS did
provide his own conclusion, that, “if we have learned anything in this war, it is that
military and naval research must not only be continued and supplemented, but must
have general direction that comes from the intimate knowledge of new things.”97
Prior to the full Committee taking up these issues, a panel of the DEF
committee took up the issue of the control of publications and concerns over the
production and testing of anthrax (leakage and spread).  On December 12, 1944, it
recommended controls on publications in the field of plant hormones (substances that
could be used for the destruction of crops).   Just two weeks later, Dr. Jewett
informed the DEF Committee that he had requested the NAS-NRC’s Advisory
Committee on Scientific Publications to initiate the controls recommended by the
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panel.  By January 1945, the editors of ten scientific journals, nine agricultural
experiment stations, and two USDA officials were advised of the decision to place
such publications under control.98
Upon War’s end, the DEF Committee turned its attention to other publication
issues: what and when scientific information developed under the secret BW program
could be released. It would also make recommendations on the practicality of BW
and the need for future research.  This is taken up in the next chapter.
War’s End
George Merck issued his Report to Secretary Stimson on January 3, 1945.99
An abridged version was released publicly in 1946.   He praised the BW program as
an important contribution to science and national security.  Among its
accomplishments, Merck listed the following:
• Development of methods and facilities for the mass production of
microorganisms and their products;
• Development of methods for rapid and accurate detection of minute
quantities of disease-producing agents;
• Significant contributions to knowledge of the control of airborne disease-
producing agents;
• Production and isolation, for the first time, of a crystalline bacterial toxin,
opening the way for the preparation of a more highly purified immunizing
toxoid;
• Development and production of an effective toxoid in quantities sufficient
to protect large scale operations should it be necessary;
• Significant contributions to knowledge concerning the development of
immunity in humans and animals against certain infectious diseases;
• Important advances in the treatment of certain infectious diseases of
human beings and animals, and in the development of effective protective
clothing and equipment;
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• Development of laboratory animal propagation and maintenance facilities
for strains of experimental animals;
• Applications of special photographic techniques to study airborne
microorganisms;
• Information on the effects of more than 1000 different chemical agents on
living plants;
• Studies of the production and control of certain diseases of plants.
The US program was certainly successful in establishing the study of
biological agents as weapons of war and defenses against it.  After enormous
investments of time, money (at least $44,945,968 for WRS salaries and construction
of Camp Detrick, Vigo, Granite Peak, and Horn Island), and manpower
(approximately 3900 people in the Special Projects Division of CWS alone), Merck
drew an important conclusion, “It is important to note that, unlike the development of
the atomic bomb and other secret weapons during the war, the development of agents
for biological warfare is possible in many countries, large and small, without vast
expenditures of money or construction of huge production facilities.”
At the end of the war, the US had acquired much of the knowledge and some
capability to wage biological warfare.  No agents were extensively stockpiled and no
weapons were ready for use.  Its immediately useful medical contribution was in the
development of a new rinderpest vaccine.  In the public version of Merck’s summary
of the wartime BW work, he spends time discussing the rinderpest project.
The work resulted in building up an adequate defense.  It has made that
particular agent impotent as a weapon in Biological Warfare.  (One might give
a thought to this paradox: While we perfect a biological weapon, we perfect
the defense against it, thereby destroying the weapon.  Would that all weapons
of war could be liquidated from the earth as simply as this.)
The rinderpest project was the first and only one that was designed
exclusively for the pursuit of adequate defenses (vaccines) for production in mass
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quantity.  In this it was immensely successful.  However, no rinderpest weapon was
ever investigated or developed.  No biological weapon of any kind was assembled,
much less perfected.  The future of the US biowarfare project was very much in
doubt.
Conclusion
Civilian scientists played a pivotal role in the establishment of the US
biowarfare program.  Their assessment that advances in technology made bioweapons
feasible and that they would be effective military weapons convinced a skeptical
military to invest in their development.  Once established, the biowarfare program
soon became dominated by the military: civilian scientists were useful for basic
R&D, but policy and information about weaponization was withheld from civilian
oversight.
Several important presumptions about bioweapons became established. First,
that it is necessary to extensively investigate the offense in order to prepare
appropriate defenses.  This is the most important conclusion shared by the US, UK,
and Canadian BW groups from the very beginning –  it continues to shape US BW
policy today.  This led to extensive investigations of offensive applications, but fewer
of defensive remedies (medical or mechanical).  However it was not uniformly
practiced:  development and production of a rinderpest vaccine was pursued prior to
any investigation of potential offensive use.  The rinderpest project was exceptional
because it was carried out by an independent commission and resulted in the
development of an effective vaccine.  In general, projects overseen by the military
tended towards weaponization in no small part because that is what the military’s
58
structure is designed for: the development and effective use of weapons to win wars.
The military is not structured to develop and manufacture medical therapies either for
itself or the civilian population.  Thus, manufacture of a botulinum toxoid and yellow
fever vaccine were ultimately carried out by non-military organizations, even when
the R&D and processes were developed at Fort Detrick (as with the botulinum
toxoid).
Second, many believed it necessary to keep the BW program strictly secret.
The reasoning was that only in this way could the weapon be useful: knowledge of
any BW possession would both allow an enemy to prepare adequate defenses
(vaccines, therapeutic drugs) and provoke emulation – putting the US at risk.
Although the need for a deterrent to enemy BW use was the rationale behind
developing a US BW capability, the inherent contradiction of having a highly secret
BW program coupled to the deterrent rationale was not examined.
Third, little is known about how bioweapons would have been employed for
standard military operations.  Rather, they clearly held significant potential as “agents
of total war” – i.e. strategic terror weapons designed for use against civilian
populations.
Fourth, many assumed that the use of BW would not be governed by moral
considerations or international agreements.  This was expressed in the very first
report of the WBC Committee.  The extended strategic implications of having a
bioweapon and threatening its use was not fully appreciated at the time.
Fifth, fear of technological surprise and the lack of ability to collect useful
intelligence about adversary BW programs created a need for a BW threat
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assessment.  World War II generated enormous concerns about enemy intentions that
helped override pre-war assessments about bioweapons.  Fears about a Nazi BW
program led the US and UK to invest in a more sophisticated bioweapons program
than those founded either by Japan or Germany.  In performing a threat assessment,
the US expanded the list of potential bioweapons based on a self-referential cycle:
i.e., if we can do this, the enemy must either be pursuing the same path or already
have done it.  Worries about being behind caused the US to create the most advanced
BW program in the world.
Sixth, on a large scale, defense against biological weapons is typically much
more complicated than offensive development.  Defense involves monitoring,
detection, surveillance, intelligence collection, production and stockpiling of medical
therapies and physical protective gear, and an organizational capacity to deliver them
when needed.  Offense involves R&D to mass produce, stabilize, enhance the
virulence of, and disseminate an agent and an appropriate delivery device.  Medically,
creating safe and effective vaccines for humans that will work against all varieties of
potential BW agents takes longer than creating the biological weapon itself because
of the complexity of human immunity.  Organizationally, providing medical
protection to every potential victim of a BW attack is more complicated than that
required to put them at risk.
As the US biowarfare program expanded over the next two decades, many of
these presumptions and their consequences remained unexamined.
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Chapter 3: Developing the Offense
“The military exploitation of massive amounts of highly
infectious agents through unusual portals of entry creates new
problems for which these [preventive medicine] were not
designed and against which no experience has been
developed.” – LeRoy Fothergill, M.D., Ft. Detrick scientist
US choices about BW development diverge from those made by the UK after
WWII.  Unlike nuclear weapons, which the UK chose to acquire, the US was alone in
its relentless pursuit of a biological weapons capability during this time.  The BW
program in the former USSR would not begin in earnest until after 1970.   Yet by
1969, the US had the ability to initiate the use of weapons we could not confirm as
being in the arsenal of any other state.  This chapter reviews the history of debate and
motivation for the US BW effort.
In the twenty-four years between World War II and the decision to terminate
the US offensive BW program, biological weapons were produced, agents stockpiled
and tested, and a policy for first-use replaced that of retaliation.  This effort consumed
tens of millions of dollars.  It is therefore remarkable that despite acquisition of a BW
capability in the 1950s and 1960s, the US chose to terminate its entire biowarfare
program in 1969, destroy all its bioweapons, and restrict military BW activities to
primarily defensive R&D thereafter.
The Late 1940s
In the immediate post-war years, opinions diverged over the potential
effectiveness of bioweapons.  In a complete reversal of opinion, many civilian
scientists who urged the initiation of the US BW program were skeptical about such
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weapons at war’s end.  In contrast, the military that had reluctantly embraced the
promise of bioweapons in 1942 became committed to preserving the program.  This
debate played out in the discussions of the DEF Committee regarding publication
issues and over the future of the BW program at Camp Detrick.   The military view
prevailed and launched a new stage of BW research, production, and development in
the 1950s and 1960s.
The DEF Committee: Publication Issues
By CWS request, the DEF Committee – the third BW scientific advisory
committee – provided advice on two major issues in 1945 and 1946.  The first was on
publication of scientific knowledge acquired in the course of BW research at Camp
Detrick.  The second was an assessment of the BW program for the CWS.
In early 1945, the war in Europe clearly favored the allied powers.
Anticipating the end, scientists in the Special Projects Division (SPD), Camp Detrick,
asked the DEF Committee to make a recommendation on the publication of their
work.  The problems the SPD scientists faced were several:  all BW information was
classified as secret or top secret; papers would reveal the scientists’ association with
Camp Detrick – revealing its purpose; and publication of results by associated
universities or institutes under WRS or CWS sponsorship would indicate their interest
in BW studies.  However, much of the work was of fundamental scientific value and
not directly related to BW.
After meeting in February 1945, the DEF Committee recommended that it
take responsibility for accepting, dating, and filing copies of papers that might be
submitted for scientific publication.  It proposed working with the NAS Committee
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on Publications to determine whether papers could be published and – if they could
not be published for security reasons – the authors would be notified and a copy
kept.100  It is not known whether this process was adopted, as publication restrictions
on biological warfare-sponsored research were relaxed later in 1945.
The revised policy was “to retain security restrictions on the military
developments resulting from our research and to make available for the benefit of
humanity, information of scientific value.”101  Some defensive aspects remained
secret when “military necessity” demanded it, but otherwise was unclassified when
no direct reference to any connection with BW work was made.  Also unclassified
were “agents, techniques, and apparatus for the destruction of living plants, when not
identified with classified military activities.”102  Within six months nearly 100 papers
were accepted for publication in scientific journals.103  All offensive investigations
and military developments were to remain secret.  Despite this – in addition to
George Merck’s revelation of the offensive BW program early in 1946 –  two
remarkable publications came out in 1947 and another in 1949.
Theodor Rosebury published his June 1942 study of possible biowarfare
agents for WRS in 1947.  The title is unambiguous, “Bacterial warfare, a Critical
                                                
100 “Excerpt from Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting” (13 February 1945), National
Academies of Science Archives, Committees on Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 5: “Research
Papers: Review of Permission to Publish.”
101 Colonel H.N. Worthley, Chief, SPD, Letter to Frank B. Jewett (27 December 1945), National
Academies of Science Archives, Committees on Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 5: “Joint Security
Control: 1944-1948.”
102 JCS Policy Memo 32 (19 November 1945) “Revised Classification of Matter Concerning Biological
Warfare,” National Academies of Science Archives, Committees on Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box
6: “Meetings: Report & Follow-up: Jun 1946.”
103 William B. Sarles, “Report on DEF Committee Meetings. June 17-18, 1946,” National Academies
of Science Archives, Committees on Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 5: “Joint Security Control:
1944-1948.”
63
Analysis of the Available Agents, Their Possible Military Applications, and the
means for Protection against Them.”104  As introduction, the editor wrote,
Publication of this compilation of data pertaining directly or indirectly to
bacterial warfare seems desirable not only for the sake of its value per se, but
also as a contribution to an informed discussion of the portentous moral and
political issues involved.  As the authors became associated with the
government’s biological warfare project, they are not in a position to
incorporate into the review data published since 1942…. It will not escape the
informed reader, that in a striking number of cases, technical developments
discussed as possibilities in this paper have already become realities as
evidenced by recent publications.105
The second publication in 1947 – also by Theodor Rosebury – directly linked
him with Camp Detrick (the co-author of the book), and hence Camp Detrick with
offensive BW work.106  Experimental Air-Borne Infection  is a detailed account of the
methods and types of experimentation done at Camp Detrick on a range of agents,
documenting the new field of aerobiology.  Later in 1947, possibly in reaction to
many news accounts speculating about the US BW effort, the Army banned
publications on biological weapons.  However, Rosebury then published Peace or
Pestilence: Biological Warfare and How to Avoid It two years later.  It is a fairly
detailed account of offensive and defensive studies done at Camp Detrick during the
war, including scientific references.  Rosebury wrote, “we need not doubt that BW is
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capable of taking its place beside the atomic bomb and other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction.”107
It is clear from these publications that the US had assembled the scientific
base for research on and development of biological weapons.  The US still lacked a
usable weapon, however, and a clear sense of how such a weapon would be used
should one become operational.  This was discussed by the DEF Committee, but even
they could not come to a consensus as to the usefulness of the BW program.
The DEF Committee: The Future of BW Work in Peacetime
After the war, Major General Waitt, Chief, CWS, asked the DEF Committee –
later the Advisory Committee on Biological Warfare – for a thorough review of the
research and development work of the CWS Special Projects Division (SPD).
Knowledge about the US BW program had become public, but no details were
released, leading to speculation.  Rather than deny its existence, CWS wanted to
increase support for the BW program.  However, members of the DEF Committee
were more skeptical about the military usefulness of BW.
At a meeting in June 1946 to review the SPD’s work, the question of how to
respond to an editorial in The New Republic on June 10, 1946 was raised.  The New
Republic wrote:
The War Department, in releasing the Smyth Report, gave the world and the
average man a glimpse of the epochal achievement behind the atomic weapon
and emphasized its fateful meaning for the human race.  There is, however, no
Smyth Report for biological warfare.  The statement made through the War
Department by George Merck, head of the project, was most inadequate…
The subject remains veiled as if it were still wartime and as if this revolution
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in warfare were as legitimate a secret as the minor invention of a new
gunsight.  What our leaders actually may be keeping secret is the nature of the
next war.  So man walks along the precipice, and will not know the depth of
the abyss until the fatal plunge.108
General Waitt thought that an authoritative paper should be published to
respond to such charges and Dr. Woolpert, scientific director of SPD, recommended
Rosebury’s 1942 paper as a useful answer to the editorial.109  (As noted above, this
was done.)  Members of the DEF Committee disagreed, however, on the necessity of
a thorough report on BW.  Dr. Dyer, USPHS, worried that “such a report would have
to be so conservative in its claims – if it adhered strictly to known facts – that it might
jeopardize future appropriations from Congress.” 110  Therefore, information about
potential biological warfare agents were released, but nothing of the military
accomplishments of the US BW program.
After the meeting, Dr. W. Mansfield Clark wrote to the chair of the DEF
Committee, “… you may if you judge wise, quote me as advocating more publicity of
the war-time activities at D [Camp Detrick].  Between you and me and the doorpost, I
am disturbed by the apparent fear on the part of the Generals that the truth will cut the
budget.”111  Dr. Clark, a civilian scientist, had served on all prior BW advisory
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committees and had a thorough knowledge of the wartime work.  He believed BW
work should continue, but with qualification.
Specifically, Dr. Clark was skeptical about pursuing further work on anthrax,
and worried about a lack of military direction.  He and others thought the military
should tell the scientists what they wanted from BW agents.  General Waitt told them
that the military planners don’t know what they want because they are not aware of
the potentialities of BW weapons. 112   There was a difference of opinion as to which
was the cart and which the horse.
At this point, after millions of dollars of investment, the scientific advisors did
not have a sense from the military of what was expected of the biological weapons
they were instructed to develop.  The reason seems to be clear: the military wanted a
BW capability, but had not yet defined how such weapons would be incorporated into
its arsenal.  Strategy for bioweapons was to emerge after a weapon was developed,
but, logically, scientists found it difficult to develop weapons without knowing the
applications for which they were intended.
Because of this lack of direction –  a lack of indication as to military utility –
and the failure to create any usable weapon at all after several years of intensive
effort, many of the scientific advisors recommended terminating the US BW
program.
Dr. Clark closed his letter to Dr. Pepper, Chair of the DEF Committee, on a
very skeptical note, “I am disturbed…by the general attitude that what was started
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during the war must go on with the plea that it will contribute to general well being
and medicine in particular…. It doubtless would not do to say so but I would look
sympathetically to a decision to grease and close D. and farm out some
problems…”113
Another long-time scientific adviser, Ernest Goodpasture, was even more
skeptical.  “It has seemed to me that we have been all along actuated more by an
emotional reaction than by a very critical analysis of the situation…. I am still not
clear about the potentialities of using such biological weapons against personnel of
the enemy.”114  Similarly,  Dr. Hagan wrote, “I would emphasize again that although
progress toward the development of offensive B.W. agents has been somewhat
disappointing…We should go far enough into the subject, now that we have the
facilities for doing so, to satisfy ourselves and generations to come that there is no
practical use for such agents in warfare…”115 The most emphatic opposition to further
BW work came from Dr. J. Howard Mueller:
I am extremely skeptical about the probably efficacy of BW as an offensive
weapon in relation to other known military devices.  Certainly nothing which
has come out of the work thus far offers a practical plan for an offensive use
against human beings…. I am convinced that a large part and perhaps all of
the bacteriological work which is in progress at Detrick or which is projected
could be carried out better in well organized civilian medical research
institutes.  The objective of all this work differs in no way from investigations
which will be carried out in every such medical institution in this country and
in foreign countries. … They are the problems of every day life and will
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continue to be studied intensively and I can see no excuse for putting any of
them into the hands of a segregated group of individuals back of a barbed wire
fence.116
Dr. Pepper provided a summary of the Committee’s views to Dr. Jewett, NAS.
Only Dr. Ira Baldwin expressed strong support for the continuation of BW work.  Dr.
Pepper reported support for continued BW work; but also that certain members
suspected that BW would never prove as efficacious an offensive weapon as other
known military devices.  He recommended efforts to increase the virulence of all
agents under study and research on other agents (in part because anthrax would not be
an effective weapon without an increase in its virulence) and the continuance of an
advisory committee.117
Dr. Jewett then forwarded the report and Dr. Pepper’s letter and wrote to
General Waitt, Chief of CWS, expressing his view that “If the Military are to get full
value out of whatever there may be in b.w. it is essential that the theoretical
possibilities be developed to the limit unhampered by preconceived notions of an
engineering or military character.”118
Gen. Waitt responded that skepticism about the practicability of BW was a
minority opinion (which it was not).  “I am firmly convinced that this is a weapon
capable of achieving decisive effect against an enemy.”    He believed that R&D on
therapies be kept at Detrick, but that the responsibility for production and use of
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biological and chemical preparations developed for prophylactic purposes be the
responsibility of the SGO.119
The contract of the DEF Committee – then renamed the Advisory Committee
on BW – with the government expired in 1946.  General Waitt did not see any further
need for the committee, which met little after the summer of 1946, and so he
terminated it in January 1948.  One scientist wrote back, “There can be no question
concerning the wisdom of the discharge of the Academy Advisory Committee on
Biological Warfare.  Many of us have felt for some time that we were not serving a
very useful purpose.”120
BW Policy Evolution
In 1947, the BW R&D program was placed under the authority of the
Research and Development Board of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.121  A
Chemical and Biological Warfare committee was created to advise the Secretary of
Defense and in 1948 issued a report that concluded that the US was susceptible to
covert attacks.  This led to the creation of the Special Operations division at Camp
Detrick the next year to investigate this threat.  However the JCS still considered
biological weapons in the research and development stage in 1949, that is, weapons
                                                
119 Major General Alden Waitt, Letter to Frank B. Jewett (September 17, 1946), National Academies of
Science Archives, Committees on Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 5: “Advisory Committee on BW
1946-1948.”
120 M.C. Winternitz, M.D., Letter to Dr. A.N. Richards, NAS (February 17, 1948), National Academies
of Science Archives, Committees on Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 5: “Advisory Committee on
BW 1946-1948.”
121 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs, Volume I
(24 February 1977), 2-1.
70
on which there was insufficient reliable information to base military plans or to
develop new military applications.
This JCS view of BW was challenged by an ad hoc committee chaired by
Caryl Haskins.  The committee included the most active supporters of BW work – Dr.
Ira Baldwin and General Waitt – and none of the skeptics. Secretary of Defense
Forrestal asked the committee to “undertake a full examination of all the technical
and strategic possibilities of biological warfare. The subject should be approached,
moreover, from a highly imaginative, although of course also realistic, point of
view…”122  Again, as in 1942, reluctance and skepticism by the military – this time at
the highest levels – about investments into BW was overcome by the persuasion of
scientists and the CWS promising that impressive bioweapons were technically
feasible given major advances in technology and science.
In introducing the report Dr. Haskins wrote, “It was the feeling of the
committee that a brief report dealing with the subject on a broad policy basis and in a
forward-looking manner and suggesting early action in certain major areas would be
more important and of more assistance to you than would extensive technical
studies…. The Report deals with the present capabilities of CEBAR weapons and
emphasizes their future potentialities.”123  The major findings of the 1949 report were
as follows:
1. Biological weapons are at present potent, but not decisive.
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Biological weapons are characterized by: versatility of application,
psychological impact; direct action on man and his living resources, and
non-destruction of material; capacity for self-propagation beyond the
initial target area; difficulty of detection; high ratio of effect-to-weight;
simple and inexpensive mass production.  BW can cause considerable
incapacitation or loss of life, and widespread destruction of animals and
plant crops.  BW are particularly well suited for sabotage against both key
and mass targets.
2. Biological warfare is in its infancy.
Foreseeable improvements in the production and distribution of existing
biological weapons would increase their effectiveness by a large factor.
Medical and biological sciences are on the threshold of great new
advances comparable to those in the atomic field.  New biological
weapons more potent than any now known may be expected – for
example, weapons causing epidemics, glandular or hereditary changes, or
other biological “chain-reactions.”
3. CEBAR attacks on the United States could today be serious and in the
future might be disastrous.
4. Present defenses are not adequate.
5. No operating agency of our Government now has the clearly defined
responsibility for the protection of the civil population against CEBAR attack.
This report echoes past reports in that the most promising application of BW
was for sabotage purposes.  No clear military utility is indicated.  Rather, there is a
strong sense of vulnerability to a BW attack and hence recommendations for better
defenses.  At the time, the Soviet Union was consolidating its power over the East
European countries and war was about to erupt in Korea.  There was no evidence of
an actual BW threat to the US.
Instead, fear of potential enemy capability in 1949 led the US to again invest
heavily in its BW program just as it had in the 1942 in response to a feared Nazi
bioweapon.   The start of the cold war gave rise to concerns about being
technologically inferior to a Soviet BW program, launching the next phase of BW
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development in the US. “The United States, although it enjoys atomic superiority…
does not necessarily possess a corresponding superiority in the field of biological
warfare – in fact, the situation might be the reverse.”124
The Haskins Committee’s first recommendation was that the US military
adopt an adequate program of defense against CEBAR weapons, including research
on defensive measures, public information, and measures to coordinate the defense
activities of various government agencies. It urged the organization of an alert civil
defense organization and new methods for the prevention and cure of infectious
diseases by way of a broad and vigorous research program.  Because most military
BW efforts were in weapons development that the committee supported – and
because the Chemical Corps was not intended to deal with the protection of the
civilian population – the Committee recommended that a separate program be
performed by a separate civilian research organization with some liaison with then
Camp Detrick. 125   It later recommended that strategic planning for the possible
future use of BW be undertaken without further delay.
In 1949, the US military was concerned about BW use as sabotage weapons
just as it had been in 1939 – ten years earlier.  (This is perhaps due to BW being
recognized as a particularly effective sabotage weapon – and little else yet: “the
Committee has noted a paucity of military thinking in the strategic employment of
CEBAR weapons, particularly as elements in a weapon system.”)  And just as before,
a NAS committee saw much greater strategic potential for BW.  However, while the
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WBC Committee had initiated BW work in 1942 on the basis of the presumption that
producing BW was technically feasible, the Haskins Committee urged work on the
presumption of its potential effectiveness despite the fact that BW had not proven
technically feasible at all.
At the time of the report, the US still had no bioweapons ready for use.
Instead, the committee emphasized that “medical sciences are on the threshold of
great new advances.  Within the next decade, man’s new knowledge of biology,
biochemistry, biophysics, and physiology may well place in his hands powers both of
healing and of destruction not even contemplated today.”126  Again, support for
developing BW was based in part on what new knowledge and technology made
possible – and not any military need that no other weapon could fill.
Following the Committee’s recommendation, the Secretary of Defense
convened a second committee to study chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons together.  The Ad Hoc Committee on CBR Warfare in 1950 investigated the
technical and strategic aspects of BW.  It led to significant investments in BW:
establishment of a BW production facility, field tests of BW agents and munitions,
and an expansion of all aspects of BW research.  The perceived need for a BW
program was further heightened by the Korean War.127
Despite the emphasis in the Haskins report on the need for more effective
defense, the focus in the 1950s shifted to emphasize the threat of punishment.
Brigadier General William Creasy, then head of the Research and Engineering
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Command, CWS and later Chief, CWS, wrote in 1952, “although the development of
adequate protective measures against CBR attack is an important part of Chemical
Corps work, the development of superior offensive potential is believed to be an even
greater deterrent to possible aggressors.”128  Here again, although defenses were
determined to be inadequate, the thrust of the CWS work was on weapons
development.  How a secret, superior offensive BW capability was intended to deter a
BW sabotage attack (i.e. not attributable) is not addressed.  There also does not seem
to be consideration of the inferiority of a strategic BW weapon as compared with
nuclear weapons.
After a thorough review in May 1954, a revision in BW policy in 1956 was
made,“to the effect that the US would be prepared to use BW or CW in a general war
to enhance military effectiveness.  The decision to use BW or CW would be reserved
for the President.”129  The timing of the change was linked to a speech by Soviet
Marshall Georgiy Zhukov in February 1956 that seemed to indicate Soviet capability
and intention to use biological weapons in the future.130
Bioweapons Development and Testing: 1950-1969
Between 1945-1949, the US did not achieve any BW production.  The Vigo
plant was sold and all field test sites were shut down (other than Dugway Proving
Ground).  Vulnerability tests were conducted to assess the threat of sabotage with BW
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beginning in 1949.  Repeatedly over these years, concerns about the vulnerability of
the civilian population was expressed and used to justify military testing, although the
military was not responsible for civil defense.  After the 1949 and 1950 reviews, this
lull in the BW program ended and a new intensive period began.
Small scale pathogenic field testing resumed in 1950 at Dugway.  The first
anti-animal BW test was conducted in July 1951, but the anti-animal program was
discontinued in 1954 because it lacked military worth.  The first anticrop bomb was
“developed, tested, and placed in production for the air force” in 1951, providing the
first limited BW retaliatory capability.131 Research and development on anticrop BW
expanded, was discontinued in 1958, then restarted in 1959.  Five BW anticrop agents
were standardized and three anticrop biological agents were produced and stockpiled:
stem rust of wheat and rye and rice blast.  The total amount of anti-crop material in
the US inventory in 1969 was 160,510 pounds, mostly at Rocky Mountain Arsenal,
but also at Ft. Detrick and Beal Air Force Base.132
During the 1950s, the Chemical Corps “concentrated on standardizing the
agents investigated during World War II and weaponizing them at Fort Detrick” with
the highest priority placed on anti-personnel agents.133  Eight antipersonnel agents
were standardized.  Rather than continue an open-ended research program, the JCS
tasked the Army to develop specific BW agents in September 1951. Work on the
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creation of Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), a new BW agent and munitions production
center, was completed in 1953 at a cost of $90 million.  By early 1954, Pine Bluff
achieved production readiness.134  In the spring of 1954, PBA began producing its
first BW agent: Brucella suis.  A year later, large scale production of Pastuerella
tularensis began.135 PBA was the only facility operated for large scale production of
antipersonnel BW agents (known later as the Directorate of Biological Operations,
DBO).  It had the capacity to produce bacterial, viral, and rickettsial agents and also
toxins and the capacity to grow and infect mosquitoes with viral agents.
Between 1954 and 1967, the facility produced the following biological agents
and toxins: Brucella suis, Francisella tularensis, Q fever rickettsia, VEE,
Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, and staphylococcal enterotoxin.  Bulk
agents and antipersonnel munitions filled with these various agents and toxins
were produced and stored at DBO as a deterrent capability.136
The Army’s BW effort was boosted in 1960.  The reason for the increase was
not necessarily based on the military usefulness of the BW program, but possibly
because Herbert York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, wanted to
compensate the Army for having eliminated them from competition for strategic
intercontinental ballistic missiles and for the transfer and consolidation of military
space programs in the Air Force and NASA.137  The bioweapons program was
reorganized  and the structure of its operations are shown in figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: Concept of Munitions Command (1962)
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Upon taking office, the Kennedy Administration ordered a reassessment of
BW: the JCS was to “evaluate the potentialities of BW/CW, considering all possible
applications; and, prepare a costed plan for development of an adequate BW/CW
capability.”138  In their response, the JCS relied upon a 1960 report of the Biological
and Chemical Defense Planning Board (DOD).  Part of their recommendation was for
increased emphasis on bioweapons that would incapacitate because “the advent of
limited war and small scale conflict evoked a need for weapons which could assist in
controlling conflict with minimum casualties.”139
Instead of agents of maximum destruction, BW was promoted as “agents of
minimum destruction” because they did not destroy infrastructure and facilities.
“Biological warfare weapons have unique potentialities which could very well make
them most attractive to an enemy bent upon subjugation but not total destruction.”140
The new Chief Chemical Officer, Maj. Gen. Marshall Stubbs, described the new
approach to BW nonlethals:
If we recognize the fact that conflict has a spectrum, that it is not a matter of
holocaust or surrender, then it would be foolish to assume that the infinite
military variety offered by chemical and biological weapons has not been
carefully scrutinized by a potential aggressor… we must provide our own
forces with the same form of measured response.  That we possess this form
of response is extremely important.  First, because it gives us a possible
deterrent for that level of conflict.  Second, it gives us the ability to engage in
that level of conflict on an equal footing.  It gives us the means to avoid
stronger measures which could escalate the form of conflict.  In short, CBR is
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synonymous with the flexibility required by a concept of measured and
restrained response…141
Plausible on the face of it, this reasoning was flawed as regards bioweapons.
BW, like nuclear weapons, offered little flexibility in the way of a spectrum of
conflict.  Any detected use of BW during war would likely escalate the conflict to the
level of a nuclear response.  This reasoning was not recognized at the time, but was
later a major factor in the elimination of the program in 1969.
Upon review of the JCS recommendations, the DDRE concurred that
bioweapons “had great potential; however, he felt that they could be considered
operational only in the most limited sense and that the task of measuring their impact
accurately still had to be done.”142  However, by 1960, numerous tests had already
been done: 85 series of field tests with biological simulants; 10 field tests of non-
biological simulants; and at least 40 series of field tests with pathogenic agents
(Coxiella burnetii, psittacosis virus, Brucella suis, Pasteurella tularensis, Bacillus
anthracis).143
Yet at this point, the US still felt more work with agents was necessary.  By
contrast, after a series of sea trials between 1948-1955, the UK abandoned their plans
to develop an offensive BW capability.  Early BW munitions work was terminated.
This decision was not based on the inutility of bioweapons. Rather, the sea trials had
confirmed the results of earlier testing: that BW was feasible, that it was likely to be
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relatively cheap and certainly many times more ‘toxic’ on an agent weight basis than
any chemical weapons agent.144
As a result of the UK trials with agents (and after 1955, with simulants alone)
the consensus that emerges by the 1970s is that, “the trials consistently showed the
feasibility of BW at sabotage, tactical and strategic levels and demonstrated the
extreme vulnerability of the UK…. Perhaps, above all, the trials emphasized the
relative simplicity and economy of BW.”145
This conclusion was shared by the JCS in the US by the late 1960s after an
intensive series of tests with both live agents and simulants.  To carry out the testing,
the DOD created a new task group: Project 112 Working Group.  The Army’s BW
budget was increased in the early 1960s to support an expansion of testing.  A major
reorganization of the CWS followed: the BW program was centered at Fort Detrick
and BW testing was assigned to a Testing and Evaluation Command.
According to one estimate, at least fifty trials took place under Project 112
from December 1962 – 1970, the majority of which was designed to test the offensive
capacity of biological weapons.146  A single trial often involved hundreds of bomb
tests.
During the last 10 years of the offensive research and development program,
many scientific advances were made that proved that biological warfare was
clearly feasible, although dependent on careful planning, especially with
regard to meteorological conditions.  Large-scale fermentation, purification,
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concentration, stabilization, drying, and weaponization of pathogenic
microorganisms could be done safely.147
By the end of the Johnson Administration – after over twenty-five years of
investment and hundreds of millions of dollars spent – an offensive bioweapons
capability was finally at hand.  “During the 1960s… the Army showed that it had met
the challenge of large-scale attack, at least by its own calculations.”148
Medical Defenses against BW
When President Nixon terminated the offensive program in 1969, the US had
an arsenal of biological weapons at the ready and enough knowledge to use them
effectively either in a theater of war or for sabotage.  However, it still lacked the
ability to adequately protect all its soldiers and, more importantly, the civilians who
were considered even more likely targets of a BW attack.  As of the mid-1970s, the
US still lacked BW field detectors: research on detection, warning, decontamination,
and protection was still largely at an exploratory, conceptual stage.  Experimental
vaccines had been developed for a large number of agents, but the SGO and USPHS
still lacked the policies and procedures to stockpile large quantities of these agents.
Furthermore, some vaccines were effective, but involved multiple inoculations and
had serious adverse reactions.
The Army Surgeon General’s Office was involved in BW discussions from
the beginning of the program and continued to have responsibility for medical
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defenses.  In 1952, the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council reported that there was
no scientific data to assess human vulnerability to biological agents (as opposed to
tests with simulants).149  The risk for humans was being extrapolated from animal
tests.  That was remedied with the initiation of human testing. The rationale was
given by LeRoy Fothergill, senior Ft. Detrick scientist:
A number of unique medical problems might be created when man is exposed
to an infectious agent through the respiratory route rather than by the natural
portal of entry…. In some instances a different clinical disease picture may
result from this route of exposure, making diagnosis difficult. In tularemia
produced by aerosol exposure, one would not expect to find the classical ulcer
of “rabbit fever” on a finger…  I cannot emphasize the following point too
forcefully.  May I point out that the marvelous techniques of preventive
medicine were developed over the years for dealing with naturally occurring
infectious disease.  The military exploitation of massive amounts of highly
infectious agents through unusual portals of entry creates new problems for
which these procedures were not designed and against which no experience
has been developed.150
The term “Operation Whitecoat” refers to Army plans to use human
volunteers in field testing with biological agents.  Authority for the first field test to
conduct dose-response data on Q fever was granted in January 1955 under project
CD-22.  It was a two-year project and considered successful enough to warrant the
creation of the US Army Medical Unit (USAMU) at Camp Detrick in June 1956.
USAMU was given the Army Medical Department’s research responsibilities to
provide a BW defense.151  In 1958, USAMU was assigned to the US Army Medical
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Research and Development Command (USAMRDC) and in 1969, USAMU became
the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID.
After CD-22, the first research project involving human volunteers was
designed to identify the infectious dosages of Pasteurella tularensis.  The second
involved Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE).   In 1964, the immunization
requirements for VEE and tularemia were “reasonably established.”152  Human
testing continued and expanded to include testing of Q fever vaccines.  (All three
were also weaponized.)
In the summary provided by the army in 1977 (Annex K: Research Projects
Involving Volunteers 1954-1969), there are accounts of experimentation with the
tularemia and VEE organisms, but no accounts of human testing with any other kinds
of organisms.  The results of many of these tests were published in the open scientific
literature, including findings of the effects of aerosol age on the infectivity of airborne
P. tularensis and the effects of P. tularensis on blood chemistry when acquired by the
respiratory route.
Despite advances in medical knowledge about the effects of bioweapons and
medical defenses, efforts to organize the civil defense plans were not nearly as
advanced.  In 1954, responsibilities were delegated to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare for a Public Health Service Civil Defense Program.153  That
included planning a national program for the protection and emergency restoration of
community facilities essential to health; for the protection of humans against BW,
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CW and other public health hazard (including communicable diseases); and to
provide a reservoir of trained professional personnel who could be swiftly deployed
in areas damaged by enemy attack. In addition, HEW was made responsible for
immunization studies and development of vaccines of enhanced effectiveness; the
detection, prevention, and control of airborne diseases, and laboratory techniques for
rapid identification of biological agents, among other duties.  These responsibilities
were reiterated in the “National Biological and Chemical Warfare Defense Plan” of
October 1959.154  There is no mention of responsibilities for actual production or
stockpiling of medical therapies against biological weapons.
It was recognized within the military that defense against large-scale
application was improbable:  “Biological warfare stresses the value of vaccinations,
but it is dangerous to depend too greatly on them.  Logistically, it is impossible to
develop vaccines against all the diseases which might be used as BW agents and have
them in the right places at the right times.  Furthermore, there is no solid immunity
against many agents, particularly when the disease results from relatively massive
attacks…”155
Table 2 below is a crude summary of the initial status of work with agents as
of 1969, when the offensive program was terminated.  Because it is unknown what
agents were stored in which munitions, those munitions are listed separately.
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Vaccines for all agents were experimental as of 1969.  Supplies were very small and
intended solely for military use.
TABLE 2:  Biological Weapons (1944-1969)156
Agent 1969: Safety Program 1969: Weapons Program
Anthrax
(Bacillus anthracis)







B, C, D, E







(425); Skin Test developed:
Research years 1960-1969





Vaccines developed: VEE, EEE:
Research years 1960-1974






Vaccines developed: Q Fever







Vaccine and Skin Test
developed: Brucella suis
 Standardized in 1954: used with
the M114 4-lb anti-personnel bomb
that held 320mL of Brucella suis.
108 M114s were clustered in the












pestis: Research years 1965-1974
Dysentery (Shigella
dysenteriae)
Cholera (Vibrio cholera) Vaccine developed: Vibrio
comma
                                                
156 Information on the 1945 agent list comes from “The Research Program of the War Research
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Warfare, Series 2, “Meetings: June 1944”.  Information on BW agents and munitions stockpiled comes
from Memo for the President from Dr. Edward E. David (6 July 1970); White House Title Folder Vol.
1 (1969); Box 1; WHCF; SMOF David; Nixon presidential Matierials, National Archives.  Vaccine
information comes from Department of the Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare
Programs, Volume II (24 February 1977): G-4.
157 Michael A. Guhin, “Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger,” (December 18, 1969), NSC Files, Subject
Files, Box 310, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc), vol. 1. NARA, Nixon Presidential









Rift Valley Fever Vaccine developed: Rift Valley
virus (1963-1974)
Ricin
Yellow fever Vaccine developed: Yellow
Fever virus




Weaponization work after 1964.
Not standardized by 1969: several
hundred lbs stockpiled.
Rio Bravo virus Vaccine developed: Rio Bravo
virus
RMSF Vaccine developed: Rocky
Mountain Spotted Fever Virus
(1972-1974)
Salmonella typhi Vaccine developed: Salmonella
typhii














Hog cholera and Newcastle virus
tested as antianimal BW at Plum




Late Blight of Potato
Sclerotium Rot
Cereal rusts (Puccinia) Wheat rust: 158,684 lb (1955) for
use primarily against cereal crops.




Rice blast (?) 1,865 lb
Munitions
M 1 (toxin & simulant
filled)
4450
M 2 (toxin, biological,
simulant)
71,696
M 4 (biological &
simulant)
21,150
M 5 (simulant only) 90




Total lethal agent in filled munitions was 737.5  pounds.  Total anti-crop
munitions was: 1,856 lbs (Ft. Detrick); 153,463 lbs (Rocky Mountain Arsenal); 5,191
lbs (Beal Air Force Base, CA).158
Throughout the US effort to weaponize these agents and develop vaccines,
there was almost no knowledge of what the USSR had in the way of bioweapons.
That is, the rationale for acquiring a BW capability was based more on the potential
effectiveness of such weapons (as described in the 1949 and 1950 reports) rather than
as a response to reliable intelligence about enemy BW capability.
By 1969, the militaries of the US and UK seemed to be in agreement about the
likely effectiveness of bioweapons – and the US possessed both a stockpile and the
capacity to produce them on a large scale.  After all this effort and investment on the
part of the US, however, President Nixon chose to suddenly terminate the offensive
program within the first year of his term.  There remains no clear rationale for the
decision, only speculation.
Many consider that it was for solely political reasons, albeit that a rational
connected with uncontrollability was stated.  This rationale had not hitherto
been considered during the several decades of the US BW capability.  Its
validity at the time of Nixon’s statement has been questioned and it has been
refuted in recent years, but not, probably, by US official sources. 159
At the heart of the debate is the effectiveness of bioweapons.  This was played
out between reports prepared by several interdepartmental groups established to
provide an assessment of BW and CW.  On one side was the President’s Scientific
                                                
158 Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, “Annual Review of United States Chemical Warfare
and Biological Research Programs as of 1 November 1970,”  Doc 24b downloaded from
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58.
159 Peter Hammond and Gradon Carter, From Biological Warfare to Healthcare: Porton Down 1940-
2000 (Houndsmills, UK: PALGRAVE, 2002), 57.
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Advisory Board (PSAC) and the Interdepartmental Advisory Group.  On the other
was the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  Again, as before, civilian scientific
and military groups perceived the feasibility and effectiveness rather differently at a
crucial decisionmaking moment.   This time civilian scientific advice prevailed
through a bureaucratic process that omitted the military’s case for bioweapons.
The 1969 Choice to Disarm
On April 30, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird asked National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger to review CW and BW policy.  In response, Morton Halperin, an
NSC staffer, wrote that a draft National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) was
being prepared.  On May 28, 1969, Henry Kissinger issued NSSM 59 to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and the Director, ACDA.
NSSM 59 stated that the President directed “a study of U.S. policy, programs, and
operational concepts with regards to both chemical and biological warfare and
agents” be undertaken to “examine present U.S. policy and programs on CBW, the
main issues confronting that policy, and the range of possible alternatives thereto.”160
In response, three interdepartmental groups were formed by the NSC staff:
one evaluated foreign chemical and biological warfare capabilities and was staffed by
the intelligence community; the second examined military options for CBW
employment, with emphasis on establishing their military utility; and the third
explored diplomatic options for the President (ratification of the Geneva Protocol and
                                                
160 “National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 59,” Downloaded from
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEVV/NSAEBB58.  Source: FOIA Request.
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negotiation of additional arms control agreements).161 NSC staff also asked the
President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) to write a report on chemical and
biological weapons technology.
The PSAC report recommended that the US forfeit its BW capability while
maintaining a vigorous defensive research program; ratification of the Geneva
Protocol; renunciation of first use of lethal and incapacitating lethal CW; and
continuation of research on the synthesis of toxins.162  Biological weapons, according
to the PSAC report, posed a potential long-term danger because of the potential for
mutation into an unknown or uncontrollable pathogen.  A strategic analysis from the
Office of Systems Analysis in the Defense Department was also critical of
bioweapons and their possible value as either a deterrent or coercive instrument.163  In
contrast, the report submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for maintenance of
existing biological capabilities: it was more optimistic about the reliability of BW and
the ability to control it in the field and included almost no mention of the technical
drawbacks of BW mentioned in the PSAC report.164
To resolve the sharp discrepancy, Defense Secretary Laird decided to
withdraw the JCS paper and ordered a new report from the Office of International
                                                
161 Forrest Russel Frank, U.S. Arms Control Policymaking: the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
Case Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University (November 1974), 109-110.
162 Forrest Russel Frank, U.S. Arms Control Policymaking: the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
Case Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University (November 1974), 115.
163 Han Swyter, “Political Considerations and Analysis of Military Requirements for Chemical and
Biological Weapons,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 65, no. 1 (Jan. 15, 1970): 261-270.  Cited in Forrest Russel Frank, U.S. Arms Control
Policymaking: the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention Case Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University
(November 1974), 115.
164 Forrest Russel Frank, U.S. Arms Control Policymaking: the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
Case Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University (November 1974), 119.
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Security Affairs, who cribbed heavily from the PSAC report.  His motivation for this
is unknown.  At the time, the US was under heavy international pressure to act on
biological and chemical weapons both internally from Congress because of reported
incidents relating to testing, transportation and overseas storage of CW and BW and
externally because of US use of riot control agents in Vietnam.  At the Eighteen-
National Disarmament Committee, the UK tabled a Draft Convention on Biological
Weapons on July 10, 1969.  At the UN, the UN Secretary-General issued a report on
CBW that drew attention to the danger of proliferation of such weapons if they were
not effectively banned.
The Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG) drew from the IG
reports and submitted its report to the NSC on November 10, 1969.  As to Soviet BW
capability, it wrote “Useful intelligence on actual production, weaponization and
stockpiling is nonexistent.”165  In considering US BW capabilities, the report states:
“No large inventory of dry (powdered) anti-personnel lethal or incapacitating
biological agents is maintained and only eight aircraft spray disseminators are in the
inventory.  No missile delivery capabilities are currently maintained for delivery of
biological agents, although a bomblet-containing warhead for the SERGEANT
missile has been standardized, but not produced in quantity. Small quantities of both
lethal and incapacitating biological agents are maintained in special warfare
devices.”166
                                                
165 Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, “Report to the National Security Council: US Policy on
Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents,” (November 10, 1969): 8.  Downloaded from
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58.
166 Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, “Report to the National Security Council: US Policy on
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Clearly, the IPMG report presents a dismal picture of US BW capabilities.
While no large inventory was maintained – possibly because of issues relating to loss
of virulence in storage – the numbers of people potentially held at risk from BW was
rather large – the area potentially affected by a bioweapon was estimated to be greater
than the US atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.167  Again, no results of the
numerous field tests were included.  Defense against BW was presented as primitive:
“No biological detection system is presently deployed or in prospect.  There is no
effective prophylaxis for large-scale or multi-agent biological attacks.”168  Funding
for the BW program was insignificant: at its height (FY64), the US spent $39 million.
At the November 18 NSC meeting to consider future CW and BW options,
General Earl Wheeler presented the original JCS position, but was opposed by other
members of the NSC who already knew Secretary Laird’s position.169  The Joint
Chiefs position on three major policies was overruled.  The NSC instead endorsed a
US renunciation of biological weapons, the renunciation of first use of lethal and
incapacitating chemical weapons, and a resubmission of the Geneva Protocol to the
Senate.170
A week later, President Nixon issued National Security Decision
Memorandum 35.   In it, the US renounced the use of lethal and other methods of
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biological warfare, announced the destruction of existing BW stocks, restricted its
biological programs to R&D for defensive purposes, and associated the US with the
UK draft BW convention.171 The US also renounced the first use of lethal and
incapacitating chemical weapons (excluding riot control agents or herbicides).  A few
months later, President Nixon included toxins in his unilateral ban according to
National Security Decision Memorandum 44.  Curiously, a consensus among the
leaders of State, Defense, the JCS, the UN Secretary General, and WHO – and shared
by the President’s science advisor – was that toxins were chemical weapons.172
Destruction of all biological weapons stockpiles began in 1971.
Demilitarization of antipersonnel agents was completed in January 1972.  Anticrop
agents stored at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Beale Air Force Base, and Ft. Detrick were
destroyed by October 1972.173  Ft. Detrick entered a period of uncertainty as to its
future operation as 75% of it was shut down by mid-1971.  USAMRIID and the US
Naval Unit were the only two small units that remained at Ft. Detrick performing BW
R&D.
As a result of the decision to terminate the program, much information about
the once highly secret program became publicly available.  In 1973, the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute published its six-volume study, The Problem of
Chemical and Biological Warfare, a standard in the field that included many details
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about CB agents, their utility, and national policies and programs.174  In that same
year, the USSR launched its program to modernize its bioweapons program and
founded Biopreparat.175
The Biological Weapons Convention
On April 10, 1972, President Nixon signed the “Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,” known commonly as the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC).  It is a brief document, lacking enforcement or
verification activities.  The first article is the most important: it intends to encompass
all relevant activity then and henceforth:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origins or
methods of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification
for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
The BWC entered into force in 1975.  Efforts to enhance verification of its
terms stalled in recent years.  One problem is the dual-use nature of research related
to biological weapons:  nearly all basic research on defense against BW can be
employed on behalf of offensive work.  Any attempt to monitor all relevant work runs
up against concerns over commercial proprietary information and national security.
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Without a reliable deterrent or monitoring ability, the US nonetheless continued its
biodefense research at USAMRIID.
All research at USAMRIID was unclassified from 1969 - 1990.  The impact of
this decision and the medical contributions of the program are important pieces of the
US biodefense history that is not told in the policy literature.
Conclusion
Several notable features emerge about the US BW program from 1942-1969.
First, the US never limited its work to agents it had strong reason to believe was
being investigated by other states.  This was true from the earliest years, and
continued to be true throughout the course of the offensive biowarfare program.
Knowledge of enemy capabilities and intentions were inferred based on what the US
was itself pursuing.  The US never had reliable intelligence of any specific enemy
BW work in this period of time.
Second, while the initial justification for the program was defense, the US
created several offensive bioweapons without ever developing an adequate defense.
Threat assessment activities identified US vulnerabilities and methods to exploit
them, but not the organizational, medical, or technical capacity to protect either
military personnel or civilians.  As a single notable example, a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) from 1951, warned that “contaminated letters may be sent directly to
the intended victims, without risk of detection.”176  Fifty years later there was nothing
in place to reduce that threat.
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The military had the institutional capability to efficiently produce weapons
and protective gear, but lacked the internal structure to produce and stockpile
vaccines. Protection of the civilian population was assigned to the Public Health
Service, but they, too, lacked the organization and authority to produce and stockpile
vaccines and drugs and the structure to quickly deliver them should the need have
arisen.
Third, civilian scientific advice was instrumental in initiating and terminating
the US biowarfare program.  In the interim, civilian scientific advice waned as
military programs to develop and stockpile BW weapons dominated the program’s
focus.
Fourth, the decision to terminated the offensive BW program seems to have
been made without some significant information about the military effectiveness of
bioweapons. In the end, broader political considerations and bureaucratic
maneuvering contributed to the termination of the program.  The reasoning applied by
the Office of Systems Analysis demonstrated convincingly that BW simply could not
be employed on any level when one considered the likely reaction of an enemy: major
escalation of a conflict to the level of nuclear warfare.
Fifth, for years the need to possess bioweapons was justified by deterrence:  to
prevent enemy use, the US needed to be able to threaten retaliation in kind.  The
problem, however, with this logic was the competing desire to keep the entire BW
program secret.  A BW deterrent could not be effective if the enemy did not know the
US possessed an effective bioweapon.  However, revealing the existence of such
weapons could spur an arms race and reduce its potential impact by indicating which
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agents were weaponized – and hence allowing an enemy to stockpile medical and
physical protections.  Deterrence could, in theory, work for nuclear weapons because
revelation of their possession does not diminish the punitive power of a nuclear strike
– there are no defenses in the event of a detonation.  Possession of BW – because it
must be kept secret to preserve its utility – is only for offensive, surprise uses.
Sixth, the presumption that bioweapons were easy for small states to create
pushed the investigation of sabotage possibilities and contributed to the fear of the US
vulnerability to such attacks.  Clearly, creating effective bioweapons for strategic use
was neither cheap nor easy.  Scientists overcame significant hurdles in developing the
agents for offensive use and their delivery systems.  These then required expensive
and extensive testing.  Testing of simulants was itself risky and detected across a
large area.  Testing of actual agents required large, isolated spaces to prevent
accidental exposures and yet accidents did happen that led to the revelation – and
contributed to the termination – of the US biowarfare program.  Yet because imitation
is swifter and surer than creation, there is something to the observation by Matthew
Meselson, a scientist who contributed to the PSAC reported, that by pursuing a BW
capability, the US was pioneering threats to its own security.
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 Chapter 4:  Relying on Defense
“Obviously, defensive measures will lag behind a given
biothreat; however, the same technologies that make these new
potential threats possible will also help counter them.”
—USAMRIID Commander, David Huxsoll (1986)
After nearly thirty years spent pursuing a predominantly offensive program
for the development of biological weapons, the US military had to radically alter
course and limit itself to defensive research. Between 1969-1990, USAMRIID
pursued important work on medical defenses against bioweapons at a very small
fraction of a percent of the DOD budget.  Work at USAMRIID incorporated new
technologies and new agents as potential threats were identified.  During this time,
foreign scientists worked at USAMRIID and US researchers cooperated on
international projects to test new therapies and vaccines that aided both foreign
countries where diseases were endemic and the US biodefense research program.
After 1969, there were two major changes to the way biodefense work was
conducted: it operated without an offensive program and it operated at an unclassified
status. This was stated repeatedly and emphatically reaffirmed in the Biological
Defense Research Program in 1989:
While the detailed threat analyses provided by the intelligence community are
classified, ALL WORK CONDUCTED UNDER THE BDRP IS
UNCLASSIFIED.  Those results which impinge on the national security may
be classified in accordance with Army Regulation 380-86. 177
                                                
177 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Biological Defense
Research Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD:
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The emphasis is in the text.  This decision to keep all work under the BDRP
unclassified came despite the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax release, reports of deaths from
T-2 mycotoxins in Southeast Asia, and other reports indicating the existence of
biological weapons programs in other states.   Therefore, in the midst of revelations
of an evolving threat, a deliberate choice was made to operate the US Biodefense
program under basic transparency rules and to retain the defensive focus of its work.
To gather policy implications from this history, it is important to assess the
biodefense work done at USAMRIID by examining the capability created in several
key areas:
1. Ability to assess new threats (utility of their threat assessments) – both
agent-based and technology-based;
2. Ability to respond to novel threats (based on IC information and
technology-enabled threats) and incorporate new technology to develop
better vaccines and therapies against threats new and old (medical
countermeasures); and,
3. Ability to develop useful detection devices – both for environmental
samples and for clinical use.
There are two critical questions:  how did the unclassified nature of the work
impact national security, and were the results of the biodefense work heavily
dependent on findings made under the offensive program?  These are taken up at the
end of the chapter.  If a credible judgment can be made that the unclassified US
biodefense program was essentially successful since 1969, then one has to question
whether any recent changes in the security environment warrants its adjustment.
USAMRIID: 1969-1990
The US Army Medical Unit was renamed USAMRIID in 1969 and continued
the work of creating medical defenses against biological agents.  As USAMRIID
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began operations, the disposition of stockpiles of biological weapons occurred
quickly over the course of the early 1970s.
Any description of USAMRIID’s research will necessarily be incomplete.
USAMRIID compiled Annual Reports from FY1969-FY1990.    Two of these years
(1983 and 1984) were said to never have been published.178  However, references to
these documents were made in subsequent Annual Reports.  It is likely that
administrative changes led to the disruption in publishing these reports.179  No Annual
Reports are available after FY1990 because there was no further requirement for them
from the Army Surgeon General.  The first war in Iraq and concerns after the terrorist
and anthrax letter attacks of 2001 led to a reconsideration of government policy:
USAMRIID now implements biosecurity policies that limit its transparency and
openness.
Many of the early years of the program included detailed descriptions of the
research work.   These became more abbreviated in the 1980s.  Overall it provides a
reasonable sense of the scope of the research performed.  Not all work was published
in the open scientific literature, although USAMRIID scientists regularly published
many of their findings internally.
The information in this chapter is brief summary compiled from hundreds of
individual work units from 1969-1990.  Over that time work at USAMRIID was
reorganized several times and the coding for the work units changed (1977, 1981,
1985).  Every attempt was made to accurately track individual research projects
                                                
178 Email communication with Denise Lupp USAMRMC Command Librarian/USAMRIID Library
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179 Personal communication, September 27, 2006.
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through time (FY69-FY90), but a few errors may have been made.  Dramatic changes
in FY81 and FY85 made further sequential tracking impossible.
In addition, the three subcategories of research described – pathogenesis,
vaccines and therapy, and detection – were artificially imposed.  In only a few years
was work categorized in this way (FY1969 – FY1976).  In more recent years, there
were numerous sub-categories.  Finally, judgments were made as to where a work
unit that encompassed more than one category fit best.  In general, if work on
pathogenesis led to a new therapy or method of detection, it would go into one of the
latter categories.
A fuller description of the work is in Appendix A and a list of all work units is
attached as Appendices B-D: these include information organized by category of
research, along with a title of the work unit, the PI(s), total funding, professional man
years committed, and total number of publications.
Funding
Funding at USAMRIID increased regularly between 1969-1989. Figure 3
below shows growth from just over $1 million to nearly $20 million by FY87.  There
are two jumps in funding: in FY73 and FY85.  (The increase was likely in FY84,
when a reorganization led to the initiation of numerous new work units.)  The reasons
for these shifts are not known.  (If one converts these sums to 2006 constant dollars,
the average spending at USAMRIID was approximately $23 million per year.)
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Generally, the majority of effort was on the development of vaccines and
therapies for agents that posed a biowarfare or medical threat to soldiers.  Less was
spent on general pathogenesis studies, and the least was spent on detection devices.
Table 3: Funding at USAMRIID by area





Vaccines/Therapies $119,491,399.00 62% 814.3 55% 943 53%
Pathogenesis $56,082,200.00 29% 508.25 34% 559 32%
Detection $16,784,700.00 9% 167.9 11% 260 15%
TOTAL $192,358,299.00 100% 1490.45 100% 1762 100%
New agents were periodically added to the list as new diseases emerged and
also in reaction to possible indications of Soviet BW work (T-2 mycotoxins and the
Sverdlovsk anthrax release).  Research focused on certain Bunyaviruses, Togaviruses,
Flaviviruses, and Arenaviruses, in addition to toxins.  There were other smaller
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projects on Ebola and AIDs.  The majority of effort throughout this time was spent on
arboviruses, hemorrhagic fever viruses, and toxins.  Rickettsia were actively studied
in the early part of this time, but most research was terminated or transferred to
WRAIR in the late 1970s, as more effort was devoted to anthrax, hemorrhagic fever,
and toxin studies.
Over this twenty-year period, numerous experimental vaccines and chemical
therapies were developed and tested, but only two received FDA approval: a vaccine
for anthrax; and the antiviral drug ribavirin for treatment of respiratory syncytial
virus.
No experiments required use of dry aerosolized agents.  Most notably, in only
two cases was a vaccine that was shown effective against the wild type or parent
strain of an agent not shown effective against a challenge with more virulent strain or
different portal of entry.  For anthrax, later tests in more appropriate animal models
established the effectiveness of the vaccine against all strains.  Only the plague
vaccine was ever known to be ineffective against an aerosol challenge.
Again, all research at USAMRIID was unclassified.  This did not mean all
results were published or that all results are still available.  However, it did allow
USAMRIID to host foreign scientists and to engage in important collaborative
research projects.
There are references to certain agents being “acquired” – for exampled, dried
powders of virulent anthrax (Vollum 1B) and streptomycin-resistant tularemia
(SCHU-S5).  Because all stockpiles of agents were reported as destroyed by 1972, it
is assumed that these were not produced at USAMRIID, but under contract for
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specific research purposes.  The methods of doing such are likely classified and
therefore are not referenced in the annual reports.
An Overview of USAMRIID’s Work
USAMRIID’s unclassified work involved the following kinds of
experimentation with potential bioweapons agents:
• Vaccine and Adjuvant Development
• Antiviral Drug Development / Drug Screening
• Assay Development






• Host Range Studies
• Aerosol Animal Model Development
• Basic Pathogenesis
Much of the basic research into pathogenesis, host range studies, aerosol
animal model development, bioregulators/immunomodulators, and genetic
engineering was applied to further the advancement of drug discovery, vaccine
development, and the creation of assays to detect agents.  Taken out of context or in
isolation, some of the work could be characterized as potentially offensive work –
such is the nature of most scientific exploration.  However, the application of the
information gained was clearly defensive.  This can be seen from the heavy emphasis
on vaccine development (and adjuvants) and on the development and testing of
antivirals and assays for detection.  Development and validation of new medical
therapies depended on this integrated approach.
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Vaccine Research
USAMRIID spent the vast majority of its funding and manpower – (62% and
55%, respectively) – on the development of vaccines and therapies to major biothreat
agents.  As of 1969, only the anthrax and tularemia vaccines were considered to be
both safe and effective against various forms of their respective diseases (the licensed
plague vaccine was safe but not effective against aerosolized Y. pestis).  Even then,
tests from the 1960s and 1980s indicated that the anthrax vaccine was not effective
against all virulent strains, such as Ames, that were labeled as “vaccine-resistant.”
(That concern was diminished after 2002.)  Therefore, as of 1969, the biodefense
researchers could be certain that only a single vaccine – the LVS for tularemia – was
both safe for widespread use and effective against a virulent aerosol based on
challenge tests in humans performed in the 1960s.  LVS is still an IND vaccine.
For all the other agents that had been weaponized, the vaccines in existence
were known to induce unacceptably high levels of undesirable reactions, or
unacceptable side-effects, or both.  Scientists therefore developed new, experimental
vaccines – using new technologies and building on new knowledge that
biotechnology made possible. The following is a brief summary of USAMRIID’s
work in the area of vaccine development on major biothreat agents.  A full
description of the work, including citations, is provided in Appendix A.
Anthrax. When researchers found that the anthrax vaccine might not be
reasonably protective against an aerosol spore challenge, they applied rDNA
techniques to clone the expression of the PA gene in order to produce a more
effective vaccine.  Site-specific mutagenesis allowed the creation of a variant of the
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PA protein that deleted the six amino acids spanning the cleavage site, allowing for
the creation of a possibly less toxic anthrax vaccine.  In all, five new live anthrax
vaccines developed using rDNA technology entered preclinical safety and efficacy
testing by FY1989.
Q fever.  A similarly extensive effort was made to find a new, less reactogenic
vaccine for Q fever.  In addition to a new, whole cell vaccine that entered safety and
immunogenicity testing in FY1979, USAMRIID researchers developed a CMR
vaccine in FY1985, and two subunit vaccines. Again, rDNA technology was used in
their research, especially to identify and clone immunogenic proteins as subunit
vaccine candidates. The safe and effective induction of nonspecific resistance by an
immunomodulatory complex of C. burnetii was identified in two vaccine candidates:
they reduced susceptibility to lethal infections by other agents.  A similarly broad
research program (live, inactivated, and subunit vaccines) to find a new vaccine for
RMSF was underway at USAMRIID in the 1970s, but work was transferred to
WRAIR in 1979 under a mandate to reduce work on rickettsiae.
VEE. The TC-83 (attenuated) vaccine was developed in the 1960s to replace
an old, formalin-inactivated vaccine.  Despite having protective efficacy in man, it
produced a febrile illness, with virus shedding in 15-30% of recipients, had
abortogenic and/or teratogenic potential and was not tested in children. It might also
be pancreotropic.  The C-84 formalin-inactivated vaccine was prepared to avoid these
side-effects, but it was not as protective against an aerosol challenge with virulent
VEE.  To improve its effectiveness, poly-ICLC and tilorone HC1 (analog 11,567)
were found to be good adjuvants when given in combination with inactivated VEE
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vaccine in lab rodents and rhesus monkeys.  USAMRIID researchers developed a
metabolized lipid emulsion, an effective adjuvant with the inactivated VEE vaccine,
and submitted it for a government patent. The lipid emulsion adjuvant demonstrated
high effectiveness at potentiating the immunologic response to VEE, RVF, and WEE
inactivated vaccines.
Rift Valley Fever. The RVF inactivated vaccine was developed prior to 1969,
but in FY1977, it was reported that it did not meet modern safety standards for use in
man.  USAMRIID scientists therefore prepared a new inactivated vaccine and began
work on an attenuated vaccine.  In addition, basic research that identified vaccine-
relevant epitopes on a small sequence of the RVF G2 surface viral glycoproteins,
provided an excellent model to test the feasibility of the synthetic peptide approach to
vaccine development.  This was pursued through the use of a bacterial plasmid
expression system and E.coli and also through the creation of recombinant vaccinia
viruses. Researchers also determined that Avridine combined with the inactivated
RVF virus vaccine, effectively reduced or prevented aerosol-acquired encephalitis.
Hantaan: The Salk Institute was producing two vaccine candidates for
USAMRIID in FY89.  One was a vaccinia-Hantaan recombinant containing both the
S and M segments.  Another was based on a vaccinia-Hantaan recombinant that
included only the M segment.
Machupo: USAMRIID began work in 1971 after an outbreak of Bolivian
hemorrhagic fever.  Work included attempts to prepare a killed vaccine and subunit
vaccines; on defining the efficacy of prophylaxis and treatment with immune serum;
and a joint study with the Middle America Research Unit on a candidate attenuated
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virus vaccine.  By FY1975, a dosage of BHF immune globulin (human origin) that
protected monkeys against severe disease was determined.   Studies in monkeys
showed that the Junin virus protected against experimental lethal challenge with
Machupo virus.
Junin: Work on a new Junin virus vaccine was performed under a joint
program with Argentina under the auspices of a UN Development Program that
resulted in a new vaccine for Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever.  (An IND submission
was made to the FDA.)  USAMRIID scientists demonstrated that the new vaccine
induced a protective response in guinea pigs and monkeys against a significant
airborne challenge of virulent virus.
Lassa:  USAMRIID scientists developed Lassa-vaccinia virus recombinants in
an attempt to create a vaccine for Lassa fever.  In addition, during outbreaks in
Liberia, human immune serum was collected that provided the US with a potential
therapy in case of infection.
Botulinum toxin:  USAMRIID had some pentavalent toxoid stockpiled that
had been developed in 1958 by Parke, Davis & Co. under a contract with Ft. Detrick.
However, it was considered reactogenic and stockpiles were diminishing.  New lots
were prepared with similar reactogenicity, but which enhanced the immune response
to the type B toxin. USAMRIID researchers worked on developing a new,
heptavalent toxoid that would be effective against all types of botulinum toxin (A,B,
C, D, E, F, G).  Two RFPs were issues – one for a hexavalent toxoid and one for a
heptavalent toxoid in FY1985.
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SEB:  As of 1969, USAMRIID had a toxoid to staphylococcal enterotoxin B
stockpiled that retained immunogenicity for18 months.  Work at USAMRIID was on
a new, polyvalent toxoid that included enteroroxins A, B, C, and D.  Although gram
amounts of purified toxin (SEA, SEB, and SEC) were prepared, as of FY1982 when
work on SEB was curtailed, no polyvalent toxoid was available.
Ricin:  Work on ricin is reported as of FY1989.  Active and passive
immunization protected mice from lethal effects of aerosolized ricin, but pulmonary
lesions were still detected.  USAMRIID scientists developed a bivalent vaccine
consisting of whole ricin and saxitoxin that reacted with anti-saxitoxin and anti-ricin
antibodies.
Drug Development and Drug Screening
For many biothreat agents, chemotherapeutic drugs were developed.  What is
notable about many of these post-exposure therapies is the heavy dependence on
rapid diagnosis.  If it could be quickly determined that an individual has an infection,
there are drugs that can mitigate or completely reverse the course of the disease
despite the lack of a vaccine.
For example, a two week course of antibiotics is effective post-exposure to
tularemia when given within 24 hours.  Similarly, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever is
fatal without prompt and appropriate treatment, but is susceptible to antibiotic therapy
if it can be diagnosed accurately.  Antibiotics can also successfully treat exposures to
aerosols of anthrax – again, only if it is diagnosed quickly.  In 2001, six of eleven
individuals with inhalational anthrax survived with modern medical care.  Finally,
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antibiotic therapy is used to treat Q fever infections, but are most effective if begun
with three days after the appearance of symptoms.
In 1972, USAMRIID began to actively investigate antivirals.  It was
recognized that vaccines could not be relied upon because they were usually virus-
specific and ineffective after the onset of infection.  (For example, botulinum
antitoxin is effective when given prior to onset of clinical symptoms, but gives no
protection against respiratory failure once symptoms present.)  In 1980, USAMRIID
established a major drug-screening program both in house and under contract to The
Swiftwater Laboratories.  This program identified new antivirals with efficacy against
potential biothreat agents.  Two of the most promising antivirals were Ribavirin and
poly-ICLC, an interferon-inducer.
Ribavirin: Ribavirin is a nucleoside analogue with a close structural
resemblance to guanosine.  USAMRIID scientists demonstrated that Ribavirin
significantly inhibits a broad spectrum of both DNA and RNA viruses.  Ribavirin was
effective in the treatment of the following viruses: type A and B influenza virus
infections when administered in small particle aerosols, Yellow Fever virus, Hantaan,
Machupo, Junin, Lassa, Rift Valley Fever, and VEE.  When combined with
amantadine and rimantadine, Ribavirin’s effects were enhanced against RVF and
VEE.  Treatment with Ribavirin could begin as late as day 3 against RVF.  In man,
intravenous treatment with Ribavirin during the first six days of illness decreased
mortality from Lassa fever from 73% to 8%.  Prophylactic treatment with Ribavirin
completely prevented the onset of clinical disease of Machupo completely.   Ribavirin
is the only antiviral with FDA approval for therapy against respiratory syncytial virus.
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Poly-ICLC:  Poly-ICLC is an interferon-inducer and is effective in the
prophylaxis and early treatment of Yellow Fever, Japanese Encephalitis, and VEE.
However, it enhanced Machupo virus infections.
Other antivirals tested:  Amantadine and Rimantadine were shown to have
prophylactic and therapeutic effectiveness against influenza. Tilorone hydrochloride
and three analogs were effective antiviral agents against VEE by a mechanism that
did not involve the synthesis or release of interferon.  Finally, Avridine, in addition to
being an effective adjuvant with RVF virus vaccine, reduced mortality in hamsters in
the early stages of RVF infection through day six post-infection.
Detection
A significantly smaller share of USAMRIID’s resources was spent on assays
to detect biothreat agents – whether in environmental samples or during infection.  By
FY1990, USAMRIID had developed IgM antibody-detection assays for each agent.
Researchers had found that assays for antigen, and, in some cases, early IgM
antibody, can be used to rapidly diagnose patients presenting with a number of
militarily relevant diseases.180 As of FY1990 when rapid diagnosis teams were
deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield, the diagnostic capability included 11
assays for naturally occurring viral, rickettsial, and bacterial disease threats, and four
assays for potential biological warfare agents.
                                                
180 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1990
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit D809 EA 005.
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This capability resulted from years of basic research to understand the
pathogenesis of the various agents and the application or adaptation of new
technologies like PCR biotechnology, ELISA, and solid-phase radioimmunoassay.
Basic Research
Approximately thirty percent of USAMRIID resources were spend on basic
research over the twenty years of this study.  Much work done was in support of new
vaccines or assays.  Nonetheless, a variety of work was performed on pathogenesis,
strain cultivation and production, the development of appropriate animal models,
genetic engineering of microbes, and tests of environmental stability and aerosol
dynamics.  Because so much of the work is described  in detail in Appendix A, the
summaries here are intended to highlight only some of the work done.
Pathogenesis. Some effort was spent on understanding the immune system
response to various agents, including distinctions between humoral and cell-mediated
immunity.  These helped identify appropriate interventions.  In addition, pathogenesis
studies of the action of T-2 mycotoxin led to the discovery that virtually all
tricothecenes bound to the same site on the ribosome as T-2, so if protection at that
stage could be devised, it would cross-protect from a large number of tricothecenes.
Pathogenesis studies of anthrax led to a fuller understanding of the basis for
virulence.  An understanding of precisely where the PA toxin of anthrax was cleaved
led to the production of an inactive PA for experimental anthrax vaccines.  Other
studies led to an understanding of exactly what combinations of its toxins was lethal.
While it became possible to genetically alter anthrax strains, simple filter matings
demonstrated the ease with which antibiotic-resistant characteristics could be donated
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between organisms, leading to tetracycline-resistant and streptomycin-resistant
anthrax strains.
In another study of the virulence factors of Q fever, researchers studied the
mini-chromosomes involved in transforming avirulent strains into virulent ones in an
effort to identify the DNA involved in the attenuation of virulent strains.
Cultivation and Production.  Methods and specific media to cultivate large
quantities of agents was developed and detailed in the USAMRIID reports.  Similarly,
methods to generate large amounts of toxin production by agents were developed as
well as methods to purify toxins.  By the late 1980s, methods to synthesize large
amounts of toxin were applied to test the potential of new technology to produce
toxins in quantities that were not previously possible.  This significantly expanded the
list of toxins USAMRIID researchers were working with.
Animal Models.  Animal models were developed for all agents to establish
LD50s and to test vaccines and therapies for safety and efficacy.  USAMRIID
carefully monitored the health of all animals and established a breeding program for
animals that were difficult to purchase.  In order to gather the information required,
animals were challenged by various routes – including aerosol exposures – to lethal
and incapacitating agents, vaccines, and therapies.
Genetic Engineering.  Genetic engineering of organisms was done to create
new vaccines (mostly vaccinia recombinants), create gene libraries, and to develop
assays.  The genetic engineering of the vaccinia virus was to produce a single vaccine
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that could confer immunity to several hazardous viral diseases.181  Some genetic
engineering was done to alter pathogenesis as described above.  As the knowledge
and technology advanced over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, USAMRIID
scientists applied new techniques to study the various agents.
Environmental Stability and Aerosol Dynamics.  Over the course of this
period of time, no aerosol survival/environmental stability tests were reported for
anthrax, tularemia, Q fever, VEE, and botulinum toxins.  These were presumably
done under the offensive program, as they were weaponized then.  However,
environmental stability tests were done for many agents.  Some involved artificially
stabilizing the agent.
Aerosol studies of P. pseudomallei in FY1980 showed that even with no effort
to stabilize it, P. pseudomallei cells survived the stresses of aerosol dissemination and
persisted as airborne particles long enough to constitute a potential hazard in all
environmental conditions studied.  However, Junin virus, while transmissible in SPA,
exhibited a biological half-life of approximately 28 minutes.
Aerobiological studies with the virulent strains of Machupo and Lassa fever
virus (Carvallo and Josiah, respectively) were done in 6200-L aerosol chambers.
These established that while Lassa virus was more stable in aerosol than Machupo,
both were relatively stable in aerosol and both were highly infectious and moderately
lethal for cynomolgus monkeys by the airborne route.
                                                
181 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Biological Defense
Research Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD:
USAMRDC, 1989), 2-5.
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Environmental stability and aerobiological studies were also done with T-2
mycotoxins.  Researchers determined that it was very stable in a dry state for a long
time and could be aerosolized (wet) with a common solvent with a particle size of 3
microns.  Studies established the increased potency of an aerosol exposure to T-2.
The potential for aerosol transmission of RVF isolates was studied in FY1979.
It was also shown in mice that the inactivated vaccine did not provide complete
protection against RVF virus disseminated in small particle aerosols.  Other studies
investigated a variety of potential vectors for RVF virus.
Epidemiology.  USAMRIID researchers sought to understand the basis for
natural disease outbreaks caused by viruses such as Hantaan (HFRS), Lassa,
Machupo, Ebola, and RVF.  Efforts to find natural reservoirs of these agents led to a
better understanding of possible factors associated with outbreaks in some cases.  For
others, like Ebola, no natural reservoir was found.
Perhaps the best epidemiological modeling was done for RVF.  Because it is
carried by specific strains of mosquitoes, tracking the conditions that led to dramatic
increases in the population of those vectors helped researchers predict RVF outbreaks
and, in some instances, prevent them.  USAMRIID researchers used data from
satellites to track conditions relevant to RVF virus activity in fifteen regions in five
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  It was also postulated that such information would
help distinguish natural from artificial outbreaks.
Biodefense Work Under Transparency Rules
Over time, working under a biodefense strategy that was unclassified and
limited predominantly to defensive studies led to more scientific publications and
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enhanced international cooperation on natural disease threats that were also potential
offensive biothreat agents.   This scientific exchange both enhanced the US
biodefense program and provided assistance to countries that lacked the resources to
tackle exotic disease outbreaks on their own.  Working under a strict defensive
mandate also meant the end to large, open-air tests in public areas.
Scientific publication at USAMRIID
Results of the research at USAMRIID could be classified.  However, the work
itself as it was being performed was unclassified.  Over time, the number of scientific
publications in independent, peer-reviewed journals rose steadily to the point where
the number of articles published consistently exceeded the number of “professional
work years” at the institute – basically, more than one article per PI each year, as
demonstrated in figure 4 below.




































































































This output was used as evidence of the scientific merit and relevance of the
work done at USAMRIID.  In addition to publishing actively, scientists made
numerous presentations of their work at scientific conferences and meetings.  There
were no reports of which, if any, research results were classified.  Some aerobiology
results were published, but very little of the work with anthrax was made public in the
general scientific literature – especially not the disappointing results of the challenge
studies with the MDPH vaccine against aerosolized anthrax spores.  These results
were published in a more limited way.182
International Cooperation: Validation of Technologies and Medicines
Scientific exchanges brought foreign scientists into USAMRIID laboratories
to work.  International cooperation also brought USAMRIID scientists and
experimental vaccines and drugs to countries that needed assistance in controlling
local outbreaks.
As a result of this work, diagnostic assays were tested under actual field
conditions, vaccines and therapies were tested in humans, and sometimes the
readiness of US biodefenses was enhanced by the acquisition of human immune
plasma for rare, lethal diseases.  The following are examples of international
cooperative efforts:
• In 1969-1970 there was a severe outbreak of VEE in Central America.
USAMRIID scientists provided the attenuated, live virus vaccine and
technical support to create an immune barrier to prevent the further spread
                                                
182 Bruce Ivins, Patricia Fellows, and Gene Nelson, “Efficacy of a standard human anthrax vaccine
against Bacillus anthracis spore challenge in guinea pigs,” (Ft. Detrick: Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases: 16 August 1993).  NTIS publication # ADA269134.
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of the virus.  This was successful, and also provided researchers with
greater confidence in the vaccine: a 96% conversion rate was noted and no
reversion to virulence.
• In 1987, an extensive epidemic/epizootic of RVF in Mauritania and
Senegal offered researchers an opportunity to validate their rapid
diagnosis assays under field conditions.  The new procedures were
significantly faster and used less equipment: it was not as sensitive, but
was 97% as specific.
• In 1979, USAMRIID researchers worked with the Israeli Defense Force to
define alternative immunization schedules for the RVF vaccine, because it
was not available in quantities sufficient in many scenarios for its use.
• In FY1986, USAMRIID scientist John Huggins demonstrated that
Ribavirin could treat Hantaan virus infections.  This led to a clinical trial
of Ribavirin in the PRC, where Hantaan virus infections occur naturally
each year.  Assays for Hantaan virus were also successfully field-tested
during that study.
• In FY1990, other collaborative research in Yugoslavia led to the
awareness of an outbreak of HFRS there.  A field study was established to
test the efficacy of ribavirin and USAMRIID’s diagnostic tests.
• In the 1970s, work on a new vaccine for Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever
was done under a UN Development project, jointly conducted by US and
Argentine investigators.  The live, attenuated Junin vaccine was taken to
final product in 1982 in compliance with vaccine requirements for the US
and Argentina.   Researchers also tested the effectiveness of ribavirin in a
field trial against AHF.
• During outbreaks of Lassa fever in Liberia in the late 1980s, human
immune plasma was harvested from recovering patients and used to treat
infected ones.  In the process, USAMRIID collected several hundred,
high-quality Lassa-immune plasma units for future treatment of the
disease.
In FY1986 alone, NRC postdoctoral fellows came to work at USAMRIID,
from the UK, Republic of Korea, India, France, Sweden, the PRC, Japan, Senegal,
and Finland.183  USAMRIID also hosted international conferences on filovirus
                                                
183 Commander’s Forward, USAMRIID, Annual Progress Report FY1987 (Frederick, MD:
USAMRIID), p. v.
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research.  As a result of USAMRIID’s leadership, a “comprehensive, collaborative
research program was organized with the Institut Pasteur and implemented in the
Central African Republic.  The innovative international program, a pioneering first,
allowed previously separate and independent laboratory and field efforts to be
combined, closely integrated, and efficiently focused on Ebola and Marburg
viruses.”184
It is difficult to imagine that the US government would have allowed foreign
scientists into its biodefense labs if the work was classified.  It is even more difficult
to imagine USAMRIID scientists being given permission by foreign governments
such as China to administer experimental US drugs to foreign human subjects if those
drugs came out of a classified US biodefense program.  The orientation of the
program toward medical therapies, the willingness to publish and share information,
and the lack of security classification, therefore, made international cooperation
possible which, in turn, enhanced the US biodefense program.
No Open-Air Testing in the Public Domain
The US conducted a series of tests in the 1940s and 1950s to test the
vulnerability of the US to covert attacks with biological weapons.  Various delivery
devices were tested in public areas, such as subways, ventilation systems for
buildings, and for large-area tests.  These established that US citizens were vulnerable
to sabotage and covert delivery of BW agents on very small and very large scales.
Another round of tests was done in the 1960s to test the military utility of BW.  These
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USAMRIID), pp. ix – x.
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established the conditions under which BW could have effect for military purposes.
After 1969, no further vulnerability tests are reported.  All testing was later confined
to Dugway Proving Ground, and then only to validate new technologies or
equipment.
Most testing of biological defense material was in the laboratory: “Laboratory
studies requiring the use of aerosols are conducted only in response to specific
equipment or material testing requirements and in the larger context of the goals of a
particular project.”185  Nearly all testing was done with simulants.  Outdoor testing
was extremely limited and only after preparation of NEPA documentation.  Outdoor
testing was done to validate detectors, masks, protective clothing and other protective
devices, and decontamination systems.186
At Ft. Detrick, aerosol tests were done, but with wet agents.  These were done
both to understand any differences in pathology when an agent was presented by
aerosol and to check whether vaccines or therapies worked against an aerosol
challenge.  Novel delivery methods were not investigated at Ft. Derick nor were
novel pathogens created.
Limiting Threat Assessment
Threat assessment types of work was limited at Ft. Detrick to determining
whether an agent posed an aerosol threat – as a wet agent.  It was not considered
                                                
185 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Biological Defense
Research Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD:
USAMRDC, 1989): 2-7.
186 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Biological Defense
Research Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD:
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120
necessary to run tests with dry agents.  Much of the work was, by its nature, dual use.
These included aerosol stability tests, the identification of resistant strains, large-scale
production of agents and toxins (and purification methods), and animal challenge
tests to determine LD50s.  However, no work was done to deliberately enhance
virulence:
“Use of recombinant DNA procedures with pathogenic organisms and toxins
is closely controlled at all locations, both within and outside the government.
Development of a more virulent strain of a pathogen is specifically prohibited
under any circumstance, and is not the goal of any BDRP effort.  In fact,
BDRP uses of recombinant techniques are with the goal of producing a less
virulent strain which may be more safely used in the laboratory or for vaccine
development.”187
The veracity of this statement is confirmed by the work reported annually
from 1969-1990.  Methods to isolate particularly virulent strains were used for the
purpose of finding good candidates for attenuated vaccines.
Perhaps the most unusual threat assessment work was done to establish the
effectiveness of vaccines after radiation exposures, i.e. in a nuclear warfare
environment.188  Otherwise, the work performed was predominantly protective: threat
assessment was done in the context of a medical therapy being developed and not
simply to evaluate vulnerabilities.  When aerosol stability tests were done without a
candidate vaccine to test, these were in response to information from the intelligence
community (e.g. T-2 mycotoxins).
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188 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1976
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit 096 01 010.
121
National Security and the Question of Past Offensive Work
What is striking from a review of work on the agents in Appendix A is that the
vast majority of work was on the development of vaccines and therapies.  Very little
work was done that could be characterized as “threat assessment” or potentially
offense-oriented.  It is possible to argue that the reason for the absence of that kind of
activity was the prior existence of the offensive program.  That is, threat assessment
work had already been done for the agents on which USAMRIID was working during
the 1969-1990 period.  While that would be true for nearly all the agents, there were
additional agents studied as they emerged as potential threats: T-2 mycotoxins,
Hantaan virus, Ebola and Marburg.
It is difficult, therefore, to conclude that the work of the defensive program
depended heavily on information from the offensive program.  Rather, it is possible to
argue that insufficient attention was given to developing appropriate and adequate
defenses under the pre-1969 program: vaccines were not always as effective as
previously thought, not usable for the general population, and stockpiled in quantities
insufficient for general use.  Furthermore, it is not necessary to know the exact
behavior of an agent under various environmental conditions in order to create
defenses: the effectiveness of vaccines could be tested in animal models with wet
aerosols.  That is, it was not necessary to bring a biothreat agent to the doorstep of
weaponization (or to weaponize it at all), in order to develop medical
countermeasures.
The answer to the question of whether national security was harmed by the
unclassified nature of USAMRIID’s work depends on whether one concludes that the
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scientific work was enhanced by close international collaboration or not.  Foreign
scientists were working in USAMRIID laboratories and on joint projects because the
program was open.  As discussed above, it is possible to conclude that international
collaborations enhanced US biodefense in several important ways (vaccine
development, antiviral testing, field detection devices).  Furthermore, decisions on
whether to publish results clearly were made and it is possible that information was
classified in order to protect national security.
Conclusion
The overall record of USAMRIID is largely one of success: a focused
research program on major biothreat agents yielded new vaccines and therapies,
contributions to scientific understanding of disease processes, and detection systems.
What is surprising is the level of achievement with extremely limited funding.  Over
twenty years, only $465 million (2006 dollars) was spend at Ft. Detrick for the
development of medical countermeasures.  That averages to approximately $23
million each year.
There are two areas that clearly needed improvement: production capability
and diagnostic capability.  Only a few lots were produced for any given vaccine.
These were often depleted.  The vaccine for tularemia was produced in the 1960s and
depleted by the 1980s.  New lots were produced in the late 1980s by more modern
methods, requiring a whole new round of safety and efficacy testing.  The Q fever
vaccine was also depleted and needed replacement in the early 1980s: that is, there
was little stockpiled until a new experimental vaccine was produced.  The RMSF
vaccine stockpile was also depleted in the early 1970s, however a new vaccine was
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needed as this 1939 vaccine was determined to not provide total protection against
RMSF in the 1970s.  The Chikungunya vaccine stock was also depleted in 1970,
requiring the production and evaluation of new vaccine lots.  Finally, stocks of the
botulinum toxoid was also dimishing as of the early 1980s and the only producer of
the equine antitoxin notified the CDC that they would end production in 1978.
There was apparently no accounting done to ensure that stockpiles were kept
adequate to research needs and for potential outbreaks. Production of new lots of
experimental vaccines for exotic diseases is not likely to be done for commercial
interests.  Therefore, a better system for procuring and stockpiling needed vaccines is
required.
Finally, only about ten percent of USAMRIID’s efforts went towards
dectection systems.  These were both field detection systems and diagnostic assays of
clinical samples.  USAMRIID scientists did make significant contributions to the
development of faster, more sensitive and simple assays.  However, more attention is
required here because, as described in this chapter, many biothreat agents are
susceptible to known therapies if and only if they can be accurately diagnosed early –
often prior to the onset of symptoms.
Looking back at how much was done, the conclusion that much more should
have been invested is difficult to avoid.  Much more funding is going into biodefense
today, but the current trend has shifted toward greater secrecy and more limited
opportunities for international collaboration.  The risks of doing so should be
measured against this successful record at USAMRIID’s record.
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Chapter 5:  The Regression of BW Strategy
“Scrupulous adherence to the BWC on the U.S. side, coming to
the bar with clean hands, is of course an absolute prerequisite
to the moral platform of BW prohibition.  There is no more
powerful instrument for that credibility than self-inspection.” –
Joshua Lederberg
A common reaction to uncertainty is to seek control of whatever can plausibly be
expected to submit to the exertion of power.  September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
anthrax attacks initiated a major reaction within the US government.  As part of that
response, agencies that never before had classification authority acquired it; a new
department was created within the government; and new controls were placed on
scientists and scientific research, along with new funding. At the same time, the US
government chose to withdraw from international agreements and cooperative
approaches, relying instead on its own power and initiatives.  All this is reflected in
the current biodefense strategy, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” issued by the
White House in April 2004.
Controlling access to information, individuals, technology, and materials and
gaining a greater belief of control of the threat through threat assessments is a
reactionary posture that is eroding US strategy to address the problem of bioterrorism.
Fortunately, significant amounts of new funds are being invested for the development
of medical countermeasures (including new high-containment laboratories) through
NIH.  However, the current approach is a major departure from the past thirty years.
It is, fundamentally, a return to the US BW strategy as originally conceived in World
War II.
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Several key events in the past fifteen years made policymakers think more
immediately about the threat of biological weapons – both from states and from non-
state actors.  The consistent response and continuing trend is that of the government
attempting to exert more and more control over as many aspects of the bioterrorist
threat as possible.
Evolution of Biodefense Policy: 1989-2004
From the early 1990s until the US Biodefense Strategy was announced in
2004, biodefense policy was evolving in reaction to domestic and international
events.  Fear of WMD terrorism motivated new investments, mostly into domestic
preparedness.  After the anthrax attacks in 2001, however, billions of dollars were
allocated for medical countermeasures.  Therefore, many important aspects of the
current biodefense strategy were developed over this period of time.
Eighteen years after the US signed the BWC (and sixteen years after ratifying
it), the US Congress passed the “Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.”189
It is the implementing legislation that binds individual US citizens by the terms of the
treaty, with the stated purpose being to “protect the United States against the threat of
biological terrorism.”190 However, international efforts to negotiate a Protocol to the
BWC that would have included verification and enforcement measures came close to
completion, but was suddenly abandoned by the US in 2001.
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190 See section 2(a)(2) of the “Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989,” Public Law 101-298
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Critical Events and US Responses
Vladimir Pasechnik defected from the USSR to the UK in 1989, bringing with
him stunning information about a massive Soviet investment in biowarfare under the
guise of a legitimate scientific organization, Biopreparat.  More information came
subsequently from Ken Alibek, who later published an account of his involvement in
Biopreparat in Biohazard (1999).191  In addition, in the midst of the historic
transformations within the USSR, reciprocal visits were arranged for Russian,
American, and British scientists.  The Americans and British were surprised at the
extent of the offensive activities they viewed at several sites in the then-Russian
Republic.192
In January 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted to having programs
in violation of the BWC.  In April 1992 he issued a decree stating, “It shall be
established that the development and implementation of biological programs in
breach of the Convention … is not being permitted in the territory of the Russian
Federation.”193  This was not verified by the US because planned visits to Russian
military sites were not permitted, although Russian scientists were allowed to visit
USAMRIID and sites associated with the former US offensive program.
In addition to these revelations, concerns about Iraqi WMD and the ability of
inspections to reveal the extent of those programs – especially BW programs – was
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ongoing in the 1990s.  In its Comprehensive Report in 1999, The UN Special
Commission stated the following:
Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 in April 1991 and until
July 1995, Iraq denied that it had had any proscribed biological warfare (BW)
activities. Based on the results of its inspection and verification activities, the
Commission assessed and reported to the Council in its report of April 1995,
that Iraq had not provided an account of its proscribed biological programme
nor accounted for materials and items that may have been used or acquired for
such a programme. The Commission stated that with Iraq's failure to account
for the use of these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only
conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been
purchased and used for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of biological
warfare agent. Iraq was provided with evidence collected by the Commission.
On 1 July 1995, Iraq, for the first time, acknowledged that it had had an
offensive BW programme but still denied any weaponization. Subsequently,
in August 1995, after the departure from Iraq of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel
Hassan, Iraq admitted that it had weaponized BW agents and deployed
biological weapons for combat use.194
Subsequent declarations by Iraq about its BW program were declared
inaccurate or incomplete and inspections could not verify all aspects of the
dismantlement of the Iraqi BW program
In addition to concerns about state-sponsored BW programs in the former
USSR and Iraq, terrorist activities were raising alarm.  In February 1993, terrorists
detonated a car bomb under the World Trade Center.  Then on March 20, 1995 the
Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin gas, a nerve agent, on the Tokyo subway, killing
12 and sickening several thousand others.195  The cult had used sarin gas in a prior
attack and investigators later learned of their interest in biological weapons such as
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botulinum toxin.196  Only a month later, on April 19, 1995 domestic terrorists bombed
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people – 19 of
them children.
In response to these major terrorist acts, the Clinton Administration issued a
secret Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-39) in June 1995.  It stated that “the
United States would give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to
detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological, or
chemical materials or weapons use by terrorists.”197  In this directive, the FBI was
designated as the lead agency for crisis management and FEMA the lead for
consequence management. The next year, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici WMD bill that required Federal agencies to put systems into place to
protect the public from terrorism.198  As a result, the United States Army's Chemical
and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) began delivering domestic
preparedness training nationally to emergency responders in 120 cities. These
programs were developed and executed as a partnership among six federal agencies
(DOD, DOE, FBI, FEMA, PHS, and EPA) and the emergency response
community.199  Concerns about bioterrorism were mounting.
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In November 1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen held up a five-pound
bag of sugar on national television and stated that if such an amount of anthrax was
dispersed over a city the size of Washington, DC, half the population would die.200
According to one expert, the prominent and sustained attention given to the threat of
bioterrorism by the US prompted at least one terrorist organization, al-Qaida, to
become interested in BW.  Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an al-Qaida member, wrote in
April 1999:
“… we only became aware of them [biological weapons] when the enemy
drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be
produced simply with easily available materials.201
In 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 to protect
America’s critical infrastructures.  It created a National Coordinator to deal with
critical infrastructure protection, foreign terrorism, and domestic mass destruction
(including biological weapons).202  He added $1 billion for chemical and biological
defense to the Five-Year Defense Plan and announced the selection of ten states
whose National Guard units would receive special training to manage the
consequences of a WMD attack.  Some funding was also made available for medical
countermeasures and a national pharmaceutical stockpile.
Within one week after the September 11, 2001 attacks, anthrax-laced letters
were postmarked to news media organizations.  More anthrax letters were later sent to
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congressional offices.  In all, eighteen people in five states contracted anthrax, five of
whom died of inhalational anthrax.  A total of 33,000 people were give post-exposure
prophylaxis.203  The perpetrator’s decision to identify the powder as anthrax
contributed to a quick and appropriate medical response.  Terrorism – and
bioterrorism in particular – became a far more immediate and public threat than ever
before in US history.
In 2002, a new department was created to deal with threats to the US, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).204  The stated mission of DHS is to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the US to
terrorism; and to minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist
attacks that do occur within the United States.
The dominant response to the perception of the WMD terrorist threat focused
on enhancing domestic response capabilities at all levels of government.  Additional,
modest efforts were also being made to specifically address the bioterrorist threat.
These included access controls to biological agents and oversight proposals for dual
use research.
Access Controls on Select Agents
In May 1995, Larry Wayne Harris acquired plague bacteria from the
American Type Culture Collection under false pretenses.  Harris was charged with
three counts of mail fraud.  Harris’s fraudulent acquisition of plague bacteria
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prompted concern in the government about the ease with which individuals (i.e.
terrorists) might be able to acquire the most virulent pathogens.  Therefore, in 1996,
Congress passed the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act”205 that made it
a federal crime to even threaten to use a weapon of mass destruction, enlarged the
definition of biological weapons, and required HHS to promulgate regulations
covering certain biological agents.
CDC became responsible for the Laboratory Registration/Select Agent
Program in early 1997: it developed the list of 42 agents covered by the program,
issued rules requiring that laboratories have appropriate controls for handling
biological agents in place, and required notification to the CDC of any transfers.  This
program was expanded in 2002 under the “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act”206 by increasing security measures, adding screening
of entities and personnel, and creating a comprehensive national database of select
agents and toxins.
More legislation was being considered by Congress to limit possession of
biological agents, but was not enacted until after September 11, 2001.  Within weeks
of the September 11 and anthrax attacks, the House and Senate both passed
legislation that required registration of anyone possessing select agents, criminalized
unsafe handling (and required certain standards and procedures for proper handling),
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and banned their possession by a group of “restricted persons”.  The President signed
the USA Patriot Act into law on October 26, 2001.207
For the first time, the US government would know the location of every
institution handling select agents and likely have performed background checks on
the researchers performing work with them.  In addition, the US sought to expand its
control of research.   The US began requiring that institutions outside the US institute
the same kinds of physical security in order to engage US scientists in joint research
projects.  This led to the curtailment of joint research projects because other
institutions outside the US did not have the funding to upgrade their physical
security.208  In addition, new rules about which scientists could attend international
conferences were instituted.209  Therefore, in addition to defining who could work
with select agents in the US, the government was also beginning to define what
researchers could do and say about their work.
Oversight of Research
Four different initiatives to institute an oversight process for research with
particularly virulent pathogens are in place. The first began in the early days of
recombinant engineering in the 1970s.  The Asilomar conference of 1975 was the first
major attempt by scientists to voluntarily impose oversight mechanisms over their
work to prevent accidental releases or exposures.  It resulted in the creation of
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Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) at institutions doing recombinant work and
the Recombinant Advisory Committee (RAC) within the NIH. This is a precedent for
compliance with biosafety guidelines.  (As of 2002, two categories of research now
require approval of the HHS Secretary according to new regulations that implement
the 2002 bioterrorism bill.210)
The second oversight process evolved in the late 1990s during debates at
WHO over the destruction of the last known stocks of variola virus.  The WHO
Orthopoxvirus Committee had recommended the destruction of all variola virus
stocks as of 1996, but in May of that year the deadline was extended to June 1999.211
However, the US reversed its support for destruction in 1999, and instead WHO
authorized a smallpox research program in return for another delay (until 2002).212
An Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research was soon convened: it defined
the areas of research, vetted research proposals, and annually reviewed progress.  All
work done under the WHO Variola Virus Research Committee is publicly available.
In 2002, the decision to destroy the variola virus stocks was delayed indefinitely and
research with the virus is ongoing.  This is a precedent for the international oversight
of a particularly virulent virus.
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The third initiative is still being developed within the US: the National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB).  It was convened in response to a
call from a National Academy of Sciences report, Biotechnology Research in an Age
of Terrorism.213  In that report, the NRC Committee recommended the creation of a
committee to provide advice, guidance, and leadership to implement a system of
review and oversight.  In March 2004, NSABB was created within HHS to provide
advice regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research.214  According to its
charter, NSABB is charged with the following activities:
• Developing criteria for identifying dual use research and research results.
• Developing guidelines for the oversight of dual use research, including
guidelines for the risk/benefit analysis of dual use biological research and
research results.
• Providing recommendations on the development of a code of conduct for
scientists and laboratory workers, and development of mandatory
programs for education and training in biosecurity issues.
• Advising on national policies regarding the conduct of dual use biological
research, including policies governing publication, public communication,
and dissemination of dual use research methodologies and results.
• Advising on national policies governing local review and approval
processed for dual use biological research.
• Advising on criteria and processes for referral of classes of research or
specific experiments by IBCs to the NSABB for guidance.
• Responding to requests for interpretation and application of the guidelines
to specific research proposals in instances where a proposal has been
denied by an IBC.
• Recommending strategies for fostering international collaboration for the
effective oversight of dual use biological research.
Working Groups are still meeting and focusing their recommendations.215
Unlike the NIH RAC oversight process, this is a possible precedent for oversight of a
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much broader range of research by the government.  The rationale behind the NAS
proposing such an oversight group was so that it could both identify consequential
work and find ways to instill responsibility in advance of carrying out such research.
Finally, the fourth oversight arrangement in place deals not with the conduct
of research, but the publication of dual-use research results.  An experiment published
in 2001 that transformed a mild poxvirus into a lethal one attracted the attention of
scientists and policymakers because it generated a broader realization that pathogens
more virulent than would otherwise evolve in nature could be created using
biotechnology.216  Concerns about the misapplication of biotechnology were
generating discussion in scientific circles.
In response, the editors of the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences included a commentary justifying their decision when they published an
article with potential bioweapons implications. The article was by Ariella Rosengard
on how the vaccinia virus evades the human immune response.217  In the
accompanying commentary, P.J. Lachmann wrote, “The experiments of Rosengard et
al. are an illustration of how the exploitation of microbial genomics can allow studies
of the biology of viruses that cannot themselves be studies safely – or at all.  The
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work is far more likely to stimulate advances in vaccinology or viral therapy than it is
to threaten biosecurity.”218
Just a few months later, Eckhard Wimmer published the results of his lab’s
chemical synthesis of the polio virus.219  Science included no separate commentary in
the print version in which it appeared, but one blistering commentary did appear in
the prior issue (Wimmer’s article was published online on July 11, 2002).  Steven
Block wrote the following about Wimmer’s work:
[It] amounts to little more than a stunt – and not a particularly cheap stunt at
that, given that the effort was reportedly bankrolled by hundreds of thousands
of dollars from DARPA….It’s critically important to hold a national dialog
among biologists, health care experts, politicians, and the general public about
the future of biological work with biological weapons implications.  But
publishing research like this is a poor way indeed to open the conversation.220
Wimmer’s piece received wide press coverage expressing concern about the
implications for the control of bioweapons in general and poliovirus, in particular.221
In an effort to be proactive, thirty-two of the world’s leading journal editors
and scientist-authors called for vigilance and personal responsibility whenever
potentially dangerous research is submitted for publication.  They issued a joint
statement that was reprinted in the major scientific journals in February 2003 in
which they urged scientists and journals to consider establishing processes for
reviewing risky papers and either modify or decline to publish articles if the potential
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risks outweighed the benefits.222  However, as the technology continues to evolve,
more research articles will continue to explore the creation of new and genetically
altered microbes and their products.223
Government policy on scientific information has shifted.  According to
National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189) from 1985, the National
Policy was that products of research were to remain unrestricted to the maximum
extent possible. “If national security requires control of that research, then it will be
controlled through classification.” However, Executive Order 13292 (signed in March
2003) expanded the kinds of information that can be classified to “(e) scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes
defense against transnational terrorism…. or (h) weapons of mass destruction.” (The
expanded items are underlined.)
Current Strategy
The official biodefense strategy was articulated in Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 10, Biodefense for the 21st Century.  The four major pillars of
current biodefense strategy are summarized here:
Threat Awareness. This includes biological warfare-related intelligence and
Red Teaming Efforts “to understand new scientific trends that may be exploited by
our adversaries to develop biological weapons and to help position intelligence
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collectors ahead of the problem.”224  It also includes periodic assessments of the BW
threat as it evolves, and an effort to anticipate and respond to emerging BW threats –
including the development of safe and effective countermeasures.  DHS was given
the lead for conducting assessments of the threat and HHS was given the lead to
develop countermeasures.
Prevention and Protection. “Preventing biological weapons attacks is by far
the most cost-effective approach to biodefense.  Prevention requires the continuation
and expansion of current multilateral initiatives to limit the access of agents,
technology, and know-how to countries, groups, or individuals seeking to develop,
produce, and use these agents.”  For protection, the government proposed
vulnerability assessments to better protect critical infrastructure and gave the lead to
DHS to develop and deploy biodetection technologies and decontamination methods.
Surveillance and Detection.  DHS was given the lead to develop a domestic
attack warning system and the capability to perform technical forensic analysis
through the creation of a National Bioforensic Analysis Center within the National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center.
Response and Recovery.  In response to an attack, plans are being created to
integrate response efforts at every level of government.  HHS was given the lead to
coordinate a public health response, including the distribution of medicines and the
development of medical countermeasures.
To implement this strategy, the US government poured an enormous amount
of new funding into the NIH for the development of medical countermeasures,
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including public health preparedness and support to the Strategic National Stockpile.
Significant amounts are also being spent by DHS for biothreat countermeasures,
including the creation of a new facility, the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasure Center.
Overall, funding for civilian biodefense rose from approximately $295 million
in FY2001 to $5.24 billion in FY2006.225  Total federal funding – including DOD –
for bioweapons prevention and defense jumped from $1.6 Billion in FY2001 to
nearly $8 billion in FY2006.226  The agencies receiving funding for biodefense-
related work are: USDA, Commerce, DOD, DOE, HHS, DHS, State, Veterans
Affairs, EPA, and NSF.  DOD’s budget in this area increased modestly: the majority
of new funding has gone to HHS for medical countermeasures and to improve state
and local capacity and to DHS for biological countermeasures.  The work of these
three major agencies are discussed below.
Department of Defense
DOD has a long history of work in the chemical and biological defense area.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 mandated that DoD coordinate,
consolidate, and integrate the chemical and biological (CB) defense requirements into
a single program, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP).  Four
agencies play key roles in the CBDP:  The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the
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Defense Intelligence Agency.227  A significant portion of the budget goes to
DARPA’s BW Defense Program.  It works on “anticipating threats and developing
novel defenses against them…”  However the CBDP overall “continues to be a
threat-driven program, not technology-driven…. [O]ur programs and technologies are
driven by validated threat assessments and user mission requirements, not by
technologies.”228  In addition to DARPA’s approximately $150 million in spending
each year, the CBDP will, beginning in FY06, invest more that $1.5 billion over five
years to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against advanced bio-
terror threats, including genetically engineered intracellular bacterial pathogens and
hemorrhagic fevers.”229
Health and Human Services: Response, Recovery & Countermeasures
The 2006 budget for HHS includes more than $4 billion for biodefense.  This
includes approximately $1.7 billion for NIAID for new and improved vaccines,
diagnostic tools, and therapies against potential bioterrorism agents; $1.6 million for
the CDC (surveillance and detection and training local response teams), and $600
million for the Strategic National Stockpile.230  Funding for the work at HHS – the
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majority of which goes to NIAID – has been consistently higher than that for DHS.
Since FY2003, funding for HHS has been approximately $4 billion per year, while
funding for all biological countermeasures at DHS has been approximately $400
million.231
The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases reacted swiftly to
the September 11 attacks.  It developed a Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research and
NIAID Research Agendas for CDC Category A, B, and C agents.  NIAID’s mission
“is to carry out the research needed to understand the pathogenesis of these [agents of
bioterrorism] microbes and the host responses to them, and to translate this
knowledge into useful interventions and diagnostic tools for an effective response.”232
Agents were placed on the list based on shared characteristics: high morbidity and
mortality, potential for person-to-person transmission, directly or by vector, low
infective dose and high infectivity by aerosol; ability to contaminate food and water
supplies; lack of a specific diagnostic test and/or effective treatment; lack of a safe
and effective vaccine; potential to cause anxiety in the public and in health care
workers; and potential to be weaponized.  Accordingly, the six areas of work were
listed as follows: biology of the microbe, host response, vaccines, therapeutics,
diagnostics, and research resources.
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Among the current accomplishments are listed the following:233
• More than 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine available; a “next
generation” vaccine (MVA) in advanced testing; and oral cidofovir in
advanced product development for use in an smallpox attack;
• A new vaccine (rPA) for anthrax tested and procured under Project
Bioshield (75 million doses), and development of novel antitoxins to
neutralize anthrax toxin.
• Vaccines for Ebola in human trials at NIAID Vaccine Research Center;
and
• A new vaccine under development for botulinum toxin and also candidate
antibody treatments in development.
NIAID is also building National Biocontainment Laboratories to BL4
standards; nine Regional Biocontainment Laboratories with BL3 facilities; and
funding ten Regional Centers of Excellece for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious
Diseases Research to provide the “human infrastructure” for biodefense research.234
NIH also has an important role in purchasing medical countermeasures under funding
provided under Project Bioshield.
Congress passed legislation in 2004 authorizing the procurement of
biodefense vaccines by establishing a Special Reserve Fund of $5.6 billion to make
purchases for the Strategic National Stockpile over ten years.235  The intent was as
follows:
To provide protections and countermeasures against chemical, radiological, or
nuclear agents that may be used in a terrorist attack against the United States
                                                
233 Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., testimony before “The Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health,
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,” US Senate Hearing: the NIH Biodefense
Research Program (February 8, 2005).
234 Anthony S. Fauci, M.C., NIAID Director, “Statement on Biodefense,” downloaded from
www3.niaid.nih.gov/biodefense/about/directors_statement.htm.
235 “Project BioShield Act of 2004,” Public Law 108-276 (July 21, 2004) 108th Congress.
143
by giving the National Institutes of Health contracting flexibility,
infrastructure improvements, and expediting the scientific peer review
process, and streamlining the Food and Drug Administration approval process
of countermeasures.
However, the process requires that the Secretary, DHS, perform a material
threat assessment of current and emerging CBRN agents before countermeasures can
be purchased.236  Only four material threat assessments have been made (anthrax,
smallpox, botulinum toxin, and radiological/nuclear devices), resulting in only four
contracts totaling $1 billion of the $3.418 billion allotted through 2008.237  Two of
those were for anthrax vaccines and the others for countermeasures against a
radiological or nuclear event.  No further material threat assessments have been
released as of summer 2006 because they are classified.
Department of Homeland Security: Threat Awareness & Surveillance
Established in 2002, the Department of Homeland Security is designed to
protect the territory of the US from acts of terrorism and assist in the response to an
attack.  It is the third largest cabinet department in the Federal government.  In the
area of biological countermeasures, DHS has the lead role in threat awareness,
environmental surveillance and threat attribution.  Work on biosensors has been
coordinated with the EPA and CDC.  The goal is the creation of a national
biosurveillance capability.
The other major area of work involves threat awareness and attribution.  To
accomplish these missions, DHS created the National Biodefense Analysis and
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Countermeasures Center (NBACC).  The mission of NBACC is “to provide the
nation with the scientific basis for awareness of biological threat and attribution of
their use against the American public” by:238
• Understanding current and future biological threats, assessing
vulnerabilities, and determining potential impacts to guide the
development of biodefense countermeasures; and
• Providing national capability to conduct forensic analysis of evidence
from bio-crimes and terrorism to attain a “biological fingerprint” to
identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack.
The stated mission is to preserve homeland security through knowledge of the
potential threat, prevention of surprise, and attribution of use. The NBACC program
is intended to complement the capabilities of the existing USAMRIID, national labs,
and other contract research organization. 239  The NBACC program has four “pillars”
BTCC – Biological Threat Characterization Center:  Provides laboratory-
based, scientific data from the analysis and assessment of biological threats to
human health and agriculture.  Develops and applies models, materials, and
validation processes to evaluate vulnerabilities and define risk.
BFAC – BioForensics Analysis Center: Provides definitive forensic
examination of biothreat agents and related evidence and serves to integrate
the forensic requirement for law enforcement, national security, and homeland
security.  (Five years after the anthrax letter attacks, the FBI has no strong
leads as to who the perpetrator was despite knowledge of the agent and
delivery methods. 240)
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BKC – Biodefense Knowledge Center: Evidence-based subject matter
expertise to integrate, analyze and distribute critical information assembled
from multiple sources through a clearinghouse center. The Biodefense
Knowledge Center (BKC) of NBACC was dedicated on September 10, 2004
and is located at Los Alamos National Laboratory (DOE).  BKC, along with
the future BTCC, will develop material threat assessments and formal risk
assessments of select pathogens.241
ABC – Agricultural Biodefense Center: Advances research-based solutions
for prevention, detection, diagnosis and response to high consequence foreign
animal diseases.  It is established at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
NBACC will be the first DHS laboratory focused specifically on biodefense.
DHS officially broke ground for NBACC at Ft. Detrick in June 2006.  Construction is
estimated at $128 million.  The 160,000-square-foot facility will house the Biological
Threat Characterization Center (BTCC) and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center
(NBFAC).242  It will include over 70,000 square feet of laboratory space, 20% of
which will be built to BL-4 standards.  Officials have repeatedly stated that the
research is designed to advance scientific understanding of potential bioterrorism
agents, that is the “next-generation biological threats.” 243  Doing this, it is asserted, is
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only for defensive purposes and will not violate the terms of the BWC.244  However,
it is not at all clear that the work will not be in violation of the international treaty.245
The argument for performing threat assessment work based on what is
technologically feasible and not necessarily based on an actual threat was described in
a recent article by Seth Carus and James B. Petro. 246  The authors make two
important assertions:
• “In the absence of high-quality intelligence, the use of capabilities-based
assessments will increase the number of potential BW scenarios
incorporated into existing assessments; thus, a methodology for
characterizing and prioritizing these ‘threats’ will be required to increase
the likelihood that biodefense expenditures address those that pose the
greatest risk to the U.S.”
• The termination of the US offensive BW program left gaps in the US
ability to identify organisms or toxins potentially within foreign BW
programs.   “Empirical data and resulting technical assessments are
needed to effectively address questions of technical feasibility raised by
intelligence and some openly published research reports.”247
Basically, the authors state the need to investigate the offense in order to
prepare better defenses because intelligence collection alone cannot be relied upon to
accurately identify the evolving threat.   Development of potential threat agents and
scenarios for their use (red teaming) are advocated as essential to biodefense.  This is
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dangerous ground to walk.  The whole purpose of “Red Teaming” is described in a
DoD report as follows:
In general, red team challenges can help hedge against surprise, particularly
catastrophic surprises. It does this by providing a wider and deeper
understanding of potential adversary options and behavior that can expose
potential vulnerabilities in our strategies, postures, plans, programs, and
concepts.  This role (to explore technically feasible and responsive threats) has
become increasingly  important as a complement to the more traditional
intelligence-based threat projections (capabilities-based versus threat-based
planning).248
BTCC will therefore investigate, novel threats, novel delivery of threats, novel
packaging, and perform red teaming exercises to provide high resolution pictures of
future biothreats.249  The work is not intended to be unclassified, but subject to some
level of security restriction.
Characteristics of the Current Strategy
What the US has in place are three structures with relatively distinct
responsibilities.  DoD develops countermeasures and protective devices for military
personnel. DHS develops surveillance and response systems for use within the US
homeland for the protection of the US civilian population and for the ability to
identify the perpetrator of any terrorist act. HHS’s responsibility is in the
development and stockpiling of medical countermeasures for the civilian population
in addition to improving public health response capabilities.  All three departments
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have some responsibility for scientific investigations of current and future biothreat
agents. However, while DoD and DHS attempt to define future threats through
experiments designed to create them, HHS works on medical countermeasures based
on an agent’s known characteristics (i.e. without significant modification).
HHS moved quickly to define its work prior to the creation of DHS and has
worked in the absence of any enlarged biothreat list from DHS.  HHS’s criteria are
based on the characteristics of the pathogens themselves and potential for widespread
harm. This kind of information is readily available and has not traditionally been
classified.250  That is, researchers do not need to first demonstrate that the pathogen
can be weaponized in order for it to be on a high priority research list: over half the
agents on the Category A list are not DoD threat agents (i.e. DoD does not believe
they have ever been weaponized).251 See table 4 below.
Table 4: Category A Agents (NIAID list)
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Work at HHS is in large measure an expansive version of the post-1969
biodefense program at USAMRIID.  However, the current US biodefense strategy as
it is being carried out by DHS is, on the other hand, a much more expansive version
of the pre-1969 US BW program – lacking only the explicit approval of offensive
work (although some of the work recently revealed has pushed the limits of the
BWC).252  The military’s pre-1969 approach to the threat – surveillance, detection
and threat assessments – has essentially been duplicated at DHS.  In summary, the
current strategy emphasizes the following:
• BW are feasible, powerful, inexpensive, and easily hidden (useful for
sabotage).
• Advances in technology are making new bioweapons possible.
• Intelligence collection cannot be relied upon to characterize the extent of the
BW threat.
• In order to have a more complete understanding, investigations into the
offensive potential of current and novel pathogens must be done in order to
develop appropriate defenses.
• It is also necessary to thoroughly test the ways in which the US is vulnerable
to attack (Red Teaming) in order to develop better strategies for protection.
• BW work requires classification – of basic research and possibly of
publications.
• BW work requires access controls.
• BW use is not governed by moral considerations or international agreements.
• Deterrence is not feasible: work must focus on prevention and response
The National Strategy for Homeland Security released in 2002, states that,
“The expertise, technology, and material needed to build the most deadly weapons
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known to mankind – including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons – are spreading inexorably.  If our enemies acquire these weapons, they are
likely to try to use them.”253  The US response, therefore, focuses on law enforcement
methods to control access to the US and to pathogens in order to apprehend terrorists
before they are able to strike and the forensic ability to ensure attribution in the event
a crime is committed.  Very little in the strategy relies on cooperative efforts with
other states (except in sharing law enforcement information).  There is not even a
passing mention in either the National Strategy for Homeland Security nor in
Biodefense for the 21st Century of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention nor
the Geneva Protocol.  The omission of the BWC reveals the extent to which the
current US strategy has departed from the past thirty years.
In 1969, the US forfeited its bioweapons capability in favor of a strategy to
support the convention – the norm – against BW as having any place in any arsenal in
the world.  It became a party to the BWC in order to reinforce this notion.  The
considered judgment in 1969 was that biological weapons provided no strategic value
in the hands of a well-armed state like the US and reduced US power in the hands of
others even if held in small quantities. It was enough to perform unclassified
biodefense work on medical and mechanical countermeasures.
Thirty-seven years after the termination of the US offensive BW program, the
agents the US fears most are still those it weaponized.  The anthrax used in the 2001
attacks bore uncomfortably close resemblance to the anthrax the US military
produced and stockpiled for potential use.  Pushing to stay at the leading edge of the
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threat curve brought the threat itself to being in an unpredictable fashion.  The fear of
precisely this outcome led the US to the 1969 decision.  However, this reasoning has
been forgotten.
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Chapter 6:  Choice and Consequence
“We can choose to save the world for ourselves and our
children with science as our servant, helping us to restore and
to build…Or we can choose the easier road, the road of hate
and fear that would lead us to destroy our neighbors because
we don’t like the way they live and because we are sure they
are threatening to destroy us.” – Theodor Rosebury, 1949
The US is currently applying logic that bears close resemblance to that which
drove the War Department to invest in a new BW program during World War II.
Fear and technology are entwined once again to form a strong plea for offensive work
in the name of defense.  The proclaimed enemies this time are believed to be
determined terrorists armed with WMD employing sabotage techniques to cripple the
US at home as well as states seeking a weapon with deterrent value.  The enemy sixty
years ago was feared to be the same.  Then as now there are active discussions about
technological advances making possible more potent bioweapons.  Now, however,
the claim is unfortunately more true than ever before.
There are both potential benefits and risks to the strategy as currently
conceived.  Investigations that enhance scientific understanding of disease processes
and human immunity can lead to better medicines.  Funding for detection devices can
improve the basic technology such that diagnoses of common and exotic diseases are
quick and reliable.254  That is the potential positive interaction that could improve
public health and biodefense preparedness.  The risk comes from the pursuit of threat
assessment and red teaming activities – and their classification.  Such work invites
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emulation and gives all governments legitimacy to pursue similar programs in similar
fashion.  This is likely to increase suspicion and fuel a dangerous cycle of increasing
threat and fear.
As an alternative to the current approach, the US could build more upon the
strengths of the post-1969 biodefense program: cooperative, international,
unclassified research restricted to defensive investigations and designed to improve
the capacity to identify and respond to outbreaks wherever and whatever their source.
It may seem paradoxical, but more security can possibly be obtained through
increased interaction and cooperation with the rest of the world rather than through
predominantly restrictive security measures that attempt to control and contain the
threat to areas outside the US.
The Past as Future?
Table 5 below compares the presumptions of the three periods of time in US
BW policy. These key presumptions formed at the end of World War II about the BW
threat are analyzed here in the context of past and current policy.
Table 5: Comparison of Presumptions
1941 – 1969 1969 – 2001 2002-present
BW are feasible, powerful,
inexpensive & easily
hidden
BW are feasible, powerful,
inexpensive & easily
hidden




make new BW possible
Advances in technology
make new BW possible
Advances in technology













Perform realistic testing of
US vulnerabilities
No open-air testing in the
public domain
Use Red Teaming to test
US vulnerabilities
Classify BW work BW Work is Unclassified Classify BW work
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Classify BW publications Open publication policy Classify BW publications
Biosecurity access
controls
Biosafety access controls Biosecurity access
controls
BW use not governed by
moral considerations or
international agreements
BW use prohibited by
BWC and domestic laws.









BW are Feasible, Powerful, Inexpensive and Easily Hidden
Current US strategy assumes that bioweapons are all of the above: this has
been demonstrated.  The US created and stockpiled dangerous bioweapons and, more
importantly, the USSR did as well.  Indeed, the enormous Soviet BW program
ballooned in the years after the BWC was signed, demonstrating the ease with which
such a program could be hidden.  It was not until Vladimir Pasechnik defected to the
UK in 1989 and Ken Alibek followed that the US was able to determine the scale of
the Soviet BW program – and the exotic kinds of research it pursued.  Both were a
significant shock to the US intelligence community.
While the US military studied the possible applications of BW in war-fighting
environments, the consistent observation from 1941 to now is that bioweapons are
most useful for sabotage purposes.  They are – and have always held the most
potential as –  strategic terror weapons.
Advances in Technology make new BW possible
Another major theme that echoes down through the decades is that advances
in technology make new, potentially more fearsome BW possible.  This was a major
argument made by the WBC committee to press for the initiation of the BW R&D
program in 1941.  The same argument was then employed by the Haskins Committee
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in 1949 to resuscitate a BW program after several years of indifference.  Today, the
same argument is again employed to make the case for investigations into the
characteristics of future BW agents in a classified facility (NBACC).  However,
allowing the military exploration of this space is a major risk: it leads to the
development of novel weapons.
Technology is enabling the creation of novel pathogens and the large-scale
production of exotic toxins.  Synthetic genomics is making possible the creation of
agents that resemble and have attributes of select agents, but which cannot be
identified as such based on their sequence.  It also provides the capability to produce
novel pathogens of equal or greater danger than select agents.255  Recent experiments
have deepened this concern: avoiding the genesis of such weaponry by any state or
group should be a major concern.
Intelligence Collection not Sufficient
The intelligence community (IC) does not have a strong record of success in
the BW area.  That is largely due to the first point: a BW program is readily hidden
because it carries no unique signatures.  During World War II, the IC looked actively
in the European theater for evidence of a BW program.  Although significant
evidence pointed away from any such program (no antibodies detected in German and
Italian prisoners of war), the strong belief that Germany had the intent to use BW led
to a dismissal of this information and a more intensive hunt for any BW information.
In addition, although strong evidence pointed toward Japanese BW investigations and
                                                
255 David Relman, “Working Group on Synthetic Genomics: Progress Report,” Presentation delivered
to the National Security Advisory Board for Biosecurity meeting (July 13, 2006).  Downloaded from
www.biosecurityboard.gov.
156
use, the US did not pursue that information until the end of the war – perhaps because
the government did not believe that the Japanese could develop such a program.
The limits of the IC in the BW area were known during the post-1969 period,
but the biodefense program nonetheless relied upon the IC to provide lists of
validated threats to guide their research.  As new threats were identified (e.g. T-2
mycotoxins, Ebola etc.), work at USAMRIID shifted or expanded.
However, the recent lack of sufficient information from the IC about the
actual BW threat has led to the adoption of a seemingly logical, but actually the most
dangerous presumption of all: that investigation of the offense is necessary to develop
appropriate defenses.  This was first argued in 1941 by the Chemical Weapons
Service.  It was abandoned after 1969, but is being resurrected today.  The logic is not
supported by historical experience.
Investigation of the Offense is Necessary to prepare Defenses
NBACC was founded in 2002 to perform threat characterization and
bioforensic work. Just as in 1941, the need to understand the implications of
technological advances drives the need for up-to-date threat assessments. Thus an old
argument is being repeated: in order to develop appropriate defenses, a thorough
investigation of the offensive potential of BW is necessary.
In the 1941-1969 period, this guiding logic led to the creation of potent
bioweapons and pitifully few defenses.  That is, the theory was tested and proven
wrong.  Despite this relevant historic example, rather the opposite result is expected
today.  “A biological threat characterization program would enable U.S. biodefense to
anticipate and prepare for emerging threats, bringing the defense closer to parity with
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the threat curve.”256  There is no reason to believe, as the authors and many others do,
that the outcome will be exactly opposite to that already experienced by the US from
its 1941-1969 threat assessment work.
Threat assessment based on technological potential will enlarge the threat
space, rather than provide a realistic characterization of it.  Among a myriad of
possibilities, it is unlikely that the US will develop just those that an adversary is
pursuing. It has also been demonstrated that such work is not actually necessary for
development of appropriate defenses.
USAMRIID’s work resulted in the development of new vaccines and
therapies for both DoD threat agents and for emerging infectious diseases (EID) of
particular virulence.  It made rather limited investigations of the offense – and then
only what was necessary to validate defenses. Proceeding in this way allowed for the
development of the scientific base to respond to novel threat agents and EID.
Necessary to Investigate the Nature and Extent of US Vulnerability
It is the current policy that it is not only necessary to investigate the
characteristics of future bioweapons, it is also necessary to test the ways in which
such novel organisms could threaten the US.  Again, a reasonable assumption is to
find vulnerabilities in order to minimize them.  The problem is that many ways in
which bioweapons make US citizens vulnerable are already known because of
extensive testing in the past.  That knowledge combined with more sophisticated
epidemiological models should be sufficient on which to base estimates of novel BW
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effects.  Furthermore – as with the creation of novel pathogens – the generation of
new information about how to effectively disseminate them cannot be kept secret
forever from every potential terrorist.  History bears this out.
In the late 1940s, the usefulness of BW for covert and clandestine operations
was recognized and many tests done to assess this utility.  Ira Baldwin, former
scientific director at Camp Detrick, wrote a “Report on Special BW Operations” in
October 1948 that emphasized the vulnerability of the US to secret BW attacks.257
What ensued was a series of tests in public areas with simulants, including subway
and ventilation systems.  In 1951, a US National Intelligence Estimate concluded,
“Possible methods of introducing and disseminating biological weapons are almost
limitless.” 258 As one example, “Contaminated letters may be sent directly to the
intended victims, without risk of detection.”  So it was written, so it was done over
fifty years later.
BW Research and Publication Requires Classification & Access Controls
As noted in the previous chapter, a recent Executive Order expanded the kinds
of scientific information that could be subject to classification to include information
about WMD and transnational terrorism.  Numerous other actions by Congress have
imposed biosecurity controls on work with Select Agents.  Editors of scientific
journals now voluntarily monitor their own publications for bioweapons implications.
In addition, most of the work on biological countermeasures at DHS is subject to
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some level of security restriction.  This is causing significant delays in the purchasing
of medicines under the BioShield Project, because new purchases are dependent on
prior DHS material threat assessments, which are currently classified and cannot
therefore be released as written.  Information about the exact quantity of medicines in
and location of the Strategic National Stockpile is also not publicly available.
This is all very similar to the way in which the US BW program was carried
out from 1941-1969.  It operated under strict secrecy, with a brief window of
openness between 1945-1949.  Much of the work remains classified, but that has not
prevented the inadvertent spread of information relevant to weapons application.
Simply knowing that it is possible to use a pathogen as an efficient and effective
biological weapon is enough to provoke emulation.
Operating a secret biodefense program invites emulation and suspicion.  It
also reduces opportunities for international collaboration on research with important
pathogens.  This lack of transparency can lead to dysfunctional behavior.  Disease
outbreaks have long been considered natural until proven otherwise.  This allows for
quick public health interventions to save lives – often involving international
responses.  If the reverse were presumed, efforts to collect and preserve “evidence”
could interfere with an appropriate public health response.
BW Use Not Governed by Moral Considerations or International Agreements
In its very first report, the WBC committee clearly stated its belief that BW
use would not be governed by moral considerations or international agreements.  At
the time, the US had signed but not ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use
of BW in war.  Their reasons for this belief are not stated, although the events of
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World War II undoubtedly affected their perceptions: the second meeting of the WBC
committee was the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
National Strategy today implicitly adopts the same posture.  There is no
mention of either the Geneva Protocol nor the BWC in the US Biodefense strategy.
International cooperation is limited to the sharing of law enforcement information and
the interdiction of prohibited technologies.  The US scuttled attempts to create a
Protocol to the BWC in 2001 because it did not believe in its purpose.  Current
policymakers simply do not see any worth in or power to be derived from supporting
the norm against BW or international agreements towards that end.  The only power
on which it believes it can rely is military strength.
Deterrence Not Feasible
The original BW program began with the goal of creating bioweapons in order
to have a deterrent to enemy BW use.  The idea of deterrence in kind later shifted to a
notion of measured response during the Vietnam War to allow for the first use of non-
lethal BW in an attempt to avoid a full escalation of the conflict.  That provoked a
very strong response.  In 1969, it was determined that as a deterrent on a strategic
level, BW were redundant and not usable against a nuclear-armed state because any
BW use – even nonlethal BW – would escalate the conflict to nuclear exchange.
Today, the US is more concerned about terrorist use of BW and less so with
state BW programs because the US nuclear arsenal is still a deterrent against states.
The conclusion – again implicit – is that terrorists using WMD cannot be deterred.
They must either be physically prevented from carrying out their crimes, or the US
must be able to act quickly and effectively to minimize the damage and later
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prosecute the offenders.  If the strategy is to be characterized as one of deterrence, it
is through the denial of ends sought through effective domestic preparedness.
However, it is difficult for the US to argue both that it can fully defend itself against
BW and that technology is rapidly making novel and more potent BW possible.
Which History?
This study shows that the fork in the road the US is currently following has
already been well trodden.  It is a dangerous path, if history is any guide.  It is not too
late to walk further down the road less traveled by because the prospects are actually
better there.
A National Program
The 1941-1969 period is instructive not only for the biodefense logic it
created, but also for the consequences that followed.  The fear was always that the US
might be behind the threat curve, even as it was actually pushing the leading edge of
it outward.  Offensive BW investigations generated lethal and nonlethal biological
weapons that the US held in substantial quantity.  Within this period of time, the US
military changed its attitude toward BW from one of skepticism, to one of support:
policy shifted from deterrence to first-use.  Housing the secret program within the
military establishment after WWII encouraged the weaponization of BW, because the
creation of effective weapons is part of the military’s mission.  A major oversight was
the placement of the R&D for medical defense within the same organization.
However, that was deemed logical because of the secrecy surrounding the entire BW
program.
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In the end, the application of this strand of logic to biodefense resulted in a
significantly imbalanced situation: the US possessed BW weapons, but not adequate
defenses against even the major threat agents it had weaponized.  Table 6 below
shows the quantities of biological threat agents the US had stockpiled in its arsenal as
of 1969 and the kinds of vaccines available.
Table 6: Balance of Readiness as of 1969
1969 Weapons Program 1969 Safety Program
Anthrax 220 lb (lethal) Vaccine – 1960s*
Botulinum Toxin 23,000 cartridges IND Vaccine *
Tularemia 804 lb (lethal) IND Vaccine
VEE 4,991 gal + 334 lb (incapacitant) IND Vaccine *
Q Fever 5,098 gal (incapacitant) IND Vaccine *
Brucellosis M114 4-lb bombs Vaccine *
SEB Stockpiled
Yellow Fever Standardized 1959 (mosquito vector) Vaccine
Plague Vaccine (1946-1998)*
The list above does not include agents in weapons, because there is no
published list available that indicates which agents were placed into which bombs.
Also, an important qualifier to the list of vaccines is that they were not all considered
effective (these are starred).  At the time, the anthrax vaccine was not considered
effective against certain strains labeled as “vaccine-resistant” (including the Ames
strain) and required numerous injections and annual boosters. The Q fever and VEE
vaccines both induced unacceptably high levels of side effects.   The botulinum
toxoid also produced undesirable reactions and was effective against only five of the
seven types of toxin.  For brucellosis, an IND vaccine was reported to have been
developed, but as of 2004, no human vaccine is licensed or available for use.  For
plague, a vaccine was available, but it was known to be ineffective against an aerosol
exposure.  Therefore, only the vaccines for tularemia and yellow fever were known to
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be safe and effective for use in man against the respective weaponized forms of the
agent as of 1969.
Biodefense policy can continue to reenact this early history or choose to build
upon the history after 1969.  In very broad terms, the choice is between applying
national security-type measures to the biodefense problem or those of public health.
The consequences of furthering the path the US is now on should be clear.  Building
instead upon the post-1969 program is not as certain, but carries fewer risks and
potentially greater benefits.
International Cooperation
The post-1969 program spent several decades attempting to create more
effective vaccines for agents the US had previously weaponized and new vaccines
and therapies for highly pathogenic EID and new threat agents.  As described in
chapter 5, the program was modestly successful, despite extremely limited funding.
The average annual budget for USAMRIID’s work was approximately $23 million in
current (2006) dollars.
Work done under the Biological Defense Research Program was unclassified
and restricted to defensive work.  This sometimes required limited investigations of
what could be considered offensive work, such as tests of environmental stability,
aerosol dynamics, and selecting and cultivating particularly pathogenic strains, and
purification of toxins.  However, careful inventories were kept of quantities of toxins
produced for research purposes and for the production of toxoids.  In addition, aerosol
tests with virulent agents were done with wet aerosols – not dry aerosols as would be
more appropriate for offensive use.  That is, knowing how a pathogen performed in a
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wet aerosol was sufficient to test the efficacy of vaccines and therapies in animal
models.
Overall, the limited types of offensive studies were consistent with the overall
purpose of the program and done without classified status.  Furthermore, USAMRIID
scientists appreciated the implications of recombinant DNA technology, but chose to
apply it primarily toward novel vaccine development rather than use it as a reason to
develop novel pathogens.  The need to perform experiments in a fairly transparent
organization that sometimes included foreign researchers possibly helped keep the
kinds of experimentation away from exotic threat assessment work.
Orienting the program in this way was designed to enhance confidence that
work at USAMRIID was consistent with its obligations under the BWC.  In addition,
it made possible international collaborations that enhanced confidence in its
biological countermeasures: detection systems were field tested during outbreaks of
viral hemmorhagic fevers in other countries, the efficacy of the antiviral drug
Ribavirin was evaluated in humans during natural outbreaks in China and Yugoslavia,
and other important knowledge about experimental vaccines and therapies was
gained.
Current biodefense work at NIAID most closely resembles the scientific work
done at USAMRIID from 1969-1990.  However, NIAID’s budget is significantly
larger – nearly $1.7 billion per year.  Medical countermeasures are the core of any
strategy to deal with pathogens – whether used deliberately as a weapon or naturally
occurring.  Detection systems are also important: development of this technology and
its domestic implementation is largely the responsibility of DHS.
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Therefore, the recent shift in approach must reflect either an assessment that
the post-1969 program was inadequate in some fundamental way or that a change in
the security environment warranted such a reversion.  The three significant features
that are transforming the post-1969 program are: a dedicated BW threat assessment
effort conducted under NBACC; significant amounts of classified work; and
significant amounts of funding.
A major failure of the post-1969 program was the ability to track
developments in other state BW programs.  Threat assessment is intended as the
remedy.  Historically, it has been shown that threat assessments did reveal US
vulnerabilities, but still could not reduce them nor enhance intelligence collection.
Knowing what adversaries might hypothetically be working on will do little to
describe what they actually are working on.  It is akin to the story of the drunk man
who lost his wallet in a dark alley but searched for it under the street lamp because
the light was so much better there.
Thus, although threat assessments are defended as necessary to gain parity
with the actual, emerging biothreats –  there must be another reason for the change in
policy.  It is more likely that concerns about WMD terrorism after 2001 prompted a
need to do something the US was comfortable with, such as meeting a national
security threat with national security measures.
The Road Ahead
The history of US engagement with the problem of biological weapons is
instructive both for the unanticipated results of the 1941-1969 period and the
forgotten era of defensive work (1969-2001).  The early period produced weapons
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before strategy – and when strategy was carefully considered, the weapons were
considered dangerous for the US to have.    The latter period produced defenses
against natural and biothreat agents in the absence of a weapons strategy, but rather
under the commitment to the international BW ban.
Therefore the most important elements of a strategy to deal with the BW
threat is quick detection, organizational response capability, and medical
countermeasures under a program that operates under transparency rules.  Preventing
the military application of technological advances for the investigation of offensive
applications is of the utmost primacy.  Part of the solution is enforcing the norm
against such activities – which requires that the US not actively violate it.  There is no
defensible justification of such work.  Refusing such work would enforce the norm
articulated in the BWC.  It would improve US security by both restricting any
offensive work to that only necessary to improve defenses (as was done at
USAMRIID) within a transparent, defensively-oriented program.  That transparency
is key to providing reassurance and avoiding unnecessary, provocative investigations.
Another area of work is to improve detection capabilities.  Detection of
pathogens is now most advanced within the US, but the US would be in a better
position if detection of virulent pathogens was possible before being released on US
soil.  That is, an international network of detection systems would enhance US
security if it was designed for both EID and potential BW agents.  It would require
investments in training laboratory workers and building laboratory capacity –
transferring materials and knowledge to improve scientific capabilities in areas of
greatest need.
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Such networks are not without precedent. Networks to monitor compliance
with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is already in place although the treaty itself
has not entered into force.   Monitoring of disease activity depends on the sharing of
information and individuals with the experience and training to know what is natural
and what suspicious.  This can and should be strengthened because it is more than
likely that more can be known through inadvertent revelations through sanctioned
contacts than through attempts to infiltrate select programs.  For example, some of the
former USSR BW secrets were gained while US and UK scientists were on an
approved visit: one Russian scientist did not realize his comment about work with
smallpox was highly unusual.
As the US invests heavily in the scientific base to work with the most virulent
pathogens, it is important to emphasize that the work be done as transparently as
possible to diminish international concerns and avoid the proliferation of classified
BW work.  After all, the medical benefits of such work cannot legitimately be
restricted to any one country.  The development of a vaccine or therapy that can save
lives has not and should not ever be considered as information relevant to national
security.  In the past, an argument was made to this effect: that the US should not
reveal its defenses – past stockpiles of vaccines were classified – because it would
invite attack.  It is a curious argument.  Currently, the inadequacy of US medical
countermeasures is public: USAMRIID’s Medical Management of Biological
Casualties is a description of major biothreat agents and the current state of medical
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defense and therapy.259   Knowing the effectiveness and limits of a vaccine is
essential public health information and should not be classified.
Instead, international cooperation enhances US biodefenses by allowing for
the field testing of systems and therapies against many biothreat agents that occur
naturally in other parts of the world – over half of the NIH Category A list is endemic
overseas.  It builds some measure of trust, as well, that the US is not simply interested
in the advancement of its own interests at the expense of others – but that the health
of all can be pursued together and that it has its own worth.  WHO efforts are
instructive in this way: WHO scientists have gained access to countries even in the
midst of wars in order to better the health of local populations.  The successful
smallpox campaign is an instructive example.
International cooperation is even more imperative today in the fight against
terrorism.  In this fight, the US cannot depend only on its military strength.  It must
find ways to reduce the sources of terrorism abroad by investing in the health and
well-being of other countries.  It is true that in doing so, the US builds local capacity
and transfers knowledge.  However, because all medical research is potentially
consequential work and the only defining factor is intent, then it is even more
important that the US shape the intentions of the scientists, making them contributors
to the shared goal of international health and security and not providing incentives to
put it at risk.
Unfortunately, current US policy works in precisely the opposite direction,
nationalizing policies and granting currency to other governments to conduct
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classified BW threat assessments.  Oversight is today being directed to identifying
dangerous experiments in order to perform them rather than to induce caution. The
NAS committee that proposed an oversight system (NSABB) did so for the purpose
of minimizing the potential for the misuse of biotechnology: “The key issue is
whether the risks associated with misuse can be reduced while still enabling critical
research to go forward.”260 That is the key challenge and the answer will likely
require the participation of all countries to prevent the deviation of any one.
David Huxsoll, former commander of USAMRIID, wrote the following: he
captures the essence of what the history recounted here teaches:
An open, transparent biomedical defense program is the only type of program
that truly supports US national policy, which is based on the provisions of the
BWC.  If the medical defense program were shrouded by secrecy of any
degree, it would be incompatible with program acceptance, execution, and
accomplishment.  Selective openness is unacceptable: being “open” or
“transparent” implies access to information relating to all stages of the
research and development cycle.  I also firmly believe that a laboratory or
institute that can lay claim to internationally recognized scientific excellence
has an open program.  Transparency is the responsibility of everyone who has
any connection with the issues, either as part of his job, or as a consulting
expert (whether scientifically recognized or self-appointed).  In other words,
transparency is everybody’s business.261
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Appendix A: USAMRIID Research Summary
Below are the summaries for the agents on which USAMRIID spent
significant time and effort.  Some agents not included in this summary, but on which
researchers did report work are: Japanese encephalitis B, St. Louis encephalitis,
alphaviruses other than VEE (EEE, WEE, Mayaro, Chikungunya, O’nyong-nyong),
Legionnaire’s disease, Ebola, Dengue, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, HIV, Malaria, nor
studies of low molecular weight peptides (neuropeptides and monokines), nor many
other toxins studied (e.g. marine toxins like saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin; toxin in snake
venoms) that was initiated in the mid-1980s.  The summaries are intended to provide
a very broad overview of the types of experimentation done and results recorded.
They are not intended to be exhaustive nor authoritative.
Anthrax
The anthrax bacillus is a gram-positive, sporulating rod that was weaponized
during the US offensive program and more recently by other states.  Historically,
mortality for the inhalational form of anthrax exceeded 85%.  A vaccine (Anthrax
Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) Bioport, Lansing, Michigan) was licensed in 1970.  It is
derived from sterile culture fluid supernatant taken from an attenuated (non-
encapsulated) strain. The vaccination series consists of six subcutaneous doses over
18 months followed by yearly boosters.262  For post-exposure therapy, intravenous
antibiotic treatment is recommended.
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The Department of Defense mandated the vaccination of all US service
members beginning in 1998.  However, production of the vaccine was suspended in
1998 when the only production facility was closed for renovations designed to meet
FDA regulations.
The Institute of Medicine reviewed the AVA, as licensed, and concluded the
following:
AVA, as licensed, is an effective vaccine to protect humans against anthrax,
including inhalational anthrax.  Moreover, because the vaccine exerts its
protection via an antigen crucial to the action of the bacterium’s toxins, AVA
should be effective against anthrax toxicity from all known strains of B.
anthracis, as well as from any potential bioengineered strains.263
During this period of USAMRIID’s history, there was considerably more
doubt about the effectiveness of the US anthrax vaccine.  After the 1979 accidental
anthrax release in Sverdlovsk, USSR, more work at USAMRIID went into research
on the anthrax bacillus.  By FY1990, it was known that in order to develop an optimal
anthrax vaccine, the mechanisms of virulence and vaccine resistance of B. anthracis
needed to be known.  In experimental animals, the toxigenic (Tox+) and encapsulated
(Cap+) Ames strain could overwhelm immunity induced by toxin-based vaccines
more readily than other virulent strains.264  The findings of the USAMRIID
researchers in these years about the potentially limited protection afforded by the US
anthrax vaccine contradict the later conclusion by the Institute of Medicine (above).
The reason for the discrepancy is the differences between the results with the lab
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animals tested at USAMRIID (the guinea pig and mouse models) and those the IOM
committee relied upon (macaque and rabbit): the latter models were considered more
accurate representations of anthrax infection in humans.
Anthrax Toxin Studies
For eight years, USAMRIID performed virtually no work on anthrax (FY69-
FY77).  For reasons that are not elaborated, basic research began in FY78 to elucidate
the mechanism of intoxication of anthrax toxin alone and to define its relationship to
the overall course of anthrax infections.265  Part of the reason given was that prior
with involved challenge studies using spores of virulent strains (1962), with very little
work on the toxin itself (1968) because interest was centered on the organism and
establishment of infection.  Research on the anthrax toxin began because while
antibiotic therapy can eradicate the organism, death could still result as a direct
consequence of toxin elaboration.  The prime goal of the work was to produce a
standard antigen as a vaccine and to improve the anthrax vaccine in use.
In FY79, production of the anthrax toxin components (lethal factor (LF),
protective antigen (PA) and edema factor (EF)) in vitro began using the Sterne strain
for production of LF, and V770 for production of PA alone. (The V770 strain is
avirulent, noncapsulated, and nonproteolytic.  It was used to develop the Wright
human vaccine.  It produces the PA antigen, but lacks the ability to produce the other
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two antigens.) Unconcentrated crude supernatants alone contained enough LF and PA
to kill rats in 1-2 hours.266
Within another year, satisfactory conditions were established for the in vitro
production of anthrax toxins.  LF and EF, when isolated, lack biological activity.
Only when combined in a specific ration with PA, do they have biological activity.267
Using purified components of the anthrax toxin, it was found that the combination of
PA and EF caused rapid, profound, and reversible increases of intracellular levels of
camp, a result identical to that caused by cholera toxin.  PA appeared to bind to
surface receptors and enable EF to penetrate cells.  EF was determined to be an
adenylate cyclase enzyme active only within animal cells.268  PA mixed with LF was
found lethal to rats with a minimum time to death of 60 minutes.
USAMRIID already had a standard purification procedure that it developed
for the isolation of PA from culture supernatant.  PA is antigenic and affords some
protection in animals.  Guinea pigs immunized with this partially purified antigen
survived an IM challenge of 9200 LD50 of the Vollum strain anthrax spores.269
In FY1982, the three protein components of anthrax toxin were purified and
characterized.  Yields, purities, and subunit molecular weights were, respectively:270
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PA:  50mg, >95% pure, 85,000 daltons
LF:  10mg, >90% pure, 83,000 daltons
EF:  2 mg,  >90% pure, 89,000 daltons
The heat-stable eukaryotic substance required by EF to express its latent
cyclase activity was shown to be calmodulin, a protein ubiquitous in eukaryotes.
Purified calmodulin fully activated EF and the dependence on calmodulin by EF is
absolute. Data suggested that EF is not recognized by the experimental host as a
foreign protein.
When LF was purified using a synthetic medium developed at USAMRIID (R
medium) instead of medium 1095, the LF was ten times more toxic than reported in
FY1981.  Only 2 micrograms of LF mixed with 100 micrograms of PA killed Fisher
344 rats in 120 minutes.271  However, the mechanism of action of LF was not
determined.
Further studies continued to find ways to ensure the production of enough
anthrax toxins for research purposes.  Initial recombinant work on anthrax toxin
focused on cloning the gene for PA.  A fragment of the pX01 plasmid was cloned into
E. coli plasmid vector pBR322 and production of biologically active PA was
demonstrated.272
In FY1986, the genes for PA, EF and LF were sequenced. It was found that
PA binds to a receptor and is cleaved by a trypsin-like enzyme in the membrane,
exposing a site to which LF or EF binds.  In vitro, the cleavage of PA by trypsin is at
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arginine-167 in a unique sequence of four contiguous basic amino acids.273  This was
a novel find:  the mechanism of action of the three toxin components were not
previously understood. PA therefore had two binding sites.  It was hypothesized that
alteration of the cleavage site by directed mutagenesis could produce an inactive PA
for use in future anthrax vaccines.
Large numbers of monoclonal antibodies to all three toxin proteins were
obtained.  Monoclonal antibodies that neutralize PA bind to the C-terminal half of the
protein and prevent toxin binding to cells.274
The Role of Plasmids
In FY1982, plasmids were discovered that regulate all the anthrax toxin
components (PA, LF, EF).275  A literature survey that year revealed no published
reports on the role of plasmids in B. anthracis.  Plasmids were then isolated from
various strains of B. anthracis: the Sterne and V770 strains contained both large and
small molecular weight plasmids, while the encapsulated virulent strains contained an
additional large molecular weight plasmid.276 In FY1986, analysis of the gene library
of the pX01 plasmid showed that it contained the genes for all three toxin proteins.277
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Researchers determined that the basis for virulence in the anthrax bacillus
resulted from two factors: a polyglutamic capsule and a three-component protein
toxin.  In FY1985, a US contractor and a Japanese researcher working independently
both found that virulent B. anthracis strains contain a second large plasmid, pX02,
which codes for synthesis of the polyglutamic acid capsule.278
By FY1990, researchers found that strains cured of pX01 had reduced
virulence for mice, but some, such as D Ames-1 were still lethal at low doses.
Virulence was partially mediated by pX02.  Mutants that produced no detectable
capsule were avirulent while mutants that produced more capsule than the parent
strain were more virulent.  This indicated that plasmid pX02 contributed significantly
to the virulence of B. anthracis.  However pX02 loci unrelated to capsule production
also appeared to contribute to virulence.  Results suggested that pathogenesis depends
on a complex interaction of plasmid- and chromosome-encoded factors of B.
anthracis and is modulated by the genetic background of the host.279
Virulence Testing
In FY1981, “a vial of lyophilized Bacillus anthracis, Vollum 1B strain, was
obtained” for research purposes.280  Spores obtained were suspended and used to
reestablish the validity of lab animal models for use in candidate anthrax vaccine
evaluations.  Dose-response values for oral exposure had not been reported
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previously, but was determined in guinea pigs to be equivalent to that by aerosol
challenge, approximately 5 log 10 viable spores.
In another study in FY 1985, researchers tested the hypothesis that 3%
calcium  “potentiated” the virulence of the Vollum 1B strain.  The addition of
calcium did not enhance the virulence of the culture.281  This experiment may have
been done because a significant finding in the [unpublished] FY1984 annual report
was that the calcium ion greatly stimulates phosphorylation and that PA causes the
incorporation of 32P from gamma-labeled ATP into macrophage proteins.282  In later
studies, researchers found that calcium is absolutely required for cell killing by lethal
toxin.  Calcium appeared to be required at several stages, but most importantly at a
step after toxin binding and internalization.  Verapamil, a calcium channel blocker,
protected cells against lethal toxin, suggesting its potential therapeutic value in
anthrax intoxication.283
Genetic manipulation of anthrax bacillus strains was done to find transposons.
Simple filter matings of S. fecalis DC16C2 with B. anthracis VNR-1 (a derivative of
Vollum 1B that has been cured of the pX02 plasmid) yielded tetracycline-resistant B.
anthracis colonies that donated their tetracycline resistance when mating with
streptomycin-resistant Sterne strain colonies.284
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In FY1985, it was found that the virulence of anthrax spores depended on the
growth conditions used in their preparations.  For example, spores grown on NBY
agar appeared to kill CBA/J mice more slowly while being no different in their
potency toward A/J mice.285
Vaccine Studies
The human vaccine against anthrax consists of an alum precipitate of the
culture supernatant of Vollum 770 strain B. anthracis.  (Note: D807-AA-011-1985
says the vaccine is from the Sterne strain.)  The primary constituent for this vaccine is
the PA component of the tripartite toxin.  However, it was generally agreed that live
attenuated vaccine used by veterinarians for vaccination of livestock provide better
protection.286
In FY1981, the sera of over 100 USAMRIID personnel receiving anthrax
immunizations were evaluated. Those who had received extensive immunizations in
earlier years but no boosters for 5-10 years were found to be essentially seronegative.
This led to numerous individuals receiving boosters at one-year intervals.287
Also in FY1981, USAMRIID researches began applying recombinant DNA
techniques to the anthrax bacillus in order to clone the expression of the PA gene with
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the goal of producing a more effective vaccine that would produce a long-lasting,
high level of immunity.288
Because live, attenuated vaccines are more effective, work progressed on
finding a more potent and safer anthrax vaccine.  Several PA fusion vaccines were
investigated.  In FY1986, the PA gene was cloned into B. subtilis with pUB110 as the
vector.  The clones, PA1 and PA2, produced PA at levels equivalent to or greater than
that produced by the parent B. anthracis.  They gave protection to rats against anthrax
toxin challenge (?!?) and guinea pigs against virulent anthrax spore challenge, even
when the spores came from a “vaccine-resistant” strains.289  Thus, these two clones
were the first prototype, “new generation” live vaccines against anthrax.  Further
work confirmed the safety and efficacy of this vaccine.290
Later, site-specific mutagenesis yielded a variant of PA protein in which the
six amino acids spanning the trypsin cleavage site were deleted.  This variant PA was
expressed in B. subtilis and purified.  The deleted PA was non-toxic in rats and in cell
culture.  Guinea pigs were immunized with this PA in combination with LF and EF.
This induced antibody titers equal to those obtained with native PA.  When the
immunized guinea pigs were challenged with virulent B. anthracis, they were
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protected just as well as those receiving native PA.  Thus the deleted PA could serve
as a substitute for PA in any subunit vaccine.291
Dose-range experiments in FY1987 showed that the number of organisms
required to produce immunity for the clones exceeded that for the veterinary vaccine,
but that the immunization schedule is similar to the veterinary vaccine and produces
similar results.292  The recombinant also protected mice resistant to the Sterne spore
vaccine from challenge.
As an alternative vaccine, aromatic amino acid requiring strains of B.
anthracis were identified.  These mutant strains were expected to be avirulent.293
These protected guines pigs challenged by virulent B. anthracis.294
In another study, PA was tested in combination with the adjuvant, “Tri-mix”
as a prototype vaccine in guinea pigs.  Tri-mix was a new immunological adjuvant
developed from Ribi Immunochem Research.  A single injection of the mixture
provided complete protection ten weeks later to a challenge of 7,000 B. anthracis
Ames spores and ELISA titers greater than 20,000 were elicited.295
In addition, the antigens EA-1 and EA-2 were evaluated for their ability to
protect guinea pigs against challenge with virulent B. anthracis.  Despite high post-
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immunization titers to these antigens, the guinea pigs were not protected.  Further
studies suggested that these antigens are on the surface of non-encapsulated
organisms and are probably masked during infection with virulent encapsulated
organisms.  Because of this, these antigens were probably not involved in
protection.296
By FY1989, five new live anthrax vaccines entered preclinical safety and
efficacy testing: two transposon-mutagenized strains of B. anthracis, and three
recombinant strains of B. subtilis carrying the PA gene of B. anthracis.  These were
compared with the veterinary Sterne and human MDPH-PA vaccines.  All five
recombinants protected the sensitive A/J mouse from lethal challenge and high doses
of the recombinants were non-lethal to these mice.  As before, the MDPH-PA vaccine
failed to protect mice from “vaccine-resistant” strains such as Ames.  However the
five recombinants were as effective as Sterne in protecting mice against Ames
(approximately 80% survival).  The mutagenized B. anthracis strains were the first
vaccines tested that were able to protect highly susceptible A/J mice against virulent
challenge.  These five vaccine candidates also demonstrated substantial protection to
guinea pigs against an IM challenge from B. anthracis spores.  Finally, a single
immunization of chemical vaccines consisting of PA + either “Tri-Mix” or “DeTox”
provided complete protection to guinea pigs against Ames spore challenge 24 weeks
later.   These vaccine candidates also appeared to result in significant immunity in a
                                                
296 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1987
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A871 AD 131, p.118.
182
shorter time than the currently-used vaccines and generally safer than the live
veterinary vaccine.297
In FY1990, the PA gene of B. anthracis Sterne strain was cloned into
baculovirus and vaccinia virus.  Immunization with baculovirus-PA conferred full
protection to guinea pigs when challenged with Ames spores.  Vaccinia-PA conferred
partial protection enhanced by emulsion of the vaccine in TriMix adjuvant.298  Guinea
pigs received a single dose of vaccine and were challenged eight weeks later with
2000 LD50 Ames spores.  Protection was: TriMix + PA (95%); monophosphoryl
lipid A (MPL)+MDPH (60%); MDPH (50%); and MPL+PA (40%).
Production
The anthrax vaccine that is licensed for use in the US is produced under
conditions that support the production and release of substantial quantities of PA by
strain V770, an avirulent strain.  Knowledge of this was published in 1963.299  By
FY1981, all three protein components of the anthrax toxin were produced and
purified to states approaching homogeneity.300
In FY1982, highly purified and soluble PA was converted to a more potent
immunogen by adsorbing it onto an aluminum hydroxide gel adjuvant.  Soluble and
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adsorbed PA preparations were evaluated as inducers of protective humoral antibody
in the standard model, the guinea pig.301
In FY1981, USAMRIID scientists grew the avirulent Sterne strain in 10- and
20-liter batches in a small fermenter.302  In FY1982, 50-liter anthrax fermenter
cultures were harvested using tangential flow filtration, a safer method.303
Challenge Tests
In FY1982, tests with guinea pigs gave worrisome results about the
effectiveness of the PA-based anthrax vaccine (the one currently used).  Previously
reported data showed that >80% of the Michigan Department of Public Health
(MDPH)-vaccinated guinea pigs were protected against an IM challenge containing
100-200 LD50s of virulent Vollum 1B strain.304  Surprisingly, there was no data
available on the efficacy of the MDPH vaccine to protect guinea pigs against an
aerosol challenge of anthrax spores.
Outbred Hartley strain guinea pigs were vaccinated with the MDPH vaccine
using the standard regime of 3 sc injections of 0.5ml each given at 2-week intervals.
They were presented with an aerosol dose of 152,000 anthrax spores (the LD50 for
guinea pigs averages 60,000 spores).  All controls died by day 4.5.  Only 50% of the
vaccinated guinea pigs survived, with death ranging from 3-7 days, suggesting that
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the protective antigen-type vaccine (MDPH) was not as protective against aerosol
spore challenge as against IM challenge.305
In a further study, guinea pigs were vaccinated either with the Sterne vaccine
or the MDPH vaccine and then challenged either by aerosol exposure or by IM
injection with virulent anthrax spores.  All Sterne-spore-vaccinated guinea pigs
survived both the aerosol and IM challenges.  MDPH-vaccinated animals had an 88%
survival rate against the IM challenge, but only 38% survived the aerosol of anthrax
spores.306
 In FY1985, it was reported that the PA vaccine did not provide complete
protection against 9 of 25 B. anthracis challenge strains.  Those strains that overcome
PA vaccination were termed, “vaccine-resistant” strains, of which the NH and Ames
strains were examples.  British investigators confirmed that Ames and NH challenge
overcame immunization with chemical vaccines.  Testing was planned to see if the
same vaccine-resistant phenomenon was observed when PA-vaccinated animals were
challenged by the aerosol route.307
When presented with an aerosol challenge of virulent B. anthracis, the non-
encapsulated Sterne strain consistently induced greater protection in guinea pigs as
compared to PA products.  At 39 weeks after vaccination, 50% of Sterne-vaccinated
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animals survived, compared with only 30% of the PA-vaccinated guinea pigs.308
However, in another study, guinea pigs were challenged with 10 LD50 of virulent
Vollum 1B strain six weeks after a booster (at 12 weeks).  No differences in
protection were noted: all vaccinated animals survived challenge.  This suggested that
insufficient time elapsed between vaccination and challenge for the differences to
become apparent.309
In the same work unit in FY1985, researchers noted that “reports from the
1950s and 1960s indicate that immunization with PA vaccines may not provide
protection against all virulent strains of B. anthracis.  These reports have been
confirmed in studies reported in the USAMRIID Annual Report, 1984.”310  The
possibility of genetically manipulating the Sterne strain for use in humans was
evaluated.  The Sterne strain was developed over fifty years ago for use in livestock.
It was reported that a Sterne-type strain (STI) was used in several million persons in
the USSR with apparent efficacy.
Detection
In FY1982, researchers found that the Sterne strain could be easily detected at
100,000 CFUs when opsonified with specific antibody.311  However this method had
little applicability for field use.
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Also in FY1982, researchers isolated N-acetylglucosamine galactose
polysaccharide from B. anthracis that seemed unique to it, opening the possibility of
using this sugar to quickly identify anthrax spores from other closely related by
nonpathogenic spore formers.312
In FY1990, PCR biotechnology and a study of the DNA sequences of the six
genes involved in virulence allowed researchers to develop a detection protocol for
virulent isolates.  Similarly, a method to distinguish vaccine-sensitive and vaccine-
resistant strains of B. anthracis was developed based upon the relative binding of
congo red dye.313
Tularemia
Tularemia is caused by Francisella tularensis, a bacteria first identified in
1911 in Tulare County, California (formerly known as Pasteurella tularensis).  As
few as 10 to 50 organisms can cause disease if inhaled or injected intradermally.
Case fatality rates are as high as 35% in untreated typhoidal tularemia (the form most
likely after an aerosol BW attack). There is an investigational (IND) live-attenuated
vaccine that prevents typhoidal tularemia.  A two-week course of antibiotics is
effective post-exposure when given within 24 hours.314  USAMRIID performed fairly
extensive work on the tularemia bacterium from 1969-1990.
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Vaccine Interactions
Mice simultaneously immunized with TC-83 (VEE) and tularemia (LVS)
vaccines showed increased mortality over that observed with the vaccines when given
singly.  Those that survived, however, were more solidly protected against virulent P.
tularensis,  (typically 15-20% receiving the LVS vaccine alone succumb to tularemia
challenge).  In monkeys, deaths occur with little enhancement of immunity
(FY1969).315
In FY1969 researchers also studied the effects of combining the TC-83
(VEE), LVS (tularemia), and EV 51 F plague vaccines in guinea pigs.  The combined
vaccine delayed but increased the antibody titer to plague.316  The LVS vaccine was
then tested for any adjuvant effect.  Others had shown that LVS in combination with
anthrax protective antigen (APA) had markedly improved the protective efficacy of
APA in guinea pigs.  No similar effect was seen with LVS in combination with SEB
toxoid in monkeys (FY1969).317
In FY1973 researchers tested the effectiveness of combining a pentavalent
vaccine (composed of formalin-treated vaccines for WEE, EEE, RVF, Chikungunya,
and Q fever) with the LVS of F. tularensis.  Protection by the attenuated vaccine was
neither enhanced nor impaired by the pentavalent combination.  After this
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experiment, studies on combined antigens were discontinued, in part because of lack
of specific military direction for such combinations.318
In other studies, the LVS vaccine did not lose antigenic potency in humans
after nine years in storage.319
Skin Test
In FY1974, approximately 300,000 human skin test doses were bottled for
human use.  (The Foshay skin test antigen is a 1:1000 dilution of the phenol-killed
Foshay tularemia vaccine, first manufactured in 1943.)  It is considered reasonably
effective in identifying individuals previously infected with F. tularensis.  For
example, between 85-93% of persons who had previous vaccination with LVS of F.
tularensis tested positive for as long as 3.5 years later.320
Other Vaccine Studies
In 1974, three nonliving vaccine preparations from the attenuated strain of F.
tularensis were tested for protective activity against three virulent strains of F.
tularensis.  Neither whole-cell extracts nor extracts prepared from S. aureus offered
significant protection against lethal challenge with F. tularensis, strains 503, 425, of
SCHU S4.321  In FY 1975, RNA-rich phenol extracts of a broken-cell supernatant
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from strain LVS protected mice against lethal challenge with strain 425, but not
against strain SCHU-S4.322
Studies of Modes of Vaccination
One study in FY1978 stated that protection against airborne tularemia ideally
would be via immunoprophylaxis; much work was reported on the protective effect of
parenteral vaccination.  More information was required, however, to define optimal
methods of vaccination to induce the most effective immune defense mechanisms of
the host, particularly against aerosol challenge.  One novel approach was to deposit
antigen locally in the respiratory tract by IN instillation to stimulate local immunity,
but there was little data on how effective these immune responses would be in
protecting against subsequent aerosol challenge.  Studies were initiated to study
relationships between host immune responses and protection against subsequent
infections.323
In FY1977, rats were vaccinated with F. tularensis, LVS, by SPA, IN, or IP
routes.  LVS was recovered from the lungs of the SPA and IP animals within 24
hours to 4 days, and only at 7 days from the IN group. Humoral agglutinins were
measured for the three vaccinated groups at 7 days, with the IP-vaccinated rats having
the highest titers.324
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In FY79, Fischer 344 inbred rats were vaccinated with either the LVS or
inactivated Foshay-type vaccine of F. tularensis.  After treatment with
cyclophosphamide to severely depress the production of humoral antibodies, the rats
survived aerosol and intraperitoneal challenge with virulent F. tularensis while all
unvaccinated controls died.  This was the first direct demonstration that serum
antibody is not a critical component of the immune system for total protection against
lethal tularemia.  Other studies showed that the LVS vaccine administered by SPA
inhalation, intranasal instillation or parenteral routes (IP, SC, or IM injection)
provided practically total and equal protection to the rat against respiratory tularemia
(SCHU S4).325  Rats vaccinated with LVS aerosols or by IM injection with LVS were
fully protected against aerosol challenge for at least two years.326  In addition,
passively administered F. tularensis whole antiserum or the total immunoglobulin
fraction protected F-344 rats against lethal tularemia.
Drug Interactions
In another study (FY78), the effect of nonspecific stimulation on macrophages
on infection was studied in rats treated with glucan prior to infection with SCHU S4
F. tularensis.  Mortality was significantly reduced when glucan was administered IN
and rats were infected by IP inoculation or SPA exposure.327
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Clinical Trials (LVS)
In FY88, eighteen volunteers participated in an initial safety and efficacy trial
of the F. tularensis vaccine (live, TSI-GSD-213, Lot 1R).  All volunteers who
received the vaccine developed a characteristic local lesion at the inoculation site and
experienced a rise in antibody titers.  However, three of the nine who received the
vaccine also had evidence of transient livery dysfuntion, resulting in the suspension
of the trials.328  The LVS strain of F. tularensis has been in use as a vaccine since the
early 1960s.329  The FY88 testing was for new lots of the vaccine produced by more
modern technology to replenish stocks because the older lots became depleted.   The
clinical trials were resumed in FY89 with thirty new volunteers.
Studies of volunteers who received the F. tularensis vaccine showed a rise in
IgG, IgM, and IgA titers, with the IgA response being the most remarkable.  IgA
antibodies appeared within fourteen days after vaccination, with the largest overall
titer increase of the three antibody classes tested. IgG significantly bound to non-
vaccinees, suggesting the existence of IgG-binding proteins in F. tularensis.  Thus,
vaccinating human volunteers with F. tularensis, LVS, stimulates antigen-specific
lymphocyte proliferation activity significantly.330
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Pathogenesis
In FY1969, researchers studied the effect of Pasteurella tularensis on serum
Fe and Zn in humans.  Half of the volunteers were exposed to 2500 viable SCHU-S4
strain P. tularensis and half to 25,000 organisms.331  Early significant decreases in
serum Fe and Zn levels with a concomitant rise in serum Cu were demonstrated in
humans infected with either acute bacterial (tularemia) or viral (sandfly fever)
infections.332  In FY77, multiple zinc treatments enhanced survival incidence during
the early post-infection period in rats infected with F. tularensis or S. pneumoniae.
This was explained in part by zinc’s ability to modify certain aspects of the host’s
defense mechanism and zinc’s inhibition of bacterial proliferation.333  At the
subcellular level during tularemia infection, only changes in the endoplasmic
reticulum were seen.334
In FY77, an assay for the specific bactericidal activity of murine peritoneal
macrophages was adapted to tularemia studies.  The bactericidal capability of these
macrophages correlated with resistance of the donor to tularemia infection.335 In
FY79, researchers tried to determine the mechanism that permits the virulent strain of
F. tularensis SCHU S4 to survive and grow within macrophages and concluded that
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none of the known microbicidal mechanisms of phagocytes are effective in killing F.
tularensis.  The difference between SCHU S4 and LVS strains appeared to reside in
their ability to effectively perform anabolic functions within the acid environment of
the PM lysosome.336 In FY80, a developing principle was that the attenuation of
intracellular parasites like F. tularensis alters the pH optima of the pathogen for
macromolecular synthesis and growth.  Immunization acidifies the macrophage
lysosomes below pH 4.5, leading to a less favorable environment and thereby to more
rapid denaturation and death of such microorganisms.337
These kinds of studies of biochemistry, structure and function of phagocytes
and their organelles in normal and diseased animals were done to disclose how
microorganisms, by altering normal cellular physiology, mitigate host defense
mechanisms, promote cellular dysfunction and enhance host susceptibility to
infectious diseases. Studies on microbial killing and digestion in phagocytes were in
their infancy then, but it was important to conceive and characterize the ways in
which microorganisms avoid being killed and digested because of their application to
development of vaccines, understanding of persistent and latent infections, design of
new therapeutic agents and the ability to deal with any new microbes that periodically
arose.338
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Acquisition of Host Resistance
Mice were immunized with the vaccine strain, LVS, of F. tularensis.  Passive
transfer of either 28-day serum from inbred LVS-vaccinated mice or spleen cells from
12-day LVS vaccines that were simultaneously challenged with streptomycin-
resistant F. tularensis SCHU S5 showed a significant delay in the appearance and
reduced the rate of growth of this strain for 48-72 hours in spleens of streptomycin-
treated inbred recipients.  Therefore, this data contrasts with then-current concepts on
the mechanism of acquired immunity to tularemia.  It suggested that humoral as well
as cell-mediated responses contribute to early resistance in the highly susceptible
mouse.339  However, based on studies with the murine tularemia model in FY77, it
was later stated that CMI has primary responsibility: humoral immunity has never
been shown to provide protection against infection with fully virulent strains of F.
tularensis SCHU S4 and SCHU S5R.340  With increasing time after vaccination, AKR
mice became less resistant to challenge with SCHU S4.341
Nonspecific Resistance
Nonspecific host resistance to L. monocytogenes and S. typhi in the AKR/J
mouse by live tularemia and DPT vaccines suggested that effective host resistance to
infectious diseases of military significance may be induced rapidly and effectively by
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vaccines in current medical use.342  When it was tested in FY1977, it was not found
viable for F. tularensis or S. pneumoniae infections.  The specific immune response
to live tularemia vaccine is unaffected by concurrent administration of preparations
that induce nonspecific protection against Listeria or Salmonella.  The researchers
concluded that it appears likely that the spectrum of infectious diseases which can be
prevented or attenuated by induction of nonspecific resistance (NSR) may be very
limited and not include potential BW agents; and that the duration of induced NSR is
short and variable and adoptive transfer is probably not possible.343
Passive Transfer
Under appropriate conditions, passively transferred spleen cells from mice
immunized with LVS ensured high-grade protection (survival approaching 100%) to
nonimmune recipients against IV, IP, or SC challenge with fully virulent F.
tularensis.344   In similar studies in FY1976, it was found that the model systems
developed permitted definitive studies on mechanisms involved in effective control of
infections caused by highly virulent and potentially antibiotic-resistant, facultative
intracellular bacteria.345
In FY1977, further work on understanding the host response using the murine
tularemia model involved immunization with live vaccine or adoptive transfer of
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immune splenocytes.  These two protected against death, but not against systemic
infection with fully virulent F. tularensis.  Evidence suggested that macrophages, but
not ATS-sensitive cells (T-cells), are essential for natural defense against attenuated
strains, but immune defense against fully virulent strains is considerably more
complex and is affected by antitularemia serum, antithymocyte and antilymphocyte
sensitive cells.346
In FY78, it was found that passive transfer of protection against lethal
infection with fully virulent strains (SCHU S5R) in the murine tularemia model can
be effected by transfer of syngeneic immune splenocytes mixed with killed bacterial
antigen.  There seemed to be a requirement for highly activated populations (recently
boostered donors).  Also, while the immune lymphocyte dose is the most critical
factor for protection, immune macrophages are also required: both T- and B-
lymphocyte activity is required.  (While only sensitized T-cells or immune serum
alone is effective against strains of lesser virulence.)347
Detection
Work on the detection of small numbers of biological agents using
luminescence began in FY1978.348  Within a year, a workable chemiluminescent
immunoreactive assay for F. tularensis, LVS was established.349  In FY80, F.
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tularensis could be detected at concentrations of 10-100 thousand organisms per ml
by ELISA and chemiluminescent (CL) response of polymorphonuclear leukocytes
was found valuable in the early diagnosis of tularemia infections.350  The sensitivity
of the CL response of polymorphonuclear leukocytes to F. tularensis was the
detection of 100,000 bacteria in FY82.351
Q Fever
Q fever is caused by a rickettsia-like organism, Coxiella burnetii, that is
highly infectious via aerosols and can persist in the environment.  Inhalation of a
single organism can lead to infection.  It has a low mortality rate (less than 3%), but is
a debilitating illness.  A single dose of a licensed Q fever vaccine is available in
Eastern Europe and Australia that provides complete protection against naturally
occurring Q fever and 95% protection against aerosol exposure that lasts for five
years.  In the US, a formalin-inactivated whole cell IND vaccine is available for at-
risk personnel.352
Phase II and Phase I whole cell vaccines
In 1960, a Q fever vaccine was prepared at WRAIR.  It was derived from the
22nd egg passage of the Henzerling strain of C. burnetii, a phase II seed stock.  By
FY1978, researchers who tested the Henzerling strain vaccine in humans concluded
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that it was highly reactogenic and led to an unacceptable incidence of local reactions,
including sterile abscesses especially among recovered or previously immunized
individuals.353  Supplies of the phase II vaccine were reduced over the years and
required replacement in the early 1980s.
In 1964, researchers showed that phase I vaccine preparations were more
effective immunogens, have lower dose requirements, lower levels of contaminating
host material, and possibly less frequent or milder adverse reactions.  An industrial-
sized quantity (five lots) of the phase I vaccine (NDBR-105) was prepared in 1972 as
an alternative to the then-current vaccine and underwent evaluation and testing prior
to testing in man in the US.354  The phase I antigen had already been tested
successfully as a vaccine in man in Czechoslovakia in 1974 and Romania in 1973.355
In FY1976, a protocol was prepared for investigating the protective efficacy
and other properties of a new phase I Q fever vaccine (NDBR-105) to replace the
phase II vaccine.356  This experimental vaccine evoked a humoral and CMI response
in guinea pigs and conferred resistance to subsequent challenge presented as SPA to
simulate a natural respiratory exposure.357  A single injection (12 micrograms protein)
of the soluble phase I antigen of C. burnetii completely protected guinea pigs against
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10,000 medial infectious doses of C. burnetii.  Even 0.12 micrograms provided partial
protection, even while no phase I complement fixation antibody was detectable prior
to challenge.358  In FY 1978, a cynomolgus monkey model was developed for Q fever
that closely resembled Q fever in man.359
In FY1979, a new protocol, “Clinical Evaluation of Formalin-Inactivated,
Dried, Henzerling strain, phase I, Q fever Vaccine, NDBR 105 (IND 610) for safety
and immunogenicity” was developed and submitted to a blue-ribbon panel of
prominent rickettsiologists.360  Progress on this was delayed due to a prolonged
illness and subsequent resignation of the PI on the project in FY1980.
After several years without any research reported on a new Q fever vaccine,
studies re-commenced in FY1985.  Mass-scale purification and chemical extraction
procedures for the commercial production of Q fever vaccine were established to
meet the conditions for large volume operations.  Pilot lots of Q fever vaccine were
produced.361 In that year it was reported that adverse reactions during vaccine trials
with phase I whole cell vaccines prevented widespread and unconditional use of these
vaccines.  Attempts to remove those components that induced adverse reactions had
only limited success.362
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However, in FY1986, 72 volunteers were evaluated prior to vaccination with
the IND 610 vaccine.  Immunization resulted in no adverse reactions.363  By FY1987,
150 volunteers had participated.364  Post-vaccination mean values were significantly
greater than pre-vaccination values for both humoral antibody and cell-mediated
immune responses.  However, there was a low conversion rate that was likely due to
the low tolerable dose of the phase I vaccine.365
By FY1988, over 180 volunteers participated in the study of the IND 610
vaccine.  No adverse reaction and no cases of lab-acquired disease occurred among
vaccinated persons.  Also, there was no correlation apparent among skin-test results
and measurements of cellular and humoral immunity, before or after immunization.366
In FY1989, immune responses of 142 persons vaccinated with IND 610 phase
I Henzerling vaccine were assessed by skin test reactions against 20ng of antigen,
specific antibody response by ELISA, and cell-mediated immunity by lymphocyte
proliferation tests.  If immune responses were marginal, individuals were considered
candidates for vaccination.  However, a 30 microgram dose of the vaccine did not
elicit a measurable, consistent immune response.  Doses greater than 30 micrograms
could not be given because of the potential for severe side reactions.367
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In FY1989, USAMRIID researchers concluded that the current level of
protection against infection by C. burnetii after vaccination of animals and humans is
inadequate because of the following: (1) the potential for immunopathological
damage; (ii) partial protection which does not adequately restrict growth of the
microorganism in the phagolysosome; (iii) the elicitation of immune responses
against several immunodominant, non-protective antigens.368  Only partial protection
is afforded because growth of the organism on the phagolysosome was not adequately
restricted.  The small cell of the C. burnetii developmental cycle evades host
immunity through antigenic variation, creating a need for an efficacious subunit
vaccine prepared from the small cells.  (USAMRIID used the small cells of C.
burnetii for infectious challenge by either aerosol or IP injections to test potential
vaccine materials.)  It was discovered that the determinants of either spores or small
cells were not detected by antibodies obtained from infected or immunized
humans.369
Because of the considerable reactivity and substantial disadvantages of
immunogical screens and skin tests before vaccination, the phase I whole-cell vaccine
was considered inapplicable to military use.370
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CMR Vaccine
In FY1985, work on a chloroform-methanol extracted residue (CMR) vaccine
began to replace the phase I whole cell vaccine.  The CMR vaccine was shown to be
efficacious and non-reactogenic, but difficult to produce from infected yolk sacs. 371
It was also found to be non-toxic at high concentrations (>100 micrograms/ml) in
vitro.372  By FY1988, this new Q fever candidate vaccine was produced (TSI-GSD
217, Lot 1-1-88) and plans were made to enter phase I human trials after animal
safety testing.  The CMR vaccine is a lyophilized produce derived from phase I whole
cell C. burnetii.  Bacteria were harvested from the yolk sacs of embryonated specific
pathogen-free chicken eggs infected with phase I, Henzerling strain C. burnetii.373
The CMR vaccine is 99% phase I LPS.
However the CMR vaccine was only scheduled to be delivered to USAMRIID
in January 1989 to enter phase I safety testing.374  In FY1989, the CMR vaccine
passed animal safety and immunogenicity tests.  In FY1990, animal tests showed that
the CMR and NDBR-105 were equally efficacious at protecting A/J mice against a
lethal challenge.  Unlike NDBR-105, the CMR vaccine resulted in milder and
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transient liver lesions and mild splenic lesions.   USAMRIID researchers then
proceeded on tests in humans.375
Subunit Vaccines
Because of concerns about the NDBR-105 vaccine, there was a need to
develop a subunit vaccine that could be administered safely and at a dosage level that
would consistently elicit measurable immune responses and evidence of protection
without pre-screens.
In parellel with tests of the phase I Q fever vaccine, researchers were also
working on a possible human subunit vaccine based on the soluble phase I antigen of
C. burnetii.  This antigen was found to be stable to lyophilization, to storage at 4C in
liquid or dry state and even autoclaving; able to induce a cellular immune response;
and 100X less skin-reactogenic than the Merrell National Labs particulate, phase I Q
fever vaccine (NDBR 105).376
Research proceeded to prepare a subunit vaccine by cloning the DNA of
virulent C. burnetii and screening the clones for production of immunogenic proteins.
Studies proceeded in A/J mice that showed that the phase I lipopolysaccharide (LPS)
was nontoxic at a dose of 100 micrograms and elicited significant antibody titers and
lymphocyte responses against LPS, and phase I and phase II cells.  A single injection
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of 2.5 micrograms gave complete protection against virulent aerosol challenge
without a detectable pre-challenge immune response.377
In FY1989, phase I non-toxic LPS and two surface proteins (P1 and P2) were
evaluated as possible candidates for development of subunit, multivalent, and
diagnostic reagents.  Purified LPSI and protein one (P1) were demonstrated to have
protective efficacy in mice.  P1 was more effective than LPSI in reducing the number
of infectious C. burnetii in spleens of challenged mice.378
Vaccine Combinations
In FY1970, experimental pentavalent vaccines containing inactivated WEE,
EEE, Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Chikungunya, and Q fever were prepared.  It met the
USPHS criteria for safety, but was hypertonic.379  Each component was compared to
its analogue in monovalent form by a standard challenge with the virulent
homologous strain.  Researchers found that WEE, EEE, RVF, and Q fever vaccines
were as effective in a pentavalent vaccine as when given alone.  Attempts to compare
the Chikungunya vaccine were delayed by a depletion of vaccine and the need to
produce and evaluate a new vaccine lot.380
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When the pentavalent combination was given with simultaneous
immunization with the TC-83 vaccine, the Q fever vaccine component was
enhanced.381
Immunology
C. burnetii infections and killed vaccines induce non-specific resistance to
challenge by various bacterial and viral pathogens.  (Prior immunization of mice or
guinea pigs with C. burnetii significantly reduced susceptibility to lethal infections by
Listeria monocytogenes, encephalomyocarditis virus, EL-4 leukemia cells, RVF
virus, and Banzi virus.)  Studies at USAMRIID centered around an
immunomodulatory complex (IMC) of C. burnetii and the immune mechanisms
induced by this complex.  Both the current phase I whole cell vaccine and a
chloroform-methanol-extracted residue (CMR) of phase I whole cells contained the
IMC.   The objective of the research was to describe the interacting components of
the IMC for the induction of safe and effective immunomodulation.382
In other studies, it was found that the immunological response to chronic and
acute Q fever were rather distinct.  Subjects with chronic Q fever recognized more
antigens.  In patients with acute Q fever, there were few IgA antibodies and none
developed antibodies to phase I LPS.  This contrasts with findings in guinea pigs,
where all infected animals developed antibodies to phase I LPS.  Therefore, in
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humans, antibodies to phase I LPS may be diagnostic of chronic Q fever in
humans.383
Virulence Studies
Virulent strains of C. burnetii are characterized by a phase I phenotype
identified by a surface coat of smooth-type lipopolysaccharide LPS, a cell wall
immunomodulatory complex (IMC), a variant endogenous plasmid, and a variant
chromosome.  Avirulent strains, designated as phase II, express a truncated LPS
molecule, do not express IMC, harbor a variant endogenous plasmid, and harbor a
variant chromosome similar to the phase I strains.  In FY1990, identification of
common deleted segments or mutations that render virulent strains avirulent was
studied in order to develop vaccine vehicles and to map the C. burnetii chromosome.
As part of this study, mini-chromosomes that transform avirulent strains to virulence
were studied with the goal of describing the DNA involved in the attenuation of
virulent strains.384
Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever
Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever (RMSF) is the most severe tick-borne
rickettsial illness in the US.  It was first recognized in 1896 and the bacterium that
causes RMSF, Rickettsia ricketsii, was identified in the early 1900s.  R. ricketsii has
long been on the list of potential biowarfare agents.  Without prompt and appropriate
treatment it can be fatal, but is susceptible to antibiotic therapy if it can be diagnosed
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accurately. It has been a reportable disease in the US since the 1920s, with about 250-
1200 cases annually (it is transmitted by tick bites).385  There is no effective vaccine:
in 1973, researchers found that the only commercially available vaccine (developed
by Cox in 1939) was not actually effective.386  USAMRIID researchers worked on
producing an improved vaccine that would offer substantial protection against RMSF
and perhaps provide protection against all spotted fever members producing disease
in man.387
Work was performed predominantly between FY1969-FY1977, at which time
guidance from the HASC required that research with R. rickettsii be reduced.388
Work continued on other rickettsial diseases, and these were subsequently transferred
to WRAIR in FY1979.
Vaccine Studies
In FY1969, studies of the commercial killed vaccine (Lederle Laboratories)
were used in RMSF studies.   Four to six months after immunization, volunteers were
inoculated with 10 median guinea pig intraperitoneal infectious doses of the Sheila
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Smith strain of Rickettsia rickettsii. The results were not reported, but symptomatic
illness responded promptly to antibiotic therapy.389
In 1971, studies of immunoprophylaxis against the spotted fever group began:
a duck-embryo cell grown, formalin-inactivated RMSF vaccine was developed that
appeared superior to other RMSF vaccines.390  In FY 1972, the Sheila Smith strain
was freed of RIF viruses, inactivated, and a lot of vaccine suitable for human use was
produced.391 In FY1973, a monkey model was developed for the study of RMSF.
Those monkeys immunized nine months earlier by either the commercial vaccine
(grown in yolk sacs) or one developed at USAMRIID (DEC vaccine) were protected
against challenge with virulent rickettsiae, although fewer died when given the DEC
vaccination.392  Rickettsia grown on yolk sacs were significantly more virulent for
monkeys than DEC-grown rickettsia.393
In FY1975, in vaccine studies in monkeys, researchers found that the two
embryo cell-culture vaccines afforded relatively better protection than the commercial
yolk-sac grown vaccine: two inoculations two weeks apart appeared to be the best
schedule.394  Also in that year, three cases of aerogenic RMSF in lab workers was
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diagnosed and treated.  Five thousand human doses of an RMSF vaccine was
produced and an application was submitted to the Army Investigational Drug Review
Board (AIDRB) for the RMSF vaccine, Inactivated SS Strain, Chick Embryo Cell
Origin.395  Approval was given and in FY1976 and phase I human testing began.
In FY1978, vaccine trials were conducted with an inactivated RMSF (IND
862) in ten volunteers.396 In FY1979, 13 volunteers were given two 0.5ml doses of
the Inactivated RMSF vaccine, undiluted (IND  862) SC 28 days apart. There were no
systemic reactions.  Because the CDC insisted that lab workers be protected against
RMSF and because there was a scarcity of the existing lab-prepared vaccine, the
USAMRIID Immunization committee proposed that the existing vaccine prepared by
Merrill-National IND 862 (lots 1 and 2) be qualified for human use.397
Other studies showed that the USAMRIID CEC-grown RMSF vaccine
protected against strains of R. rickettsii of diverse geographical origin and that spotted
fever “group” protection could be elicited after infection with any one spotted fever
group rickettsia.398   Three guinea pigs and a monkey were inoculated with R.
Montana, a spotted fever group rickettsia not known to cause disease in man.
Challenge with virulent R. rickettsii resulted in a mild illness and prompt recovery in
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the monkey, and one completely refractory guinea pig while the other two
succumbed.399
In FY1977, researchers established that guinea pigs can be infected with
RMSF by SPA, intranasal, conjunctival, intraperitoneal, and subcutaneous routes.
The USAMRIID RMSF vaccine protected guinea pigs against SPA, IP, and SC
challenges.400  In FY1979, a cynomolgus monkey model for RMSF was defined.  In
this model the USAMRIID-produced RMSF vaccine protected against an aerosol and
subcutaneous challenge, with protection demonstrated after one year.401
In other vaccine studies (FY1976), efforts were directed toward the isolation
and characterization of components of tick-borne rickettsiae to manufacture new
vaccines.  At least 32 proteins were detected in the Sheila Smith strain.402 In FY1978,
attempts were made to separate the protective antigen from suspensions of R.
rickettsii or from soluble antigen obtained by ether extraction of these suspensions.
Vaccines prepared from these preparations protected guinea pigs from challenge with
R. rickettsii.403
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Immunology
To support vaccine efforts, researchers investigated the role of CMI in hosts
infected with rickettsiae to determine how important humoral antibody-producing
antigens are.404  Studies of lab workers accidentally infected with RMSF led to the
tentative conclusion that RMSF is not an immune complex disease and that
complement was not critical to development of full-blown disease, a conclusion at
odds with the generally accepted hypothesis.405
In FY1977, it was found that prompt and profound suppression of CMI
occurred with the onset of febrile disease and the duration of the suppression
correlated with the virulence of the infecting organism.406  Overall, the pathogenesis
of rickettsial diseases were not well understood.  Studies of the pathogenesis of R.
rickettsii was terminated as a result of program changes in FY1979.407
Detection
In FY1977, researchers abandoned attempts to develop a RIA to detect
rickettsial antibodies and antigens because the assay had poor sensitivity.408
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Plague
Yersinia pestis is a non-motile, non-sporulating, gram negative bacteria. The
US and USSR developed effective methods for the aerosol dispersal of the plague
bacillus.  Untreated, mortality for pneumonic plague – the result of aerosol exposure
– approaches 100%: survival is unlikely if treatment is delayed beyond eighteen hours
of the onset of symptoms.409  A licensed, killed whole cell vaccine was available in
the US from 1946 – 1998.  It offered protection against bubonic plague, but was not
effective against aerosolized Y. pestis.  USAMRIID is developing an F1-V antigen
(fusion protein) vaccine.
Despite its potential as a biological weapon, the US did not stockpile plague
as a biological weapon.  The USSR did actively investigate plague, however, to
possibly develop a more sophisticated and deadly weapon in the years after US
defensive work on plague stopped at USAMRIID.410  Despite the lack of an effective
vaccine for pneumonic plague, little research was done on Y. pestis.  The research
years at USAMRIID for plague was between 1969 – 1973, at which time research
was transferred to WRAIR.
In FY1969, strains from ten distinct plague outbreaks in the Republic of
Vietnam were studied: all strains except 4 showed a striking similarity in respect to
physiological and virulence characteristics.  The four avirulent strains were negative
for the Pesticin I, fibrinolysin, coagulase complex.  In that year, researchers were also
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testing an attenuated plague vaccine in guinea pigs: all animals that demonstrated
antiplague titers survived challenge with 100 LD50 P. pestis 195/P.411
In FY1971, the plague vaccine, USP (E Medium) was evaluated in human
volunteers.  Each volunteer received a primary dose of 1.0 ml and booster doses of
0.2 ml on days 90 and 270.  Primary immunizations resulted in HA antibody
responses in 83% of subjects and 93% responded after boosters on day 270.412  It was
found that there is no correlation in humans between the quantity of plague vaccine
administered and the serological response.  That is, after a finite number of boosters,
an antibody plateau is reached that is not altered by subsequent immunizations or its
absence.413
As for detection, in FY1972, the IHAI test was shown to be an economical,
simple, and rapid procedure for the detection of Fraction 1 of Y. pestis.414
Melioidosis and Glanders
The causative agents of melioidosis and glanders are Burkholderia
pseudomallei and Burkholderia mallei respectively (also known as Pseudomonas
pseudomallei and Pseudomonas mallei). Both are gram-negative bacilli, efficiently
spread by aerosol, fatal diseases (without treatment) for humans for which there is no
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available vaccine or reliable therapy.415 It is endemic in southeast Asia and is
infective by the aerosol route, as well as through skin abrasions, wounds, or ingestion.
Studies at USAMRIID were initiated in FY1977 on Pseudomonas
pseudomallei.  Initial efforts were on establishing a mouse model by enhancing the
virulence of two strains in order to induce fatal infections.  Serial brain-to-brain
passages resulted in enhanced virulence: the LD50 for mice was decreased from
greater than 10,000 to less than180 organisms.416
In FY1978, guinea pigs vaccinated with a killed P. pseudomallei were
afforded only minimal protection against aerosol challenge with virulent P .
pseudomallei (increased the mean time to death).  Aerosolized tetracycline was used
to treat lethal infections in hamsters.417
In FY1980, aerosol studies showed that even with no effort to stabilize it, P.
pseudomallei cells survived the stresses of aerosol dissemination and persisted as
airborne particles long enough to constitute a potential hazard in all environmental
conditions studied.418
By FY1982, the work unit on P. pseudomallei was terminated.  All work to
that point suggested that inactivated antigens had little or no value as vaccines.419
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Yellow Fever Virus
There is a single yellow fever vaccine commercially available against yellow
fever.  It is an attenuated strain based on a wild-type virus, the Asibi strain, which
was isolated in Ghana in 1927.  A single inoculation confers immunity after ten days
and lasts for at least ten years.420  Over 400 million doses have been administered
worldwide. Recently, however, serious side effects in a small number of cases from
the vaccine were noted and is being investigated.421  USAMRIID conducted a few
studies on the yellow fever virus and the 17D vaccine strain from FY1969 through the
mid-1970s.
Vaccine Studies
In FY1969, eighteen humans were inoculated with 17D strain yellow fever
virus. Disturbances in normal amino acid periodicity in the absence of clinical
symptoms noted.422  Mice were irradiated with 400 R 24 hours before immunization
with yellow fever, 17D: no protection was induced.
When the yellow fever vaccine was combined with the VEE vaccine (live),
monkeys had less response to yellow fever component when compared to monkeys
that received 1 vaccine initially, followed by the other after three days.423  The
interference of the live VEE vaccine (TC-83) and 17D vaccine was further studied in
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1971 in monkeys and it was found to occur through day 28, with the effect lost by day
56.   This interaction was further studied in 32 human volunteers in FY73.
Simultaneous administration of TC-83 and 17D resulted in a slight enhancement of
the titer of YF neutralizing antibody and a depression of the VEE mean titers.  The
reverse occurred with administration of 17D after TC-83.424
Therapies
Cross-circulation was studied as a mode of therapy for yellow fever in rhesus
monkeys: there was a temporary improvement clinically, but it failed to prolong the
life of the animal (FY1969).425
Monkeys that were inoculated IV with synthetic polyI-polyC and later
infected with the virulent Asibi strain of yellow fever had a longer incubation period,
but the clinical illness remained unchanged (FY73).426 Later, Tilorone and its analogs
were found effective antiviral agents against yellow fever in mice, but not monkeys.
However, a lysine-stabilized polyI-polyC – poly (ICLC) – preparation was shown to
be highly effective in both the prophylaxis and early treatment of YF in both animal
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models (FY75).427  Ribavirin was also found to be an effective antiviral agent in vitro
against yellow fever.428
Basic Studies
The pathogenesis and pathophysiology of yellow fever was studied in mice to
collect fundamental information on ultrastructural changes resulting from infection
(FY71).429  Researchers found that the host metabolism of thyroid hormone is
accelerated during acute infection but not the febrile phase.  It was also discovered
that the virus matures on membranes of the rough endoplasmic reticulum and not the
smooth endoplasmic reticulum and that the Kupffer cell is the initial cell of infection
(FY73).430
In FY79, the African green monkey was studied as a possible animal model
for yellow fever virus infection that was closer to that seen in man.  Subcutaneous
inoculation of 6 PFU of the monkey-adapted Asibi strain of the virus led to the
development of an acute nonlethal illness.  This animal model was intended for study
of the metabolic response and effectiveness of nutrient support and antiviral therapy.
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Also studied was yellow fever-induced changes in tissue concentrations of certain
elements.431
Influenza Virus
The influenza virus has not been reported as considered for use as a biological
weapon in the US.  (It is mentioned briefly as a possible biological warfare agent in a
1971 Soviet publication.432)  Virulent pandemic strains, however, have spread death
and suffering rapidly around the globe in the past (1918, 1957, 1968).  The influenza
virus was studied sporadically at USAMRIID between FY1973 – FY1985.
Initial work with the influenza virus was on studies to understand respiratory
disease mechanisms, including penetration, retention, clearance, and replication of
airborne organisms.  Mice were challenged and also immunized with a mouse-
adapted influenza virus through various routes.433  In FY1974, it was shown that
Rimantadine was effective in the treatment of influenza infection in mice hours after
infection.  They also showed that a chemical could be administered by small particle
aerosol and have excellent therapeutic effects.434  It was also demonstrated that
aerosol-immunized mice were better protected than parenterally vaccinated mice
against virulent influenza virus.  Aerosol-immunized mice were totally immune to
rechallenge with 100 respiratory LD50 of virulent virus, while parenteral vaccination
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modified the course of diseased and reduced mortality, but did not prevent reinfection
of the respiratory tract.435  Studies with influenza were discontinued in 1974.
However, in FY1976, concern over the possible emergence of a new
pandemic influenza virus led NIAID to ask USAMRIID to participate in the national
program to study management of influenza after the outbreak in early 1976.  In its
study, 133 healthy Ft. Detrick lab workers were inoculated with Wyeth split-virus
A/swine influenza (A/New Jersey/8/76) virus vaccine.  Systemic and local reactions
were infrequent and mild.  Only 28% of subject 19-24 years developed HI antibody
titers >/= 1:20, while 91-100% of subjects 25-62 years reached that level.  Some
reached this level after a single booster dose, while others took two boosters.  The
split-virus was deemed safe, but poorly antigenic as a primary vaccine in 19-24 year
olds.436
Ribavirin appeared to be the most promising broad-spectrum antiviral agent
(against both DNA and RNA viruses).  In small particle aerosols, it was shown
effective in the treatment of type And B influenza virus infections.  Treated patients
experienced more rapid defervescence, disappearance of systemic illness, and
reduction of viral shedding than patients treated with a placebo.437
USAMRIID researchers also showed the efficacy of a whole virus vaccine in
mice as well as the prophylactic and therapeutic effectiveness of amantadine,
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rimantadine, and ribavirin.438  In rhesus monkeys, poly (ICLC), was a good adjuvant
when given in combination with swine influenza vaccine.439
Overall, although whole virus and split virus vaccines did not induce antibody
formation, good clinical protection was noted.  USAMRIID researchers also
developed a new technique to measure optical density: as the severity of microscopic
lung lesions in mice increased, optical density increased.440
In FY1985, a diagnostic kit developed at USAMRIID included assays for
influenza A and B, parainfluenza, adeno and respiratory syncytial viruses was
transferred to Brooks Air Force Base to support their “Project Gargle,” a global
surveillance program for respiratory diseases among Air Force personnel.441
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE)
VEE is a mosquito-borne disease that was tested as a BW agent in the US in
the 1950s and 1960s.  It is an incapacitating disease and rarely fatal. Very few
organisms (10-100) are required to cause an infection in humans although it is not
readily transmissible among humans.  It was isolated from horses in 1936 and in
1952, researchers found that it could cause disease in humans.  There were two recent
outbreaks: in 1969-1971 in Guatemala, Mexico, and Texas and in 1995 in Venezuela
and Columbia.  In both, there were thousands of human cases and in the latter
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outbreak 300 died.442 A live, attenuated vaccine is available as an IND, and a
formalin-inactivated, killed vaccine is available for boosters.  Work on VEE at
USAMRIID was extensive from FY1969 – FY1982, but fell off sharply after that.
Vaccine Studies
There are two IND human unlicensed VEE vaccines that were developed at
USAMRIID.  The first, TC-83, was developed in the 1960s and is a live, attenuated
vaccine produced by the Salk Institute. While not effective against all serotypes in the
VEE complex, it has been used to protect thousands against laboratory infections and
is licensed for use in equidae.  The second IND vaccine (C-84) is prepared by
formalin-inactivation of the TC-83 strain and is used as a booster for nonresponders
to TC-83.443
The attenuated TC-83 vaccine was introduced because of difficulties with the
old formalin-inactivated vaccine.  TC-83 has protective efficacy in man, but produces
a febrile illness, with virus shedding in 15-30% of recipients, has abortogenic and/or
teratogenic potential and has never been tested in children.  There is evidence that the
TC-83 strain may be pancreotropic, producing carbohydrate intolerance in primates.
The C-84 formalin-inactivated vaccine was prepared to circumvent these
impediments to widespread use in man.444
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Vaccine Combinations
It was reported in 1952 that a trivalent vaccine consisting of the three killed
vaccines (VEE, WEE, EEE) was successful in guinea pigs.  In FY1969, researchers
tested the efficacy of a trivalent vaccine combination of attenuated strains (TC-83,
Clone 15 strain WEE (AWEE), and small plaque mutant (SPM) of EEE.  At 21-27
days postvaccination, guinea pigs were inoculated with one thousand LD50 Trinidad
strain VEE, B-11 strain WEE and Texas strain EEE.  TC-83 and AWEE gave
complete homologous protection.  When given in combination with the EEE vaccine,
both TC-83 and AWEE had an adjuvant effect.  However, the sequence in which the
vaccines were given were important to the results: certain sequences depressed rather
than enhanced a vaccine’s effectiveness.445
Studies of the VEE and yellow fever vaccines (TC-83 and 17D, respectively)
were conducted in human volunteers.  Simultaneous as opposed to single
administration of TC-83 and 17D resulted in a slight enhancement of the titer of YF
antibody and a depression of the VEE mean titers.  Administration of 17D after TC-
83 resulted in a much greater rise in VEE titer and a depression of YF titer.  VEE
viremia was greater when TC-83 was administered alone.446 In FY1971, monkeys
were given the live VEE vaccine and the 17D strain of yellow fever at varying time
                                                
445 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1969
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit 096 02 402 and 096 02 403.
446 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1973
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit 096 02 008.
223
intervals to assess any interference.  Some was noted through day 28, but the effect
was lost by day 56.447
In addition, all group A vaccines developed and tested through FY1971 were
examined for cross-protection against heterologous virus challenge.  No heterologous
protection was seen except for the live, attenuated VEE vaccine.448
New Vaccine Testing
In FY1975, USAMRIID submitted an application to the Army Investigational
Drug Review Board for VEE vaccine, inactivated, dried, MNLBR 109, Lot No. C-84-
1.449  The effects of aggregation of virions of formalin-inactivated VEE virus
resulting from lyophilization was examined.  Prior to freeze-drying, the virions were
well dispersed, but after lyophilization aggregation was severe.  Prior to
lyophilization, the vaccine was 5-7 times more effective.450
In FY1977, the acceptability study of the inactivated VEE vaccine (MNLBR
109) was completed in eighteen volunteers. It was concluded that the C-84 VEE
vaccine was safe for human use.451   In FY1978, researchers evaluated the response of
fifteen individuals who received 0.5ml of the inactivated vaccine; seven of whom
received a booster of 0.5ml on day 28 after the initial immunization.  There was
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significant serological response to the vaccine, but not to the degree seen after natural
disease or the live TC-83 vaccine.452
In challenge studies, the inactivated VEE vaccine was not as effective as the
attenuated VEE vaccine.  TC-83 provided complete protection – as measured by
mortality – against aerosol and IP challenge of virulent VEE virus (Trinidad strain
given at 10^4.72 LD50).  C-84 induced protective responses that varied from partial
to incomplete against an aerosol challenge, but gave complete protection against a
parenteral inoculation.453
In FY1978, testing of the VEE vaccine, live, attenuated, NDBR-102 (TC-83)
(IND 142), continued with the administration of twenty-six immunizations.454
Adjuvants
DEAE-dextran was shown to be a potent adjuvant for VEE virus vaccine in
rhesus monkeys.  However, this effect was not observed in mice, guinea pigs, or
hamsters.455 Preliminary findings in FY1976 suggested that both human dialyzable
transfer factor and stabilized poly-ICLC might be useful adjuvants for the immune
response against killed VEE virus.456
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Further studies in FY1976 demonstrated the adjuvant effects of DEAE-
dextran and poly-ICLC when given simultaneously with the inactivated VEE vaccine.
Poly-ICLC antibody response in monkeys were at levels similar to that resulting from
the TC-83 vaccine and persisted 2.5 months.457 Neutralizing antibody titers in
monkeys were much higher and more persistent than in those given the inactivated
vaccine alone.  Poly-ICLC (500 micrograms/kg) reduced the median effective dose of
IVEE vaccine in mice twelve-fold.458
Further work with poly-ICLC and tilorone HC1 (analog 11,567) showed that
both were effective adjuvants when given in combination with inactivated VEE
vaccine to lab rodents and rhesus monkeys, even when analog 11,567 was given in
doses as low as 15 micrograms/kg.  A metabolized lipid emulsion (LE) was prepared
for potential use with inactivated aqueous virus vaccines and was an effective
adjuvant when given with the VEE vaccine.459
The lipid emulsion (LE) adjuvant was shown to be highly effective in
potentiating the immunologic response to RVF, VEE, and WEE inactivated vaccines.
In FY1979, a government patent was sought for LE.460
Work with specific IgG and VEE virus resulted in the preparation of a
manuscript by FY1977, “Enhancement of the primary immune response and
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protection by antigen-antibody complexes of an inactivated viral antigen: effect of
dosage and inoculation.”461
In FY1978, tests were done to compare complete Freund’s adjuvant (CFA)
and muramyl dipeptide (MDP) injection.  While CFA potentiates both cellular and
humoral immunity, MDP favors CMI.  MDP also appeared to suppress the primary
immune response while potentiating anamnestic responses to VEE C-84 antigens.462
Virulence Testing
Involvement in the control of the 1969-1971 epizootic provided field
observations as to the safety and efficacy of the TC-83 vaccine.  Back-passage of TC-
83 in burros (seven serial passages) gave no evidence of reversion to virulence.463  In
other studies, it was indicated that the interferon system is important in determining
the yield of virus from tissue culture: interferon sensitivity could be a factor to
examine when attenuating a virus for vaccine production.464
Vaccine Production
In FY1972, thirty small lots of formalin-inactivated TC-83 strain VEE vaccine
was prepared in roller bottle cultures of chick embryo cells (CEC).465  In FY1973,
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preliminary work resulted in a purification procedure for VEE that could be applied
to the large scale production of purified virus.466
Antiviral Testing
In experimental animals, alpha-interferon and the interferon-inducer poly-
ICLC were proven highly effective for postexposure chemoprophylaxis of VEE, but
there was no clinical data to assess its efficacy in humans.467
In FY1972, work on antiviral compounds began, including studies with poly I
– poly C (poly-ICLC).468  In hamsters, poly-ICLC delayed the growth of VEE, but
did not protect against late deaths.469
In FY1974, Tilorone hydrochloride and three analogs were found to be
effective antiviral agents of VEE by a mechanism not involving synthesis or release
of interferon.470
In FY1978, researchers found that an altered state of immune responsiveness
to microbial antigens is brought about by cyclophosphamide treatment prior to
immunization, resulting in abolition of humoral antibody responses along with
preservation or potentiation of delayed type hypersensitivity and cellular immune
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reactivity.  Immunized animals with such altered reactivity show loss of protection
upon challenge with VEE virus.471
In FY1979, basic research with the antiviral drug ribavirin in a VEE-infected
BHK-21 cell model showed that ribavirin inhibited virus growth by more than 90%.
The model suggested that ribavirin does not inhibit viral transcription, but may
interfere with translation.472  However, ribavirin causes the development of anemia
and thrombocytosis in monkeys and man when given in multiple, high doses. It
apparently did this by decreasing RBC survival by inhibiting release of RBC from the
bone marrow.  These effects were fully reversible when treatment was withdrawn.473
Control of an Epizootic
In early May 1969, a severe epizootic of VEE erupted on the Pacific Coastal
Plane of Guatemala.  From here, the disease rapidly swept westward and northward –
through El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua before subsiding in October.  It
reappeared in June 1970 in Mexico and within a month had spread westward 200
miles.  USAMRIID provided attenuated, live virus vaccine to control these epizootics
for the vaccination of the horse population at the periphery of the epizootic area to
create an immune barrier.  A conversion rate of 96% was reported.474
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In utero Viral Transmission
Mice infected during gestation with the TC-83 strain had decreased litter
sizes, decreased number of live births, and decreased survival until weaning age.475
Virus levels as high as 2 logs more virus/gram were found in embryos than in
maternal blood.  The highest virus levels were found in uterine tissues.476  This work
unit was terminated in FY1973 when attempts to localize the viral antigen in fetal and
placental tissues of infected dams with fluorescent antibody proved unsuccessful.477
Radiation Challenge
Several experiments involved the irradiation of mice (600 R) to test the effect
on the immune response of mice to an attenuated strain of VEE.  Data suggested that
irradiation before or after inoculation with attenuated VEE delays the onset of
protection against virulent challenge.  When the time interval between irradiation and
vaccination was short, onset of protection was delayed longer.478  However in
FY1974, similar experiments in monkeys exposed to 400 R total body irradiation
resulted in no effect on either enhancement or delay in clearance of virus.479
In FY1976, the implicit rationale for this work was stated explicitly: “This
work unit is aimed at investigating interrelationships between acute or chronic
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irradiation and immune or disease processes in animal models, so that limitations of
protective vaccines or disease in irradiated personnel may be more effectively
managed in a nuclear warfare environment.”480
Immunological Responses
In FY1975, it was found that VEE turned off leukocytic endogenous mediator
(LEM) synthesis while bacterial infections did not.481  In other studies of the
induction of immunity, an unexpected finding was the demonstration of the
potentiation of humoral immunity with a micromolecular leukocyte extract which is
known to decrease cellular immunity in vitro.  The pooled fraction, which potentiates
CMI in vitro, did not affect titer production, but appeared to adversely affect
protection since animals so immunized died at greater frequencies despite antibody
levels known to be protective in control groups.  It was an important observation
because it suggested that increased CMI induced by select antigen-adjuvant
combinations may adversely affect protection against viral infection.482
Researchers in FY1978 found that the macrophage was the primary replicative
cell for virus growth in vitro.  Nonimmune donor macrophages convert to an immune
donor macrophage state about 28 days post-vaccination.483   In a guinea pig model, it
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was shown that the humoral immune system was the protective component of the
total response to VEE antigen.484
Detection
In FY1977, opsonized VEE vaccine strain virus and Pichinde virus were
shown to stimulate chemiluminescence from human polymorphonuclear leukocyte
(PMN) with correlated with the amount of antibody available.  The test appeared to
be as sensitive – if not more so – than other then-currently employed in diagnostic
serology, and could be achieved in less than two hours.485
By FY1981, VEE (vaccine strain) could be detected at concentrations of 10-
100 thousand organisms/ml by ELISA.486
Rift Valley Fever Virus
Rift Valley Fever Virus (RVF) is a mosquito-borne disease found in Africa
(persisting in Kenya) and is a member of the Bunyavirus family.  It was studied
extensively at USAMRIID during this period of time, particularly after a new, more
virulent strain emerged in the mid-1970s.  In 1975, a new clinical spectrum of disease
was reported from South Africa: hemorrhagic fever and encephalitis.  In 1977, RVF
virus entered new territory, Egypt.  There were tens of thousands of human cases with
the classical acute, undifferentiated febrile illness, but an estimated one percent of the
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cases were associated with hemorrhagic fever or encephalitis.487  Over the next three
years, there were an estimated one million human cases.  The experimental, first-
generation inactivated human vaccine developed by the Army required multiple
injections to produce immunity and booster injections to maintain it.  It was
expensive to produce, in relatively limited supply, and was not standardized from lot
to lot.488
Vaccine Research
In FY1971, an inactivated RVF vaccine was evaluated in man by
administration of 2 doses of 0.5ml each 28 days apart.  Neutralizing antibody was
adequate in the majority of subjects up to day 270, but not at day 360.489  No further
work on this vaccine was reported until FY1977, when it was reported that the
existing vaccine did not meet modern safety standard for use in man.
To prepare a better vaccine, work was begun in FY1977 on determining the
number, molecular weight and immunogenicity of structural polypeptides of RVF
virus.490  At the same time, increased demands for the vaccine to treat epidemics of
RVF led to the testing of five lots of the inactivated RVF vaccine that had not
previously been used in clinical trials (the original protocol was submitted in 1969 to
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the Army Investigational Drug Review Board).  Safety testing determined that all six
lots were identical with respect to reactogenicity.491
Further testing of the RVF vaccine, formalin-inactivated, tissue culture origin
NDBR 103, Lot 1-6 (IND 365) continued in FY1979, along with evaluation of the
human response to the administration of RVF vaccine, inactivated, dried, TSI-GSD-
200.  Immunological responses to two doses of Lot 6 were found to be variable.  Only
those who received concurrent vaccinations with VEE were found to have a
dependably high response.492
Further testing of the RVF vaccine (NDBR 103) continued under controlled
field conditions in FY1979.  Lab workers at NAMRU-3 in Cairo were vaccinated and
all 108 vaccinees had detectable antibodies.493  Further testing was done at
USAMRIID (22 persons) and USDA (83 persons), resulting in adequate PRN titers in
all but a handful.  No adverse reactions were reported from these and other trials.494
In that year, work continued on the improved inactivated RVF vaccine (TSI-
GSD-200), however, the quantities that were available were unlikely to be sufficient
in many scenarios for their use.  Therefore, a joint study was initiated with the Israeli
Defense Force to define alternative immunization schedules.495  In FY1980, the first
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human tests of the new vaccine began, but not all lots were found to be of equal
potency.496
In FY1986, initial safety and immunogenicity testing of all lots of TSI-GSD-
200 were completed in volunteers.  There were no adverse reactions and all recipients
developed titers which were judged protective.497  Potency testing continued with 19
of 20 lots of the vaccine, although potency data would only be available after three
years.498
In FY1987, researchers demonstrated that intraperitoneal priming with
unmodified RVF vaccine NDBR 103 followed by intranasal boost yielded protective
efficacy against aerosol or SC challenge with RVF virus that was superior to that of
SC vaccination with RVF vaccine and Avridine (discussed below).  Aerosol
immunization with the RVF vaccine/Avridine mixture failed to protect any mice
when challenged with virulent RVF vaccine by the aerosol or SC routes despite
induction of specific IgA and IgG.499
From these studies, it was determined that both peripheral and mucosal
immunity are required for complete protection – especially after aerosol exposure.500
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Vaccine Combinations
As reported elsewhere, the inactivated RVF vaccine was combined with the
inactivated WEE, EEE, Chikungunya, and Q fever vaccines in a pentavalent vaccine
that was found to be physically compatible and met the USPHS criteria to safety.
Each component of the pentavalent vaccine was as effective in this form as when
given alone.501
Synthetic Peptides for Vaccine Development
In FY1985, studies revealed six distinct vaccine-relevant epitopes capable of
eliciting in vitro neutralizing antibodies on the G1 and G2 surface viral glycoproteins.
Immunization of mice with G2 gene products expressed in E. coli as well as in
recombinant vaccinia viruses containing RVF virus glycoprotein genes protected
mice from a lethal challenge of RVF virus.502
Further work found that the vaccine-relevant epitopes were confined to a
small sequence on G2, making RVF virus perhaps the best virus model defined to
date to test the feasibility of the synthetic peptide approach to vaccine
development.503
In FY1985, two approaches were taken.  Partial coding sequences of RVF
virus glycoprotein genes were incorporated into a bacterial plasmid expression system
and introduced into E. coli.  These allowed the regulated, high-level expression of
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RVFV glycoprotein analogs.  Partially purified polypeptides from these systems were
used with adjuvants to immunize mice and afforded protection from lethal challenge,
although only marginal titers of neutralizing antibody resulted from the
immunization.  The other method involved creating recombinant vaccinia viruses
containing the genes responsible for both RVF virus envelope glycoproteins and
evaluated in the mouse-challenge system using various routes for vaccine
administration.  High-titer neutralizing antibody and high-level protection followed
immunization.504
In FY1987, after animal immunization with a large number of recombinant
vaccinia virus constructs, it was clearly demonstrated that any construct expressing
mature G2 envelope glycoprotein was protective in the mouse protection assay.505
In FY1987, researchers found that monoclonal antibodies (MAB) specific for
the G1 and G2 polypeptides of RVF virus were completely protective against aerosol
challenge when combined together, but resulted in heavy mortalities if used
separately.  Monoclone-G2 treated mice died of encephalitis; monoclone-G1 treated
mice died of hepatitis.506
Recombinant vaccinia viruses expressing specific sequences from RVF virus
refined requirements for future vaccines. Researchers chose the Connaught strain as
the parent vaccinia strain for future vaccinia recombination experiments and
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candidate human virus vaccine development.507  In FY1989, vaccinia viral strains
from the master seed of the Connaught smallpox vaccine were plaque-purified in
certified MRC-5 cells.  A single derivative (Connaught 3E-1) was selected as parent
for all future recombinants.  In addition to RVF genes, sequences from Hantaan ,
Lassa fever, and VEE were under consideration for expression in vaccinia virus.508
Attenuated Vaccine Studies
In FY1985, three attenuated strains (Caplan, Smithburn, and Moussa) were
evaluated as potential vaccine candidates.  Each was compared to the formaldehyde
inactivated RVF vaccine in mice challenged by aerosol with the virulent ZZ-501 RVF
strain.  All three performed poorly.509
In FY1986, the T1 strain of RVF virus, isolated from mosquitoes, was used to
immunize hamsters by intranasal and subcutaneous routes.  Both routes afforded the
hamsters total protection from lethal challenge with virulent RVF virus.510  Both the
wild-type (ZZ-501) and attenuated (T-1) strains of RVF virus were stable in water up
to three days.  Mice orally exposed to the T-1 strain in their drinking water had a
prolonged mean time-to-death versus unvaccinated controls when challenged with
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virulent RVF virus.511  The T-1 vaccinated animals recovered from hepatitis, but later
died of encephalitis.512
In FY1987 and FY1988, RVF master and production seeds of an attenuated
strain (ZA-548 MP12 strain) was produced and a candidate vaccine was in the final
test stage at the Salk Institute.513  The MP 12 attenuated vaccine candidate was
derived from the ZH-548 Egyptian isolate by serial mutagenesis.  In FY1989, bovines
were inoculated with the RVF vaccine, MP-12 and were fully protected.514  In other
studies, it was concluded that a reversion to virulence was unlikely and that genetic
reassortment with wild-type viruses during a vaccination program in endemic areas
would be expected to yield attenuated variants.515
In FY1990, the MP-12 vaccine was tested in rhesus macaques using proposed
human doses.  Virulent viral challenge by parenteral and aerosol routes were in
progress.516
Also in FY1990, an attenuated strain of RVF (C13) was isolated and found to
confer solid immunity to virulent challenge.  Its attenuation appeared due to the
absence of a nonstructural protein (NS8).  (It was found that anti-NS8 antibodies are
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protective.) If confirmed, this observation identified a method for improving the
existing RVF virus vaccines and possibly the basis for pursuit of both subunit and
live-attenuated vaccines for other phleboviruses.517
Antiviral Therapies
In FY1978, the antiviral drug ribavirin was shown to be effective in the
treatment of RVF virus in mice and hamsters.518   In FY1979, ribavirin, poly(ICLC),
and antibody were shown to be effective prophylactically and therapeutically in
murine RVF models.  Successful treatment could begin as late as day 3.  It was clear
that all three drugs lacked any effect on CNS infection, however.519
Studies in FY1981 showed ribavirin to be effective against Lassa fever and
RVF virus in lab animals.520  Toxicity studies showed that man and rhesus monkeys
develop anemia and thrombocytosis during multiple, high-dose treatments with
ribavirin.  Apparently, ribavirin induces anemia by decreasing RBC survival and by
inhibiting release of RBC from the bone marrow.  These effects are dose-dependent
and fully reversible when treatment is withdrawn.  Ribavirin was evaluated for
subacute toxicity when administered orally for 28 days.521  In addition, in vitro,
combinations of amantadine and rimantadine with ribavirin showed an enhanced
                                                
517 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1990
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A91C LA 138.
518 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1978
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A841 00 026.
519 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1979
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A91C 00 131.
520 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1981
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A871 BE 146.
521 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1981
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A870 BE 146.
240
effect against RVF, VEE, and SFS viruses above that of ribavirin alone against RVF
and VEE viruses.  These were toxic at the 200 mg/kg level as single drugs or in
combination.
In FY1982, further drug screening continued to assess the efficacy of potential
antivirals against viruses in tissue cultures and rodent models.
In FY1985, the optimal treatment regimens with the immunomodulator,
poly(ICLC) were determined in mice.  For prophylactic treatment, three 1 microgram
doses over 12 days were found to be effective against RVFV infection.  For
therapeutic application, three 20 microgram doses were required.  However, therapy
combining ribavirin and poly(ICLC) was also highly effective: protection was
afforded with very low nontoxic doses of these drugs when administered as late as 48
hours after infection.  In additionm a new immunomodulatory compound, Picabanil,
was also found to be moderately efficacious against RVF virus infection in mice.
Picabanil elicited only low levels of interferon, but induced strong cytotoxic activity
of NK cells.522
In FY1987, three more immunomodulators, AVS-1968, 1300, and 1018
showed excellent in vivo activity against RVFV, as well as an extract of C. burnetii
with only a single dose.523  Further testing indicated that AVS-1018 was a candidate
for clinical trials.524
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Adjuvants
In FY1979, the lipid emulsion (LE) adjuvant was shown to be highly effective
in potentiating the immunologic response to several inactivated vaccines: RVF, VEE,
and WEE.  A government patent was being sought at that time.  In addition,
compound CP 20 (961) was also shown to be an effective adjuvant with the RVF and
WEE vaccines.525
In FY1985, mucosal priming with Avridine, an immunomodulator, combined
with the inactivated RVF virus vaccine was effective in reducing or preventing
aerosol-acquired encephalitis, although it did not prevent hepatitis. Priming by SC
injection of the RVF vaccine plus Avridine resulted in mucosal and systemic
protective immunity.526  Single treatment with Avridine subcutaneously or
intradermally significantly reduced mortality in hamsters in the early stages of
infection through day six postinfection.  During aerosol immunization, Avridine
appeared to be well-tolerated by mice.527
In FY1986, mouse studies demonstrated that parenteral and/or enteric
vaccination with a mixture of inactivated RVF vaccine and Avridine in liposomes
provided significant protection against parenteral or aerosol challenge with virulent
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RVF virus 21 days post-vaccination.  These studies were done to define the potential
complications of high-dose aerosol exposure to RVF.528
Aerosol Tests
In FY1979, work began on evaluating the potential for aerosol transmission of
RVF isolates.  The physical characteristics of the SPA generated from a virus carrier
fluid was studied.  The SPA consisted of particles of five microns or less in size, with
a median mass diameter of 0.964 micrometers.  In young adult ICR mice, the log
median lethal doses were determined for four strains of RVF virus:  ZZ-501 was
2.54PFU; Entebbe was 1.76PFU; SA-51 was 2.59PFU; and SA-75 was 1.86PFU.529
In FY1980 pathogenesis studies in the rat, it was determined that infection by
the respiratory routs caused initial virus replication in the lung.  Viremia develops and
the foci of infection shifts to the liver, which is fulminating and usually fatal.530  The
efficacy of the inactivated RVF vaccine was undetermined after tests in mice and
monkeys.
In FY1981, it was determined that the Lunyo virus, isolated in 1955 from
mosquitoes in Uganda, had a high degree of infectivity following aerosol exposure.
This was unexpected because all other RVF virus strains were less virulent for mice
when administered by the respiratory route.531
                                                
528 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1986
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A871 AD 131.
529 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1979
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A841 00 066.
530 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1980
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A841 00 066.
531 US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Annual Progress Report: FY 1981
(Frederick, Maryland: USAMRIID), Work Unit A870 BB 069.
243
Also in FY1981, rats were challenged with ZZ-501 strain RVF after
vaccination with either the NDBR-103 vaccine or the TSI-GSD-200 vaccine.
Antibody response was dose-related and comparable between the vaccines.  However,
the data demonstrated that the protection by the TSI-GSD-200 vaccine was less than
that against IP challenge.  It was unknown what the significance for man was, but it
showed that the inactivated vaccine does not provide complete protection against
RVF virus disseminated in SPA.532
In FY1985, aerosol studies suggested that the US should be concerned that
hostile nations might weaponize RVF virus as a BW agent.533
Basic Research
In FY1978, growth, purification, concentration, and radiolabeling techniques
were perfected for RVF virus.  The South African 1951 isolate gave consistently
higher tissue yield than did Entebbe, Zagazig 501 or South African 1975.534 Other
studies in FY1979 that compared four different RVF virus strains that were
representative of a broad range of geographic spread, time, and pathogenicity.  The
primary structure was highly conserved in all despite over 25 years difference in their
time of isolation and thousands of miles in their geographic origins.535
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Also in FY1978, research was initiated to define antigenic and other
laboratory characteristics of recent RVF virus isolates to determine if the previously
developed vaccine would be effective and also to explain the emergence of severe
forms of the disease.  The 1977 Egyptian isolate (ZZ501) was found to be 10,000-fold
more lethal for rats than other isolates, but had similar pathogenicity for other
animals. Convalescent sera from infections with all four strains neutralized ZZ501
and the inactivated vaccine protected mice equally well against ZZ501 and parent
(Entebbe strain) virus challenge.536
In FY1979, rhesus monkeys were experimentally infected with the ZZ-501
RVF virus strain, isolated from a fatal case of hemorrhagic fever in Egypt.
Hemorrhagic fever had never been reported in nonhuman primates infected with
classical RVF strains.  Two of eighteen monkeys showed frank clinical signs of
hemorrhagic fever.537
Transmission Studies
Studies began in FY1981 to understand the ecologic and intrinsic factors
influencing the ability of arthropods to transmit viruses. Research objectives included
the determination the of RVF virus vector potential of several species of mosquitoes
and sandflies known to feed on humans and domestic animals; and to determine the
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effect of environmental temperature and geographic strain of the vector on the
transmission of RVF, Dengue, Chikungunya, and EEE viruses.538
In FY1986, data from the advanced very high resolution radiometer
(AVHRR) on the NOAA polar-orbiting meteorological satellites were correlated with
a green vegetation index and used to try to predict RVF viral activity in Kenya.539
This was then applied to determine the key ecological parameters leading to and
associated with a RVF epidemic/epizootic in Senegal and Mauritania in 1987.  The
AVHRR was being used to monitor and predict the potential for RVF viral activity in
fifteen regions in five countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  There was a demonstrated
link between RVF virus epidemics and periods of exceptionally heavy rainfall.540
This work led, in FY1989 to an accurate prediction of an outbreak of RVF in Kenya.
In the field, methoprene prevented emergence of adult mosquitoes for two weeks
after flooding, preventing initiation of an RVF epidemic/epizootic.541
By FY1990, Data from NOAA LANDSAT, METEOSAT, and SPOT
satellites, space-shuttle photography and airborne synthetic-aperture radar were used
to determine key ecological changes leading to and associated with RVF epidemics in
Senegal, Mauritania, Zambia, and Kenya; and also to YF in Nigeria.  Field ecology
studies demonstrated that outbreaks of African RVF and other arboviral diseases are
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characterized by distinct spatial and temporal patters directly related to specific
environmental parameters.  This knowledge could help “distinguish naturally
occurring disease outbreaks from those caused by BW.”542
Detection
In FY1979, researchers developed a solid phase radioimmunoassay (SPRIA)
procedure for the quantitation of antiviral antibody and detection of cell surface
antigens.543  In FY1980, the SPRIA for RVF virus antibody demonstrated a 1:1
correlation with the 80% PRNT.  Thus this new procedure was near the stage where it
could replace the costly PRNT as the primary measure of anti-RVF virus antibody
response.544
In FY1981, an antigen-specific ELISA was developed for RVF.  It held
promise for rapid diagnosis, vaccine standardization, and studies of antigen
metabolism in infected animals.545
In FY1981, new techniques of lymphocyte hybridoma production of
monoclonal antibodies to detect and characterize RVF virus antigens was underway.
Preliminary lymphocyte hybridoma experiments yielded numerous monoclonal
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antibodies, most of which were directed at nucleocapsid antigens.546  Another
technique was also pursued in FY1981:  antigenic analysis of RVF virus progressed,
with the goal of producing RVF virus immunogens using rDNA technology.547
As of FY1982, standardized procedures using ELISA technology allowed
complete testing of either RVF of VEE antigens within 5-7 hours.  Polyclonal antisera
were more sensitive than monoclonal antibodies as capture antibodies for RVF.  (A
new method was developed in 1979 for RIA using the “antibody capture principal” –
later adapted to ELISA – for detection of virus specific IgM antibodies.  Such
antibodies generally develop shortly after infection, peak rapidly, and decline as
specific IgG is produced.  This was an improvement on using a retrospective
diagnosis of virus infection based on measuring a rise in IgG.)548
In FY1985 a nucleic acid hybridization assay was developed for detecting
RVF virus in infected VERO cells and infected cell media by using a cDNA probe.
Using this system, researchers detected RVF virus sequences in inactivated vaccine
preparations and samples of aerosolized virus collected post-aerosol exposure.549
In October 1987, there was an extensive epidemic/epizootic of RVF in
Mauritania and Senegal, offering researchers an opportunity to validate their rapid
diagnosis assays under field conditions.  The antigen-capture immunoassay was only
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30% as sensitive as the standard virus isolation and identification procedures, but was
97% as specific (few false-positives).  The antigen-capture immunoassay took less
than three hours and minimal equipment, while traditional procedures required at
least one week for isolation and identification, cell cultures and more sophisticated
resources.550
Korean Hemorrhagic Fever Virus (Hantaan)
Korean Hemorrhagic Fever virus was first recognized in Korea in 1951, but
the etiologic agent was not isolated until 1978 in the lungs of a rodent.  In FY1979,
work progressed on the characterization of the agent that caused Korean Hemorrhagic
Fever.  It was determined to be a heat-stable, enveloped, cell-associated RNA virus,
but it was not yet clear whether it was a Bunyavirus or arenavirus.551  In FY1980, it
was determined to be a Bunyavirus and was named Hantaan virus.552
In FY1981, Hantaan virus was propagated to high titer in cell culture and a
sensitive plaque assay for detecting virus infectivity and neutralizing antibody was
developed.  These allowed for preliminary characterization of the virus.553
In FY1985, further work continued on Hantaan virus because of their ubiquity
in nature and transmission via aerosolization rather than via an arthropod vector.  In
that year, the medium (M) and small (S) segments of the virus were cloned and
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partially sequenced. The S segment coded for the nucleocapsid protein and the M
segment for the two viral envelope glycoproteins.554
In FY1986, assays for Hantaan virus were successfully field-tested during a
collaborative study of an outbreak in the PRC and the efficacy of antiviral drug
therapy was monitored with those assays during the China study.555
In FY1989, two vaccine candidates were being produced.  At the Swiftwater
Instititue, a vaccinia-Hantaan recombinant containing both the S and M segments was
prepared and was undergoing expression studies and safety tests at USAMRIID.  The
Salk Institute was preparing a vaccinia-Hantaan recombinant that included only the M
segment.556
USAMRIID researchers became aware of a major epidemic of HFRS in
Yugoslavia because of their collaborative research there.  A field study was
established in Sarajevo to attempt an efficacy trial of the antiviral drug, ribavirin and
evaluate the diagnostic tests.557
Other work in FY1990 included the testing of specimens from patients
obtained from various collaborators worldwide.  All attempts to detect hantaviral
antigen by immunoassay failed.  However, testing of sera obtained during the Korean
War confirmed that the hemorraghic fever described during the conflict was due to
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Hantaan virus and that the IgM antibody-detection assay was the method of choice
for diagnosis of acute disease.
Machupo Virus
Four arenaviruses are significant human pathogens: Lassa, Junin, Machupo,
and Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCM).  All have a demonstrated potential
to produce explosive outbreaks under artificial conditions and all are highly infectious
by aerosol.558
After an outbreak in 1971, USAMRIID initiated work on Machupo virus, the
causative agent of Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, starting with characterization of the
gross and microscopic pathologic changes in infected rhesus monkeys and attempts to
prepare a killed vaccine, including defining the efficacy of prophylaxis and treatment
with immune serum and a joint study with the Middle America Research Unit on a
candidate attenuated virus vaccine.559
In FY1975, a dosage of BHF immune globulin (human origin) that protected
monkeys against severe disease was determined.  As of FY1976, live, attenuated and
inactivated experimental vaccines were used to protect monkeys against challenge
with Machupo virus. 560
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Cross Protection and Subunit Vaccines
Significant protection against Machupo virus occurred with both Tacaribe and
Tamiami viruses and it was found that a combination of two viruses was more
protective than one.561  In FY1978, work on a single vaccine to protect against both
Machupo and Junin virus infection (BHF and AHF, respectively) was underway.
Studies in monkeys showed that the Junin virus protected against experimental lethal
challenge with Machupo virus.  The Junin virus used in this and in guinea pig studies
(with similar results), was the clone 3 strain, an attenuated virus used experimentally
in 600 volunteers in Argentina as a possible AHF vaccine.562
Briefly in FY 1978, there was work on the glycoprotein and nucleoprotein
subunits of Machupo virus as possible vaccine candidates.  Guinea pigs inoculated
with either subunit antigen survived homologous virus challenge.  However, the PI
left the institute and the work unit was terminated.563
Therapy
In FY1976, in vitro studies showed that ribavirin was an effective antiviral
against Machupo viruses.564  Further work showed that rhesus monkeys infected with
Machupo virus were treated successfully with ribavirin, even when therapy was
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delayed until after the onset of clinical illness.565  Ribavirin, in primates, prevented
the onset of the hemorrhagic component of the disease.
However, ribavirin, in monkeys, successfully treated systemic, but not CNS
components of the disease when therapy was initiated after onset of clinical signs.
Prophylactic treatment prevented clinical disease completely: monkeys
seroconverted, but failed to develop viremia or any clinical signs of illness.566
In contrast, lysine-stabilized poly(ICLC) was found to enhance Machupo virus
infection.567
Basic Research
As of FY1977, little was understood about the genetics of arenaviruses,
although human pathogenic and nonpathogenic members of the group could be
distinguished by complement fixation and immunofluorescence techniques.568 It was
known since FY1975 that monkeys that survive acute BHF infection often develop a
wasting neurovascular disease.569
In FY1979, aerobiological research studies were done with the Carvallo strain
(#21677) of the Machupo virus and the Josiah strain of the Lassa virus.  Under
experimental conditions, Lassa virus was considerably more stable in aerosol than
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Machupo, although both were relatively stable in aerosol and both highly infectious
and moderately lethal for guinea pigs and cynomolgus monkeys by the airborne
route.570  Experiments were done in 6200-L aerosol chambers.  The LD50 for
Machupo was estimated at 10^2.23 PFU and the ID50 was less than 10 PFU.
Junin Virus
The Junin virus is the causative agent of Argentine hemorrhagic fever (AHF)
–  an acute, severe disease –  and was considered to be a potential BW threat by
USAMRIID researchers.  Mortality for AHF, like BHF, is approximately 15-30%.571
Within endemic regions, 200-400 cases are observed most years, with large
epidemics occurring for unknown reasons in some years.572  Work on a Junin vaccine
was needed because there was no agency or commercial interest in such studies and
knowledge of arenavirus vaccine development would be useful because of the
existence of related viruses that cause hemorrhagic fevers in many countries.573
Vaccine Research
In FY1979, a known attenuated strain of Junin virus, XJ-44, was selected for
development as an attenuated candidate vaccine strain.574  A year later, USAMRIID
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was working with three attenuated strains – all more attenuated than XJ clone 3, an
experimental but unsatisfactory vaccine used in Argentina ten years prior.  By
FY1982, work on a new vaccine had progressed so that researchers estimated that one
suitable for use in man would be available by winter 1983.575
Work on a new vaccine progressed under a UN Development Project, jointly
conducted by U.S. and Argentine investigators.  A vaccine candidate, Candid #1 was
taken to final product in 1982 by methods approved for Biologics under GLP and
GMP regulations, and in compliance with vaccine requirements for the US and
Argentina.  In process testing required by the FDA was initiated in 1982 and mostly
complete by 1983.  Studies in FY1984 continued the development of an optimal
freeze-drying menstruum.  Working with the Salk Institute – Government Services
Division, efforts were made to improve the stabilizer for the dry Candid #1 vaccine –
at that time none could enhance the heat stability of the product.576
In FY1985, an IND submission (IND 2257) was made to the FDA for a live,
attenuated Junin vaccine.  Also in that year, tests were done to study the effectiveness
of the Candid#1 vaccine in guinea pigs against an airborne challenge of 10^3.8LD50.
These resulted in the conclusion that Candid #1 strain induced a protective response
against a significant airborne challenge of virulent virus.577
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Phase I clinical trials began in FY1986 for the live, attenuated Candid #1
Junin vaccine to determine vaccine safety and immunogenicity.  Fifteen of seventeen
vaccines seroconverted after immunization with no adverse local or systemic
reactions. Field testing was anticipated for the next 3-5 years.578
In FY1988, it was demonstrated that the Candid #1 vaccine protected against
parenteral virulent Junin and Machupo virual challenge in animal models.  It was also
effective in protecting monkeys against an aerosol challenge with virulent Junin
virus.579
Cross Protection
Further research in FY1979 in monkeys showed that that Junin virus gave
excellent protection against BHF infection.  On the basis of this data, USAMRIID
began a joint project involving the Argentine Secretariat of Health and the Pan-
American Health Organization (PAHO) for the development of an attenuated vaccine
against AHF that would offer protection against BHF.580  In FY1980, work
progressed with support from the UN Development Program
In FY1986, basic studies on the pathophysiology and immunology of
arenaviruses led to the observation that cross protection among old-world
arenaviruses depended more on cross-reactive cytotoxic spleen cells than on humoral
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antibodies.  However, synthetic peptides, prepared as candidate vaccines for LCMV
(as a model for LAS), elicited humoral immunity or protection.581
Therapy
In the guinea pig model using a virulent strain (Romero) of Junin, ribavirin
was administered to test its therapeutic effect.  It did not protect against death, but a
significant delay in time to death was noted.  Ribavirin did not cross the blood-brain
barrier.582  However, it was presumed that ribavirin may be amplified in human AHF
therapy because humans are probably more resistant to the virus.583
To test the effectiveness of ribavirin, up to 80 volunteers were included in a
field trial against AHF.  (A similar field trial was done in China of a double-blind,
placebo-controlled trial of ribavirin for treatment of the Chinese variant of HFRS.
Treatment would start within four days after onset of earliest clinical symptoms in up
to 200 patients.  Two study sites were utilized: Hubei Medical College that say
primarily urban cases of the disease and Zong Chang County Hospital, that saw over
800 cases annually of the rural form of the disease.)584
Studies using human immune plasma reduced mortality from AHF and BHF
to less than two percent (from fifteen percent).  However, while it protects against
death during the acute stages of illness, it is complicated by risks associated with
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transfusion-borne diseases, volume overload, and a late-onset neurologic syndrom of
obscure etiology observed in ten percent of treated survivors.585 Also, this form of
therapy was limited to patients whose disease has progressed no further than eight
days following symptom onset.
Detection
In FY1986, a rapid diagnosis assay for Junin virus was successfully field-
tested in Argentina on samples stored from previous epidemics.586  A lymphocyte
transformation assay was developed that predicted protection more accurately than
conventional serology.587  In FY1988, a technique was developed to estimate the
numbers of lymphocytes recognizing Junin viral antigen in the blood of human
vaccinees.
Basic Research
In FY1982, preliminary experiments allowed partial characterization of the
RNA genome.588  In that year, a cytotoxicity assay for Junin virus-infected cells using
spleen cells from convalescent guinea pigs was developed and a possible model for
virulent Junin infection was shown in cyclophosphamide-treated guinea pigs.589  In
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FY1982, the virus was successfully concentrated and purified and, for the first time,
oligonucleotide fingerprints were obtained.590  In FY1986, a lymphocyte
transformation assay was developed which predicted protection more accurately than
conventional serology.591  In FY1987, it was demonstrated that the Junin vaccine
protected all rhesus monkeys challenged with Machupo viru, in the absence of cross-
reactive N-Ab.592
In FY1985, it was reported that Junin virus was shown to be transmissible in
SPA and exhibited a biological half-life of approximately 28 minutes.593
Lassa Virus
Lassa fever is a severe, often fatal disease of man originally described in 1969
in Nigeria.  Fatality rates of 20-40% were reported in hospitalized patients.
Thousands of cases are believed to occur annually in regions of West Africa,
particularly Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria.  As of FY1979, management of Lassa
infection was largely symptomatic and supportive.  Specific treatment using immune
serum was attempted in a small number of patients, but was equivocal.  If treatment
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was delayed until after the onset of clinical signs, only the combination of ribavirin
plus immune serum was effective.594
Vaccine Research
In FY1980, work on animal models showed that rhesus monkeys inoculated
SC with only 12 PFU were uniformly killed by Lassa virus.595  Studies resulting in
the death of all nine monkeys challenged with aerosols of Lassa indicated that the
respiratory LD50 for Lassa was below the lowest exposure dose of 10^2.7 PFU.596
Monkeys exposed to Junin or Machupo viruses were not significantly protected from
Lassa virus challenge.597
In FY1989, CDC investigators demonstrated the efficacy of a Lassa-vaccinia
recombinant in guinea pigs and monkeys.598
Therapy
In FY1980, experiments in strain-13 guinea pigs showed that ribavirin
delivered either IM or by aerosol did not protect them from death after aerosol
challenge with Lassa virus, although it did significantly extent time-to-death.599
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In FY1982, 385 serum samples were obtained from Liberian patients acutely
ill with Lassa fever.600  By FY1986, collections of Lassa virus convalescent plasma
was underway and minimal protective titers against Liberian and Sierra Leone strains
were established.601  In FY 1988, the collection of Lassa-immune plasma in Liberia
was expanded and more plasma units were obtained, bringing the total inventory of
high-quality, Lassa-immune plasma unites to 817.  After processing, the plasma
retained all expected neutralizing activity in vivo, and conferred protection to guinea
pigs challenged with either Liberian or Sierra Leone Lassa strains.602  In FY1989, a
lot of IgG for human use was produced.603
Basic Research
Experiments were underway in FY1978 to test the environmental stability of
Lassa virus.  It was found to retain activity after dilution in tap water.604  Also in
FY1978, studies showed that the Josiah strain was the most virulent.
In FY1980, researchers demonstrated in vitro that the arenavirus Pichinde
inhibits the proliferation of macrophages, a step necessary for the development of
cellular immunity.  This possibly represented a novel mechanism for a virus to
subvert host resistance and possibly explained the immunosuppression observed in
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human arenavirus infections which occurred with no discernible morphologic damage
to the cell.  Inhibition was dependent on the dose and duration of exposure to the
virus and was blocked by a specific antiserum to PIC.605
In FY1986, Lassa virus RNA was prepared for cloning and sequencing to
facilitate construction of synthetic peptide and vaccinia-vectored Lassa virus
glycoproteins for use as vaccines.606
Botulinum Toxin
The botulinum toxins are a group of seven (A-G) related neurotoxins
produced by the spore-forming bacillus, Clostridium botulinum, and two other
Clostridium species.  These toxins are the most potent neurotoxins known.
Botulinum toxins can be delivered as an aerosolized biological weapon: the US
weaponzied it and there was evidence that Iraq had filled and deployed over 100
munitions with nearly 10,000 liters of botulinum toxin.  Symptoms may begin as
early as 12-36 hours after inhalation, but may take several days to develop after
exposure to low doses of toxin.607  Botulinum toxins are large proteins that are easily
denatured by environmental conditions.
In FY1978, work on all aspects of C. botulinum toxins was extended: there is
almost no work reported for the botulinal toxins in the years FY1969-FY1977.   In
FY1979, recognition of the logistical and medical problems with immunizing an
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entire at-risk population, led to studies of the basic mechanisms of action of bacterial
exotoxins to test available drugs or develop new ones with therapeutic potential.608
Botulinal toxins were just one of several studied (cholera toxin, pseudomonas
exotoxin A, diphtheria toxin).
Toxoids
Animal experiments showed that botulinum antitoxin was effective against
aerosolized toxin when given before the onset of clinical symptoms, but offered no
protection against respiratory failure once symptoms presented.609  Several antitoxins
are available: an equine antitoxin from the CDC for treatment of foodborne botulism;
a bivalent intravenous antiserum (types A and B) for treating infant botulism
(licensed in 2003 by the FDA); two “despeciated” equine antitoxins from
USAMRIID; and a commercially prepared heptavalent antitoxin available through
USAMRIID and CDC.  Human data on the safety and effectiveness of the heptavalent
antitoxin is not available and its use is not recommended except under extremely
specialized circumstances.
An equine antitoxin was available for the treatment of botulism, but was
responsible for adverse reactions in approximately 21% of recipients.610  In July 1978,
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the only U.S. commercial source of equine antiserum notified the CDC that they
would no longer provide the product.611
A pentavalent toxoid to types A, B, C, D, and E is available as an IND for
preexposure prophylaxis.  It will likely remain an IND because efficacy testing in
humans is not feasible.  Immunization involves three primary shots followed by a
booster at one year.  Since 2001, the potency of the available vaccine seemed to be
declining.612  Several thousand volunteers have received the pentavalent toxoid.
A polyvalent toxoid was prepared in 1958 by Parke, Davis, & Co., under
contract to Ft. Detrick.  It was made prior to purification of the neurotoxin from the
hemagglutinin.  It contained five antigens to types A-E neurotoxins.  At the time, full
knowledge of the neurotoxin was not available.  Thus the preparation contained less
than 10% of the desired immunogen: the basic course to produce satisfactory
antibody levels required four injections over a period of a year.  Although
immunogenic, this toxoid had a high reaction rate, creating a need for a new
polyvalent toxoid from purified neurotoxin.613  As of the mid-1970s, only limited
quantities of the toxoid were available – and then to only five (A-E) of the seven (A-
G) immunologically distinct types of botulinum toxin.  The CDC had responsibility
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for distribution of the Parke-Davis toxoid, and USAMRIID scientists estimated that at
then-current rates, the nation’s supply would be exhausted by spring, 1982.614
In FY1979, two lots (MDPH A-2 and MDPH B-1) of a newly bottle
pentavalent botulinum toxoid was tested in 52 volunteers and compared to the Parke-
Davis produced investigational pentavalent botulinum toxoid.  There were no
significant differences between the lots and no difference in systemic reactions (a
reduction in reactogenicity had been anticipated for the new lots because they
contained less formalin).615  The immune response elicited in volunteers by both
MDPH lots to type B toxin was significantly greater than the response from the
Parke-Davis toxoid.  As of FY1980, a total of eighty volunteers were immunized with
pentavalent botulinum toxoid, adsorbed, pentavalent (ABCDE) (IND 161).616
Because of the severe shortage of the Parke-Davis toxoid, USAMRIID
responded to a request from CDC by transferring 496 vials (4,960 doses) of
botulinum toxoid adsorbed pentavalent (ABCDE), MDPH Lot #A-2 to them.  The
MDPH toxoids were prepared by a method almost identical to that used by Parke-
Davis in the 1950s.  The toxoid is not stockpiled at USAMRIID or CDC: it was only
a “stop gap” measure until the new and improved USAMRIID-developed
neurotoxoids became available.617
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In FY1982, the conditions for conversion of type A neurotoxin to toxoid were
determined and a monovalent type E toxoid, Lot #7007, produced by the MDPH was
evaluated in human subjects.618  It proved to be a safe and efficacious product for the
induction of substantial titers of neutralizing activity to type E  botulinal toxin.619  It
was also shown that type E neurotoxin is less potent – and its effect shorter in
duration – than type A neurotoxin.
In FY1985, it was reported that botulinum type A toxoid preparations,
collected during varying stages of toxin purification and toxoided by formalin
treatment, were nontoxic when tested in mice and guinea pigs. Their immunogenic
strengths were compared to a known immunogenic monovalent botulism type A
toxoid prepared by the MDPH. As the amount of specific toxin protein was increased
in the toxoid (purer), resulting titers in immunized guinea pigs showed a significant
increase.620
In FY1985, a solicitation was issued for the development and production of
40,000 doses of a blended product that would contain type A,B,C,D,E, and F toxoids.
A second RFP was issued for developmental studies to evaluate the feasibility of
producing type G botulinal toxoid and including this toxoid in a final heptavalent
(ABCDEFG) product.  An option to produce eight million doses of either hexavalent
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or a heptavalent toxoid was included in the initial solicitation.621  It is unknown what
resulted from these RFPs.
In FY1986, for reasons not given, a decision was made to table further
development of a heptavalent toxoid.622  However work continued on evaluation of
the heptavalent toxoid, with approximately 180 persons at Ft. Detrick immunized
with the then-current botulinum vaccine.623  As a result of these investigations, the
institute immunization policy for Botulinum Pentavalent Toxoid was changed.624
Challenge Studies
Several conclusions were made in FY1978 as the efficacy of homologous and
heterologous (equine) antitoxin in preventing type A botulism in guinea pigs: (a)
homologous and heterologous antitoxin are similarly efficacious when administered 2
or 24 hours before, or 2 hours after exposure to lethal neurotoxin; (b) administration
of either antitoxin 24 hours before challenge is efficaciously superior to similar doses
of antitoxin administered 18 hours after challenge; (c) 14 days after passive
immunization, homologous antitoxin is protective and immunologically active at a
concentration that is at least 10-fold greater than that of heterologous antitoxin (so the
effective half-life of homologous antitoxin is much longer than that of heterologous
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antitoxin); (d) passive immunization with less than optimal protective amounts of
antitoxin can prolong survival time by a factor of at least 2.625
In FY1982, because considerable progress was made in determining the best
conditions for the production of highly effective botulinal immunogens, studies were
initiated to test the efficacy of current and newly developed botulinal toxoids against
an aerosol toxin challenge.626
Toxin Production
Efforts began in FY1978 to purify the neurotoxins of C. botulinum types A-G
for development of a polyvalent toxoid.  In that year, milligram amounts of C.
botulinum neurotoxin type A were produced and toxoided.  When adsorbed to
aluminum hydroxide, a satisfactory immunogen for development of antibodies was
produced.627  Production of the type A toxin in a 50-liter fermenter under various
conditions was examined and found to be much quicker than by static cultures of the
organism.  The Hall strain of C. botulinum was found to produce an increased
quantity of type A toxin per ml.
In FY1979, new improvements led to a yield of 300 mg of toxin in a single
fermentation run, the largest batch obtained.  The purification procedures used at
USAMRIID appeared in a scientific journal, Methods in Enzymology:  the authors
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acknowledged that they learned the procedures while on a three-day visit to
USAMRIID several years prior.628
In FY1980, the methods for production of type A toxin were adapted to
produce increased quantities of type B toxin.  The Okra strain produced a
concentration of 1 million medial lethal doses/ml in 24 hours in a 50-liter fermenter
under optimal conditions.629
In FY1981, the technology was developed for the fermenter-system
production of type E botulinal neurotoxin.630  This was the first time type E was
cultivated in a fermenter system.  Unlike type A toxin, for type E neurotoxin to attain
maximum toxicity, it needed to be activated and a method for doing so was
established.631
By FY1985, a new and simpler method for the purification of type E
neurotoxin was achieved.  30mg of type E neurotoxin had been purified and stored
and 35 mg of purified type B neurotoxin had been produced using the rapid and
efficient procedure developed for type E neurotoxin.632
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As of June 1988, supplies of purified botulinum neurotoxins were as follows:
Serotype A (36mg purified; 3mg used, 33mg on hand); Serotype B (112mg purified;
21mg used, 91mg on hand); Serotype C (41mg purified, 7mg used, 34mg on hand).633
Botulinum Immune Plasma (Equine and Human)
In FY1981, the army-owned horse, “First Flight” was hyperimmunized by the
use of botulinal toxoids to all common types (ABCDEFG) and subsequently with the
homologous botulinal toxins.  He was transported and housed and the University of
Minnesota.  From this horse, over 200 liters of Heptavalent Botulism Immune Plasma
(equine) were collected.  From this 350 ml of immunoglobulin of IV quality was
prepared with substantial neutralizing activity for all seven botulinal toxin types and
became available for emergency use.634
Annother project was underway as of FY1980 to collect human botulism
immune plasma.  As of FY1980, this program had yielded over 1200 liters of
Botulism Immune Plasma (Human) (IND #1332).635  By FY1981, 2000 liters of
plasma (human) was collected.636
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In FY1982, 500 liters of human-derived botulism immune plasma were
converted to botulism immune globulin and methods to fractionate and despeciate
heptavalent (ABCDEFG) Botulism Immune Plasma (Equine) were evaluated.637
Immunology and Therapy
Efforts to treat SEB toxemia involved the use of hemoperfusion of activated
charcoal, bicarbonate-induced alkalosis or tannic acid.  Neither tannic acid (5mg/kh)
nor bicarbonate-induced alkalosis (blood pH 7.5-7.6) provided any protection against
SEB in Dutch rabbits.638  However, 3,4-Diaminopyridine prolonged survival of mice
poisoned with a lethal dose of type A botulinum toxin.639 (Because equine antitoxins
neutralize free toxin, but are unable to reverse the toxin-induced blockage of
acetylcholine release that occurs within poisoned nerves, the aminopyridines were
studied because they can enhance acetylcholine release from botulinum-poisoned
nerve terminals.) 640  In FY1981, 4-aminopyridine was also found to be effective in
antagonizing the blockage of transmitter release resulting from botulinal poisoning.641
By FY1982, the compound 3,4-Diaminopyridine (3,4-DAP) was undergoing
the pilot drug stage of development as part of the broader effort to develop a
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chemotherapeutic approach to the treatment of botulism.642  In FY1985, studies
showed that 3,4-DAP significantly prolonged the survival of mice poisoned with type
A toxin, but was not effective in the treatment of mice poisoned with type B, E, or F
toxin.  Also, while survival was prolonged for type A toxin, it did not alter the final
outcome: once treatment was stopped, the mice still died from the intoxication.643
In FY1981, two efforts were underway to understand the structure and
mechanism of action of toxins with proven BW potential.  One employed the
diphtheria toxin model.644  The other involved in vivo studies with botulinum toxin
made possible by the development of two new cell lines (NG 108-15 and PC-12) that
synthesize acetylcholine and release the neurotransmitter in response to
pharmacologic or electrical stimuli.645
In FY1985, studies were underway to develop synthetic peptide vaccines.
Peptides were synthesized from a known amino acid sequence unique to type A, B, or
E neurotoxin, coupled to carrier molecules and used to immunize rabbits and the sera
then evaluated.646  While the animals produced high antibody titers, the antibody
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neutralized only a small amount of toxins.  Therefore, those particular peptides had
limited potential as candidate vaccines and therefore others were being evaluated.647
In FY1990, the efficacy of anti-BOT IgG and anti-BOT Fab fragments were
tested for their ability to protect non-human primates from botulinum toxin given by
aerosol.648
Detection
In FY1980, a rapid technique for the detection of type A toxin in various
fluids was refined.649  However, while the mouse bioassay was extremely sensitive, a
new method of detecting and assaying nanogram quantities of botulinal toxin was
desired because that assay was both time consuming and involved cumbersome
procedures.650
T-2Mycotoxins
USAMRIID’s interest in T-2 mycotoxins began after allegations of “yellow
rain” incidents in Laos (1975-1981), Kampuchea (1979-1981), and Afghanistan
(1979-1981), that resulted in 6,300 deaths, 1000 deaths, and 3,042 deaths in each
respective case.  Confirmation of the attacks has been difficult and controversial.
There is no specific antidote and no specific immunotherapy or chemotherapy.  The
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only defense is to prevent exposure by wearing a protective mask and clothing during
an attack.  Simply washing within an hour of exposure may entirely prevent
toxicity.651  The T-2 mycotoxins are small-molecular-weight compounds, extremely
stable in the environment, and dermally active.
Work at on the mycotoxins began at USAMRIID in FY1981. A threat analysis
study by the U.S. Army Medical Intelligence Agency determined that certain of the
small nonprotein toxins were potential BW agents. To help in the development of
medical defense against these toxins, it was necessary to develop a program for safe
handling and decontamination; rapid detection and identification; determination of
the molecular mechanism of action; elucidation of the pathogenesis and physiological
aberrations; development of methods of prevention, diagnosis and therapy; and
evaluation of potential aerosol threat from these small nonprotein toxins of BW
importance.  A dozen or more small nonprotein biological toxins were potential BW
agents. However, because of limitations in personnel and resources, it was decided to
carry out initial studies on T-2 mycotoxin and two marine toxins - saxitoxin and
tetrodotoxin.652
In FY1987, a decision was made to phase down work on trichothecene
mycotoxins; the technology developed was transferred for studies of other small-sized
toxins that were potential biowarfare agents, marine toxins (saxitoxin and
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brevetoxin); blue-green algal toxins microcystin and anatoxin-a; and coral toxins
(palytoxin).653
Pathogenesis
The first experiments involved the systematic study of the measure of toxicity
of T-2 toxin by various routes of administration.654   A year later, studies suggested a
plasma membrane receptor or transport system for T-2.655
By FY1982, a researcher at USAMRIID concluded that, contrary to the
literature, T-2 does not directly inhibit DNA synthesis.  Also, cross-reaction studies
concluded that the development of agents that would interfere with the binding step
would be attractive since protection from several of the tricothecenes should result.656
By FY1982, a SOP for liquid and powder samples of T-2 was established.  In
general, it was found that trichothecenes are stable compounds that can be kept at
room temperature in the dry state for a long time.  T-2 toxin is not inactivated by
autoclaving, but completely neutralized in temperatures in excess of 500 degrees F.657
Mice died between 12-24 hours after a subcutaneous injection of T-2 toxin of
one LD50 (2.01 mg/kg body weight).  T-2 caused marked destruction and depletion
of rapidly dividing cells of the host, coagulation abnormalities, alterations in many
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metabolic pathways, and decreased protein synthesis in cellular proliferation.  These
effects could lead to a shock-like syndrome and might be the eventual cause of
death.658  However, in FY1985, in vitro studies on inhibition of protein synthesis did
not correlate with data from mouse lethality studies, raising doubts as to whether
protein synthesis is the major mechanism of action.659
Other dose-response studies showed that higher doses of T-2 resulted in an
increased efficiency of penetration and that the administration route could markedly
influence the toxicity in the mouse lethality assay.660
In FY1985, studies of the molecular events leading to T-2 toxicity in cell
cultures was successful in identifying the transport system as the major factor
determining a tricothecene’s potency.661  Researchers quantified many aspects of T-2
binding to isolated ribosomes and found that virtually all tricothecenes bind to the
same site on the ribosome as T-2 does.  Because of this, protection at this stage of
action would be expected to cross-protect from a large number of tricothecene toxins.
In FY1987, it was found that the macrocycline trichothecenes were much
more slowly metabolized and excreted than the T-2 toxins.  A new class of such
toxins (mycotoxin B) was found to be 100 times more toxic than T-2 in the mouse
bioassay and twenty times more potent as a skin irritant.662
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Challenge Tests
In FY1982, propylene glycol was used as a solvent for T-2 toxin, allowing
ready aerosolization with an average particle size of three microns.  In rats exposed to
these T-2 aerosols, inhalation was not a markedly more lethal means of delivering T-2
than systemic exposure.663
In FY1985, aerosol challenge tests were done with Diacetoxyscirpenol (DAS),
a mycotoxin found in close association with T-2 toxin.  Like T-2, it was only slightly
soluble in water, but soluble in ethanol (ETOH) and dimethylsulfoxide (DMSO).
When aerosolized, both solutions produced droplets with an average size of less than
a microgram.  When rats were exposed to aerosols of DAS-ETOH, all succumbed,
while 50% died when exposed to DAS-DMSO.664
In FY1986, aerosol tests were completed in mice and rats exposed for ten
minutes to an aerosol of various concentrations of T-2 mycotoxin. T-2 was ten- to
fifty-times more potent when inhaled as compared to systemic exposure.  Researchers
concluded that the aerosol toxicity of T-2 mycotoxin is equivalent to that for nerve
agents and a log more toxic than aerosolized mustard.665   When these tests were
extended to the guinea pig model, T-2 was found to be twice as toxic when inhaled as
compared to the intravenous route.666
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Prophylaxis and Therapy
In FY1982, two radioprotective compounds, glutathione and cysteamine, were
screened for protective effect, but increased rather than decreased the toxicity of T-2
toxin in mice.667  Several classes of drugs seemed to be effective in reducing the
lethality of the toxin and attempts were underway to generate a vaccine by
FY1985.668
In FY1985, charcoal, dexamethasone, and glutathione prodrugs, as well as
soap and water decontamination were shown to be successful for combating
tricothecene exposure.  In addition, anti-T-2 antibodies were shown to be effective in
vivo, even post-exposure.669  When T-2 was given orally to animals, followed
immediately with activated charcoal, dexamethasone was 100% effective in
preventing T-2 intoxication.670
In FY1988, Emetine was found to block the binding of T-2 to target cells and
its molecular mechanism of action defined.671
Detection
In FY1985, an ELISA was developed that could detect T-2 or its metabolite in
organs of exposed animals.672 Reagents were being generated for production of test
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kits.673  As of FY1987, the methodology was developed for the immunodetection of
the major urinary metabolites of T-2 (H-2 and tetraol).  These products were detected
in rats and monkeys after IV and oral exposure using urine samples obtained within
two to three days of exposure.674  High-performance liquid chromatograpy (HPLC)
and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) were both used to trace the
metabolism of T-2 toxin in monkeys and allowed detection of T-2 at 100
picograms.675
Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B (SEB)
SEB is one of seven antigenically distinct enterotoxin produced by the
coagulase- positive S. aureus.  SEB is intoxicating by the aerosol route after a 3-12
hour latency period.  Exposure to high levels of SEB can result in toxic shock and
death.  Because of its ability to incapacitate large numbers of people for 1-2 weeks, it
was stockpiled by the US BW program.  When ingested or swallowed, SEB provokes
profound gastrointestinal symptoms.   There is no human vaccine available to prevent
SEB intoxication.  Immunity acquired through natural exposure does not provide
complete protection from an aerosol challenge.676  Work on SEB at USAMRIID
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encompassed several work units each year from FY1969-FY1982, after which
research on SEB diminished significantly.
Toxoid Studies
An SEB toxoid in use in FY1969 retained immunogenicity for at least 18
months when stored at 4C; vaccinated monkeys showed no significant decrease in
circulating antibody or in protection against challenge throughout the course of one
year.677  Rhesus monkeys given the toxoid were partially protected against illness and
lethal effects produced by SEB toxin given by the aerosol and IV routes.  It had a
safety margin at least ten times the proposed vaccination dose.678  Five production
lots of SEB toxoid was produced by Pfizer for USAMRIID, but three were found
unsatisfactory.  From the remaining batches, the optimizing immunization schedule
was found to be two doses of 50 micrograms antibody N 28 days apart.679
Work on a polyvalent toxoid that included S. aureus enterotoxins A, B, C, and
D and other exoproteins was underway in FY1970.  Cultural and toxoiding conditions
were determined for organism 10-275, a potent producer of alpha hemolysin and B
toxin, grown in a 10-liter fermenter.680  A polyvalent toxoid was prepared in FY1970
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utilizing purified enterotoxins A, B, and C protected monkeys 33-100% after oral
challenge with 40-400 micrograms/kg of purified exotoxins.681
Toxin Preparation
In FY1972, gram amounts of enterotoxins SEA, SEB, and SEC were
prepared.  The SEA previously used had an oral median illness dose (ID-50) of 40
micrograms/kg.  A procedure developed by Schantz resulted in a highly purified
enterotoxin A with an oral ID-50 of 4 micrograms/kg.  A SED toxin was prepared and
purified, too.682
In FY 1975, the conditions for large scale production of S. aureus exfoliative
toxin was developed.  This included optimal fermentor conditions for growth in a 50-
liter vessel, centrifugation, and concentration, purification, and lyophilization
methods.683  In addition, a procedure was developed for enhancing enterotoxin B
production of S. aureus: by this method one strain increased its enterotoxin
production 100-fold.  This method of isolating carbohydrate-negative mutants from
selected membrane mutants was believed to be a general method for enhancing
enterotoxin production starting with any wild type of S. auereus.684
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Pathogenesis
In FY1969 and FY1970, studies were still underway to understand the
mechanism of action of the toxin.  At high concentrations, it seemed that SEB toxin
acted directly on macrophages, but at lower doses, it inhibited macrophage migration,
due in part to SEB stimulation of lymphocytes to produce migration inhibition
factor.685
In FY1978, monkeys were given a lethal dose of SEB (50 or 100
micrograms/kg), with hemoperfusion started at 15 or 60 minutes after SEB
inoculation and continued for six hours.  (25 micrograms/kg IV is usually sufficient to
cause death).  Monkeys receiving the lower dose survived, but those receiving the
higher dose died.  The results suggested that once SEB is introduced into the
circulatory system, it is difficult to restrict the deteriorating processes which ensue.
The only way to diminish SEB toxicity is to remove the toxin from circulation.686
Detection
A solid phase RIA system was developed in FY1971 to assay SEB in body
fluids, broths, and purified forms.  The method was satisfactory for detecting as little
as 0.01 micrograms per milliliter of enterotoxins A, B, and C.687
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Basic Research
In FY1976, it was found – as had been reported for endotoxins – that total-
body irradiation prolonged survival and increased percentage survival in animals
inoculated with lethal doses of SEB.688  The mechanism of protection was
hypothesized to involve the reduction of circulating leukocytes as an effect of x-
irradiation: since SEB molecules bind to leukocytes, a reduction of circulating
leukocytes results in less SEB transported to the lungs where it would otherwise
cause pulmonary capillary damage and eventual edema.689
In other studies, the role of myocardial depressant factor (MDF) was studied
to understand its role in the pathogenesis of SEB shock and sever infections.690
Ricin
Work on ricin toxin was initiated in FY1989 at USAMRIID.  Ricin is a lethal
toxin when inhaled.  There is no vaccine or prophylactic antitoxin currently available.
Ricin was used in the assassination of the Georgii Markov in 1978 and several other
attempts were been made to use ricin powder (as recently as 2004).  It is considered a
terrorist threat because it is relatively easy to produce and use, but such large
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quantities (tons) would be required to cover a battlefield, that it is not considered a
likely weapon for large-scale use.691
In FY1989, two lots of ricin from different suppliers were evaluated in in vivo
and in vitro models.  The LD50 for mice was approximated at 3-4 micrograms/kg and
the 50% inhibition of protein synthesis in Vero cells was approximately 100 pg/ml for
both lots.  The biological activity of the isolated A and B chains of ricin were
evaluated in an attempt to find toxoid-vaccine candidates.692 Also in that year, an
ELISA for ricin was developed.693
In FY1990, active and passive immunization protected mice from the lethal
effects of aerosolized ricin, but pulmonary lesions were still seen.694   To protect
against the lethal effects of an inhaled pathogen or toxin, attempts were made in
FY1990 to protect the respiratory mucosa through the secretion of antigen-specific
immunoglobulins (Ig) of the IgA isotype.  IgA binds to the inhaled pathogen or toxin
and may be able to neutralize any direct effect (inflammatory and/or necrotizing) on
the mucosal tissue or impair transport of the antigen across the mucosal surfaces to
the systemic circulation.695  When inhaled, ricin produces a severe diffuse necrosis of
respiratory epithelium: this effect alone can cause death by asphyxiation from
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impaired gas exchange.  Therefore, although a humoral immune response (IgG) was
elicited in mice responding to systemic ricin, it was not sufficient because it did not
protect against the necrotizing effects.696
Mice vaccinated with ricin in Freund’s adjuvant or treated with goat antibody
survived a lethal challenge and there was ricin-specific IgA in bronchial lavage from
immunized mice before and after aerosol ricin challenge.  The ricin toxoid was not
toxic at 1,000 times the lethal ricin dose and vaccine studies showed it to be an
effective immunogen without adjuvant.   A bivalent vaccine was developed consisting
of whole ricin and saxitoxin that reacted with anti-saxitoxin and anti-ricin
antibodies.697
In chemotherapeutic studies, no drugs were found by FY1990 that provided
protection against ricin.
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of Vaccines Against Rift
Valley Fever / Advanced
Vaccine Develpment
Studies of Viruses of
Potential BW Threat Oct-83 Oct-90
Peters, CJ/
Lupton, HW,




Protection Against RVFV Oct-83 Oct-85
Dalrymple,
JM $4,400 0.3 2
A91C-LA-136
The use of mosquitoes as
an in vivo bioassay for





hemorrhagic fever in the
rhesus monkey Oct-72 Oct-78
Terrell, TG,
McLeod, C,










for use in cross-protection
antiviral chemotherapy














on Conventional Agents of









Viruses / Adv Studies for
the Dvlpmnt of
Immunotherapy Against
Viral Agents of BW
Threat Oct-83 Oct-90 Jahrling, PB $1,112,000 8.4 4
D809-DB-006 Antibody, Lassa Fever Mar-86 Oct-86 Jahrling, PB $3,000 0.1 0
Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses (Other





for vaccine development Oct-76 Oct-80
French, GR,





importance May-80 Oct-80 Cosgriff, TM $282,000 0.3 0
A870-BC-148
Prevention of Viral
Diseases of Potential BW
Importance Oct-80 Oct-82 Peters, CJ $5,235,000 39.2 26
AIDS
H29-AE-035
Advanced Studies for the
Devlopment of
Therapeutics Against





Microbial toxins and their






















Lymphoid cells in vitro in
BW defense Dec-70 Jul-74
Adler, WH,
DeRubertis, F,
Zenser, TV $209,000 4.0 1
096-02-802
Chemical modificatin of











production Aug-71 Oct-80 Spero, L $769,400 8.0 12
096-03-800
Immunological studies
with microbial toxins Oct-66 Jul-73
McGann, CH,















importance Feb-80 Oct-80 Lewis, Jr., GE $49,000 1.0 0
A841-00-072
Role of microbial toxins in




Microbial Toxins Oct-80 Oct-82
Lewis, Jr.,
GE, Crumrine,





Studies for the Dvlpmnt of
Toxoids Against Toxins of
Potential BW Threat Oct-83 Oct-90
Johnson, AJ /
FY86 Siegel,





Toxin Poisoning Oct-84 Oct-85 Davio. SR $75,000 0.5 1
D807-AK-022
Advanced Studies for the
Dvlpmnt of
Immunotherapy Against
Toxins of Potential Toxins









toxins of potential BW




Studies in immunization of
















Potential BW Threat Oct-80 Oct-82 Berendt, RF $1,352,000 13.7 7
A871-AJ-138
Aerosol Studies on Agents











Agents of Potential BW
Threat Oct-84 Oct-88
Stephenson,





to therapy in respiratory









and therapy of airborne














of transfer factor Aug-72 Oct-78
Marker, SC,
Ascher, MS $454,200 5.0 12
A841-00-005
Nonspecific enhancement
of resistance to infectious
diseases of potential BW
importance Dec-76 Oct-77 Janssen, WA $85,000 1.0 2
A841-00-028
Potential antiviral drugs
for treatment of virus
infections of possible BW






military importance Oct-76 Oct-80 Liu, CT $481,500 1.9 3
A841-00-065
Mechanism of action of
antimicrobial agents Sep-78 Oct-80 Canonico, PG $126,500 1.8 2
A841-00-070
Primary eval of drugs
against viruses of military
significance. Jan-80 Oct-80 Pannier, WL $103,000 1.0 0
A91C-00-140
Effects of antioxidants
upon the inactivation of
lipid-containing viruses Jun-77 Oct-78 Hedlund, KW $20,500 0.7 0
A870-BE-146
Exploratory Antiviral
Drug Development Oct-80 Oct-82
Brown, III J,










Kende, M $2,944,000 14.5 25
BS10-AQ-197
Enhancement of Host
Defense against agents of




Potential BW Importance Oct-84 Oct-85 Wannemacher $778,000 2.8 12
D807-AD-014
Exploratory Development




Biological Importance Oct-83 Oct-90
Canonico, PG
/ Kende, M





Man / Advanced Studies
(Non-system Dvlpmnt)
Against Infectious Agents
of Biological Origin Oct-85 Oct-90 Hammond, JB $1,538,000 6.0 13
D809-BA-004 Ribavirin Oct-84 Oct-90
Canonico, PG/
Huggins, JW $1,869,000 4.4 1
D847-BA-003 Ribavirin Apr-85 Oct-90
Canonico, PG,
Huggins, JW $4,115,000 4.4 13
D847-BA-005
Antiviral Drug, Ribavirin,





of military importance Apr-73 Oct-80
Houston, WE,
Harrington, D,










/ Amino acid, protein
changes, and RNA
metabolism in blood in
infectious disease Jul-65 Jul-79
Beisel, WR &







of unique importance in
military medicine / Effect
of infection on
















indices of infections of
unique concern to military
medicine / Effect of
bacterial and viral
infections on host cell
biosynthetic mechanisms. Oct-62 Jul-77 Powanda, MC $765,700 15.9 30
096-02-111/
A91C-00-138
Efficacy of zinc treatment
in experimental
endotoxemia and bacerial
sepsis Feb-76 Oct-78 Sobocinski, P $107,300 1.5 6
TOTALS $119,491,399 814.3 943
301



















Antibody Techniques Aug-61 Oct-69 Metzger, JF $0 0.0 0
096-03-007
Peritoneal Eosinophilia as
an Assay for Antigen-





and control of militarily
important infections Feb-71 Oct-77
DuBuy, JB,
Pekarek, RS,





Important Infections Apr-71 Jul-74 Powanda, MC $127,200 5.0 2
A841-00-060
Identification of bacterial
BW agents using a
chemiluminescent
immunoreaction
procedure. Nov-77 Oct-80 Reichard, DW $328,300 2.5 0
BS03-00-023
Biochemical events at the
cellular level: possible
early indicators of
infection Nov-77 Oct-79 Critz, WJ $187,800 1.0 0
BS03-00-027
Production and use of
endogenous pyrogen
antibodies in early
detection of infections of






Agents Apr-78 Oct-79 Reynolds, JA $139,300 1.5 0
A91C-00-141
Rapid detection of immune
complexes in infectious
diseases of unique military
importance Oct-76 Oct-80 Hedlund, KW $55,900 2.1 5
A870-BC-068
Technology Development




















chemical means. Dec-66 Jul-76
Ward, MK,
Wittrock, NJ,
Hawley, HB $413,400 5.0 1
096-03-104
Rapid identification of
bacterial agents by micro-
methods. Dec-66 Jul-74
Ward, MK,
Altenbern, RA $161,000 2.1 4
096-03-105/
A91C-00-133
Laser beam scattering for
rapid identification of




plasmids in pathogens of





hybridization Jul-79 Oct-80 Ezzell, JW $115,600 1.3 1
BS10-AR-196




agents/diseases Oct-81 Oct-82 Fonelo, R $137,000 3.8 0
BS03-00-024
Diagnosis and pathology
of Legionnaires' disease Mar-78 Oct-80 Hedlund, KW $966,400 8.5 4












early diagnosis of virus
infections and detection
and identification of
possible BW agents Feb-62 Oct-77 Buzzell, A $315,300 9.5 0
096-01-020/
BS03-00-013
Diagnostic value of acute-
phase proteins during
infections of unique


















disease research Nov-69 Jul-75
Caspary, WJ,
Hughes, FL $248,800 6.0 7
096-03-402
Development of tests for
early identification of viral






Complexes Nov-61 Jul-76 Levitt, NH $528,300 8.0 8
303
096-03-404




importance Dec-70 Jul-75 McManus, AT $298,900 4.0 4
096-03-406
Immunochemical studies
of variants of arboviruses Jan-73 Jul-73 Pedersen, CE $71,300 1.0 5
096-03-407
Morphogenesis and




based on singlet oxygen
fluorescence Feb-76 Oct-77 Canonico, PG $15,400 0.6 0
A841-00-063
Rapid diagnosis of viral
diseases of military
importance Jun-78 Oct-80 Rosato, RR $566,000 3 5
BS03-00-025
Cell Surface Expression of
Viral Antigens during the
Infectious Process Apr-78 Oct-80 Urbanski, GJ $134,600 2.6 0
BS03-00-033
Role of coated vesicles in
receptor-mediated
endocytosis of biological
substances Jan-80 Oct-80 Linden, CD $64,000 0.7 0
A91C-00-137
Laboratory diagnosis of
viral diseases of military





of viral antibodies and




vaccination and repair with




Agents and Their Vectors Oct-83 Oct-90
Bailey, CL,




and Diagnosis / Advanced
Studies for the Dvlpmnt of
Rapid Diagnostic
Procedures on Agents of











Clinical Specimens Oct-84 Oct-90 LeDuc, JW $1,930,000 10.8 5
TOXINS
096-03-006




Kaplan, J $307,000 5.0 6
TOTALS $16,784,700 167.9 260
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Glossary
BDRP Biological Defense Research Program
BFAC BioForensics Analysis Center
BKC Biodefense Knowledge Center
BTCC Biological Threat Characterization Center
BW Biological Weapons
BWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons, and on Their Destruction (or, the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention)
CBW Chemical and Biological Weapons
CDC US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CWS Chemical Warfare Service
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
EF Edema Factor
EID Emerging Infectious Disease
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
HEW Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
IC Intelligence Community
IND Investigational New Drug
IPMG Interdepartmental Political-Military Group
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LF Lethal Factor
LVS Tularemia Vaccine
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NBACC National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
NIAID National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease
NIH National Institutes of Health
NRC National Research Council
NSABB National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
NSF National Science Foundation
PA Protective Antigen
PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction
PHS Public Health Service
PSAC Presidential Scientific Advisory Committee
RMSF Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever
RVF Rift Valley Fever
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SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SEB Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B
SGO Arny Surgeon General’s Office
SPA Small Particle Aerosol
SPD Special Projects Division
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission
USAMU US Army Medical Unit
USAMRIID US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
VEE Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis
WHO World Health Organization
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WRS War Research Service
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